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ART. I.—THE FORM OF THE HUMAN SKULL, AND PARTICULARLY OF THE EARLIEST KNOWN SKULLS.

THE form of the human skull is a matter which has engaged the attention of anatomists for many years : with increasing insistence since Blumenbach, in the latter part of the eighteenth century, published his *Decas Collectionis suae Craniorum Diversarum Gentium* ; and is now, in these our own days, exciting a new and ever-enlarging interest. There is little cause for wonder in this when one reflects upon the fact that the shape of the human skull has, or is supposed to have, a very marked bearing upon that branch of the evolutionary question which deals with the origin of man's body. The skull, that is the cranial portion as distinct from the facial, is the enveloping capsule which protects the brain—the central organ of the nervous system—and the size, at least of the latter, can with some certainty be calculated from the capacity of the shell in which it lay. Hence a vast amount of attention has been paid to the examination of the skulls

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of the lower races, to the skulls of pre-historic men and women, and particularly to those few battered fragments which at present we regard as having belonged to some of the earliest denizens of this planet. It is no part of the intention of this article to deal with the question of evolution in its larger bearings, nor even of the evolution of man's body, the corporeal prison which encages his soul, and through the imperfect medium of which that soul strives to make itself known. It is no part of my intention to discuss this matter from its biological, its philosophical, still less from its theological aspect, but to occupy myself with a much less extensive tract of country. In a word, I propose to examine the craniological question and the views of experts upon it; and having brought forward those statements which bear most weightily upon it, to consider what light they shed on this particular question. I do not intend to discuss the larger question. I propose to ask myself simply, "How far do the facts which we have before us—here and now—bear upon the question? Are they for or against the probability of the evolution of man's body? Or do they, as far as they go, leave the matter in a wholly undecided condition?" Fr. Gerard, S.J., in a recent article in *The Month* on the subject of "Free-Thought," says that his opposition to the Darwinian theory, as commonly accepted, is on scientific grounds, because, as it seems to him, the evidence is all against it. And he goes on to add: "I have no antecedent quarrel with it, and am ready to accept it at once if it can only be shown to explain the facts. There can be no philosophical or theological objection to it which I can imagine." What we want, as Fr. Gerard says, is a sifting of the facts. We have had a terrible lot of theory-spinning of late, justifiable much of it, at least to a large extent, but I think it is time to cry out for a halt for the examination of spoils and the estimation of their real value. We are accustomed to have it dinned into our ears, often by persons who are perfectly incompetent to pronounce any opinion upon the subject, that such and such things are proved facts of science. Well, are they? Or are they merely more or less plausible theories? These

are the questions which I think we might well sit down and consider in connection with a good many things which some have been disposed to take for granted. With so much by way of introduction, let me now turn to the subject with which this article is mainly concerned—the form of the earliest known skulls. Before attacking this point, however, or rather in the course of our attack upon it, it will be necessary to clear the ground by considering briefly some of the methods which have been and are being adopted for the purpose of comparing different skulls and estimating and measuring the differences which exist between them. When we have studied these methods we can then consider certain points which arise in connection with the relations between the size of the skull and the size of the brain which it contains. We shall then be in a position to understand the bearing of the observations which have been made upon the group of skulls which we are to consider. In the first place, let me make it clear that I am dealing solely with the cranium proper, that is, the brain-box, and not with that accessory group of bones which forms the face, constitutes capsules for the organs of sight, smell and taste, and has to do with mastication. There are many interesting problems connected with that group of bones, but these must be left aside, for to treat of them in any way would unduly and unnecessarily add to the length of this article.

The first point which an observer would wish to ascertain about any given cranium is the actual measure of its capacity, for this, when once obtained, affords us a means of estimating the size of the brain which it contained. I need not tediously describe the process by which this figure of capacity is arrived at. Suffice it to say that, after all the holes leading from the cranial cavity, with the exception of the foramen magnum (through which the brain and spinal cord communicate), have been stopped up, shot or millet seeds or the like is poured into the interior of the skull and well rammed down, until the cavity is quite full. It is then an easy matter to empty the shot or seeds into a large glass measure and ascertain the capacity of the skull in cubic centimetres.

What do we learn from the measurements thus obtained? First of all we learn that amongst perfectly normal individuals in the human race the capacity may vary to the extent of double the minimum figure, that is to say, from 1,100 to 2,200 cubic centimetres, so that there is a very great range of variation in this particular.

About 1,550 cc. may be taken as the average capacity of European, and indeed of Asiatic, races. The average for Negro and Oceanian races is about 100 cc. smaller. Still smaller are the skulls of Australians, Bushmen and Andamanese. Indeed, the average of a group of skulls of Andamanese women only amounted to 1,128 cc. But here one has to pause and consider two points. First, one has to remember that the actual stature of the individual must be considered in its relation to the size—and, of course, therefore to the capacity—of the skull. A man of six feet four inches would look as absurd if he bore the head suitable for a woman of five feet as the latter would with the skull of her taller brother. Australians are persons of average stature, and their skulls are relatively somewhat small, but the inhabitants of the Andaman Islands are amongst the smallest races—not actually pigmy—now in existence. The average stature of the Andaman male is four feet six inches, *i.e.*, the height of a boy of ten or twelve years of age. Such a stature would not consort with a skull of average European size. What is remarkable, however, is that the Andaman skull is relatively larger in comparison with the stature than the European skull, though it is absolutely smaller. To be exact upon this point, it may be mentioned that the length of the head, from vertex to chin, is contained seven and a half times in the stature of an average European; whilst it is contained only seven times in the stature of an Andamanese. Hence his skull is relatively larger than that of a European. When we come to actual pigmies, such as those discovered and described by Stanley, where the stature varies from three feet to four feet six inches, the skull is still smaller; and though I know of no measurements of capacity which have been made on any skulls of this race, their cranial cavity must be considerably smaller even than that of the

Andamanese. As regards the skulls of more ancient races, it is often difficult or even impossible to ascertain the cubic capacity, because of the imperfection of the remains. But the capacity of a group of skulls belonging to the neolithic * period in France, from the cavern of l'Homme Mort, in the Lozère, gives us as the following measurements, which for the sake of contrasts may be compared with the measurements made of skulls of nineteenth century Parisians by the same observer Broca :

	No.	Men.	No.	Women.	Difference
l'Homme Mort ...	6 ...	1606 cc. ...	6 ...	1507 cc. ...	99 cc.
Parisians (xix c.) ...	77 ...	1559 cc. ...	41 ...	1337 cc. ...	222 cc.

From these figures we learn two things : first, that the modern Parisian skulls are actually smaller in size than those of the persons who occupied the same country at a very much earlier period, which is a striking enough fact. In the next place, they bring out the great difference in size which exists between the skulls of men and women, one of numerous secondary sexual differences, and one of the most striking of these differences. Of course to a great extent, almost entirely in fact, this difference in cubic capacity between the two sexes is accounted for by differences in stature ; but when we consider that, so far as these figures can teach us, the average difference between

* As I shall find it necessary to allude to certain technical terms used in connection with pre-historic archaeology, it may be advisable briefly to explain them for the sake of those of my readers who may be unfamiliar with that subject. Since we know of the existence of early races of men almost exclusively through the implements which they have left behind them, the terminology is founded, in the first instance, on these implements, and so we have a Stone Age, followed by a Bronze Age, and that again succeeded by an Iron Age. The Stone Age is divided into two—or sometimes three—main sub-divisions : a palæolithic or old stone age, during which implements were rough-hewn and never polished ; and a later, neolithic or new stone age, during which implements were sometimes, though not always, polished. Other minor differences of workmanship need not here be delayed over, nor need I dwell upon the probable existence of a mesolithic age between the two mentioned above. The palæolithic period is again sub-divided into periods by geological methods, that is, by the relative position in depth occupied by the objects discovered, and these deposits are called after the names of the places in which they were first discovered. As most of these discoveries have been made in France, and as the sequence is best followed in that country, the names adopted for the sub-divisions are taken from spots in that part of Europe. Leaving aside the possible existence of an eolithic race before palæolithic times, the divisions of the palæolithic period, commencing with the earliest, are as follows : Chellean, Mousterian, Solutrean and Magdalenian.

the skull of a Parisian man and a Parisian woman is twice as great as that between the skull of a European and a Negro, and as great as that between a European and an Australian; and when we admit, as we must, that the Parisian woman of the nineteenth century was not by any means lacking in brains, we begin to see that actual cubic capacity, within very wide limits too, does not much help us in gauging the intellectual capacity of the former owner of the cranium. Speaking of the Engis skull, then thought to belong to the Mammoth period, but now believed to be not earlier—if indeed so early—as the Magdalenian epoch, Huxley wrote: "It is, in fact, a fair average human skull, which might have belonged to a philosopher, or might have contained the thoughtless brains of a savage." And Deniker states that "the cranial capacity of lunatics, of certain criminals, and especially of celebrated or distinguished men, scholars, artists, statesmen, etc., appears to be slightly superior to the average of their race." So that we have a wide range for conjecture as to the character of its owner when we are confronted with a skull of more than ordinary cubic capacity, but we are not at liberty from that character alone, at any rate, to conclude that he or she was superior either in intellect or in morals to the possessor of some much smaller brain-case.

From measure of capacity we pass to measure of length. These indices, so-called, or expressions of one measurement in terms of another, are legion, and I shall content myself with dealing with two of them which are, for our present purposes, the most important. If we take a series of skulls and look down upon them from the top or convex surface, from the *norma verticalis*, as craniologists call it, the most careless observer will scarcely fail to note that whilst some of these skulls—if a sufficiently miscellaneous lot has been chosen—are nearly as wide as they are long, others are much longer than they are wide. In a word, some heads are—literally, not metaphorically—long, some broad. To express this relation of length and breadth numerically is the object of what is known as "the horizontal cephalic index," or sometimes, from its paramount importance, "the cephalic index." The length is

measured from the *glabella*, or surface above the root of the nose and between the eyes, to the *inion*, or external occipital protuberance, a knob of bone at the back of one's head which every person can easily make out. Then the greatest breadth is taken—usually just above the ears. The last of these measurements is multiplied by 100 and then the result is divided by the length. The following formula indicates the process :

$$\frac{\text{Transverse Diameter} \times 100.}{\text{Antero-Posterior Diameter.}}$$

Those skulls which are much longer than they are broad are called dolichocephalic, the broad skulls are called brachycephalic, and the intermediate group mesocephalic. Different writers have assigned different limits for these three groups, but the following table may be taken as fairly representing the present state of opinion on this point :

Dolichocephalic	58.0	...	74.9
Mesocephalic	75.0	...	79.9
Brachycephalic	80.0	...	103.0

It will thus be seen that the extreme variations permit of the existence of a skull which is nearly twice as long as it is broad (Deniker), and of one which is actually broader than it is long (Ripley). Summing together a few points which have been gleaned from the consideration of facts learnt by means of this index we can, in the first place, state that all the most ancient skulls at present known to us are dolichocephalic. This is a somewhat striking fact, but it is not, as we shall see, correlated with any necessary intellectual inferiority in long-headed races or persons.

Then, in the next place, we can state that the different varieties of shape are not confined to special parts of the world, but are more or less scattered and intermixed. Huxley, in his picturesque and striking manner, stated that the subject of the distribution of head-forms might be summed up in a very few words. "Draw," he said, "a line on a globe from the Gold Coast in Western Africa to the steppes of Tartary. At the southern and western end of that line there live the most dolichocephalic, prognathous, curly-haired, dark-skinned of men—the true

Negroes. At the northern and eastern end of the same line there live the most brachycephalic, orthognathous, straight-haired, yellow-skinned of men—the Tartars and Calmucks. The two ends of this imaginary line are indeed, so to speak, ethnological antipodes. A line drawn at right angles, or nearly so, to this polar line through Europe and Southern Asia to Hindustan would give us a sort of equator, around which round-headed, oval-headed, and oblong-headed, prognathous and orthognathous, fair and dark races—but none possessing the excessively marked characters of Calmuck or Negro—group themselves.” This striking generalisation must nowadays be corrected by rather more accurate figures, based on more extended observations. The general position may be summed up in two quotations from Deniker. “There is,” he writes, “a certain regularity in the distribution of the different cranial forms on the surface of the earth. Dolichocephaly is almost exclusively located in Melanesia, in Australia, in India, and in Africa. Sub-dolichocephaly, diffused in the two extreme regions north and south of Europe, forms in Asia a zone round India (Indo-China, Anterior Asia, China, Japan, &c.), but is met with only sporadically in other parts of the world, especially in America. Mesocephaly is frequent in Europe in the regions bordering on the sub-dolichocephalic countries, as well as in different parts of Asia and America. Sub-brachycephaly, much diffused among the Mongolians of Asia and the populations of Eastern Europe, is very rare elsewhere. Lastly, brachycephalic and hyper-brachycephalic heads are almost exclusively limited to Western and Central Europe, to some populations of Asia, Turko-Mongols, Irano-Semites, and Thai-Malays.” And again, excluding the sub-classes, the nature of which will be readily understood without any detailed explanation, and dealing only with the three main categories, he writes :

“We see that generally the crania of Negroes, Melan-
esians, Eskimo, Ainus, Berbers, the races of Northern
Europe, etc., are dolichocephalic, while those of the
Turkish peoples, the Malays, certain Slavs, Tyrolese, etc.,
are brachycephalic ; that the dolichocephalic predominate

in Great Britain, while the brachycephalic are in a majority in France." Finally, it may be stated that, as these facts alone would be sufficient to show, the horizontal cephalic index tells us nothing about intellectual characters. This statement will be strengthened when we consider that the Chinese, a conspicuously long-headed race, by no means intellectually deficient, are surrounded by barbarian brachycephalic and very brachycephalic hordes, and that in many respects the very dolichocephalic Eskimo surpass the more brachycephalic Indians in culture. Nor is there any class difference, for in Italy Dr. Livi found that whilst in the northern part of the country the professional classes were longer headed than the peasants, a diametrically opposite condition prevailed in the south. Comparing brain-weight with skull-shape, Calori has shown that whilst among Italian men the brachycephalic have on an average twenty-seven grammes of brain more than the dolichocephalic, amongst Italian women the dolichocephalic have the better of the brachycephalic by twenty-one grammes. A curious example of the fact that the cephalic index tells us nothing about intellectual capacity is to be found in the measurements of the heads of a group of thirty-six anatomical teachers in universities and medical schools which were taken at a meeting held in Dublin in 1897. Amongst these gentlemen were a few Germans and Belgians, as well as Irish, English and Scotch. Well, the result, so far as the horizontal index is concerned, is very curious. Amongst so few persons there is a range from 86.5, the most brachycephalic, to 72.2, the most dolichocephalic, and between those figures every gap is filled up, that is to say, there is no complete numeral unrepresented, some measuring 85 odd, some 84 odd, and so on to the lowest. As a matter of fact, fifteen in the list were brachycephalic, fourteen mesocephalic and seven dolichocephalic. The late Canon Isaac Taylor, in his book on *The Origin of the Aryans*, tried to show that the shape of the head had something to do with intellectual faculties, and even with the form of religion professed by its owner. He tells his readers that the dolichocephalic Teutons are Protestant,

the brachycephalic French Catholic, and the mesocephalic Englishman neither one nor the other, but something between the two, which, as he is writing a scientific book, he does not try to define. Now the Canon was not right in his fundamental facts, for England is predominantly dolichocephalic, as Ripley has shown, and not mesocephalic; but if he had been right in this statement, the facts which I have brought forward will show how absurd and useless it is to attempt to gauge the intellectual characters of its owner by the length and breadth of his skull. Even our popular phraseology is here incorrect, for if the balance inclines either way at all it is against the "long-headed" man and in favour of the "broad-headed."

A further index, which, being less important, will not be dealt with at such length, is the altitudinal, that of height to breadth or length. Without going into any minutiae on this subject, it must be quite clear to the most casual observer that some persons have high, some low heads. In the language of craniologists, we have platycephalic or low-headed, hypsicephalic or high-headed, and orthocephalic or medium persons. Here again, within limits, the height of the head has nothing to do with intellectual characters. Within limits, I repeat, because there is a group of skulls called microcephalic, and housing brains of deficient character, in fact the brains of idiots. With this group I am not concerned. Microcephaly is a very interesting subject, and presents us with the important problem—still unsolved—as to whether the brain stops growing and therefore the skull does not expand but remains small, or whether the prime offender is the skull, which closes its sutures too soon and so prevents the brain from proceeding to its normal development. I must not allow myself to be drawn aside into the interesting points suggested by a consideration of the question of microcephaly, and I will, therefore, guard myself from misconception by stating that in all the remarks which I make with regard to the size and shape of skulls I am dealing only with those which may be regarded as normal for their sex and race, and not with pathological skulls, to which class the microcephalic crania belong.

As I have previously said, the indices which have been invented for measuring and estimating different points in connection with the skull are legion, and when one reads papers like those of Schwalbe's on the Neanderthal or Trinil skulls one finds it at first very difficult to see the wood for the trees. Then, when one has got the focus and sees what is the outcome of this mass of measurements and figures, and how small, how highly disputable, and, therefore, how comparatively valueless it is, one is tempted to exclaim of indicial craniology: "All that I know is nothing can be known."

That the present state of craniology is largely one of pure chaos is my firm belief, and lest this remark be taken as a mere *ipse dixit* I will quote a very recent instance in proof of my statement. Professor Thompson, of Oxford, has just published with a colleague a most elaborate work, containing measurements of 1,561 Egyptian skulls from the Thebaid and extending in period from the Pre-Dynastic races, through many of the Dynasties down to the Ptolemaic and Roman periods. It seemed desirable to separate off those skulls having a negroid character from those unaffected in this way, and the Professor lays down certain indices by which this may be done, and proceeds to separate his crania into the two groups—negroid and non-negroid—by the help of these indices. Before his book had been given to the public a month a letter appeared—an unnecessarily bitter and unpleasant letter, in my opinion—from Professor Karl Pearson, another great pundit of the weight and measurement school of biologists, in the columns of *Nature*, in which that Professor writes: "Two distinguished Oxford men of science have given a very simple series of conditions by which crania can be classed into skulls of negroid, non-negroid and intermediate types. These conditions depend entirely on a classification of nasal and facial indices, and by their processes our authors are able to distinguish between the negroid, non-negroid and intermediate types among pre-historic Egyptian crania." Then he goes on to state that he has applied the rules to two groups of skulls: "First, to a fairly long series of admittedly negro crania, all males. I

find that 7.3 per cent. are non-negroid, 39.0 per cent. are truly negroid, and 53.7 per cent. are intermediate. It is clear that we only need to let the negroes change their skins and that a sensible percentage will be non-negroid. Secondly, to a fairly long series of English skulls, male and female, I find of Englishmen 20 per cent. are negroid, 46 per cent. non-negroid, and 34 per cent. are intermediate in type. Among Englishwomen 11 per cent. are negroid, 48 per cent. are non-negroid, and 41 per cent. are of intermediate type. Thus of the whole English population slightly more than 50 per cent. are either pure negroid or partially negroid; while in an outwardly pure negroid group, upwards of 60 per cent. are non-negroid or mixed with non-negroid elements." And he concludes with the ironical remark "that the Englishman should have as large a negroid element in his constitution as the pre-historic Egyptian, and only half as little pure negroid element as admitted negroes," is to his mind "an epoch-making discovery." I do not think that one could desire a better example of the uncertainty and, therefore, of the uselessness of many indices as racial tests than that which I have just quoted.

It was possibly, in part, a feeling of this kind which induced Sergi, a distinguished Italian craniologist, to propose his natural system, which is based on the shapes of the skull, as viewed from the *norma verticalis*, which shapes he believes to be "persistent alike in geographical distribution and in the order of time, and therefore reliable elements for classification." Moreover, he claims that the "interior" or skeletal parts are "not affected by the external influences of habitat, climate or nourishment." Hence it follows that his types are hereditary—which all would admit, within limits—and unalterable—which is a much larger postulate and one with which I cannot now deal. In any case this criticism may be made of Sergi's system. It is not hard for any trained observer to place a skull in its proper class according to this classification; to indicate whether it is ellipsoid, pentagonoid, ovoid, beloid or sphenoid, if the skull is fairly well-marked in its shape. But to decide upon those on the borderland between these

main shapes, or to go further and allot skulls to the numerous sub-classes laid down by Sergi, is a much more difficult process and one which must necessarily be tainted by that which we should always strive to eliminate, namely, the personal factor. Professor Thompson admits this in the work from which I quoted a short time ago: "The refinements of some of his (Sergi's) classifications," he says, "are such that it would have been impossible for us to have grouped the [our] specimens without running the risk of, in some instances at least, falling into error." It will be admitted that a system which can only accurately be carried out by one man is of little use to the world of science, and in spite of the very ingenious method for geometrically getting over the difficulty which has recently been devised by Dr. Wright, Sergi's system is not at present one which affords much assistance to workers. But I am firmly of opinion that in this direction, and not in that of never-ending indices, lies the hope of craniology in the future.

The interest of the skull, as we have seen, is mainly due to the fact that it is the receptacle and fortress of the brain, and we may therefore turn for a few moments to a consideration of the relations between the two and to certain points which call for mention in connection with this matter. In the first place, it may be pointed out that whilst we have records of a large number of weights of European brains, we have very few, in comparison, of other races. There are records by Topinard of 11,000 brain-weighings amongst adult Europeans, and the next largest series, that of Negroes, only amounts to 190 examples. But we can in some measure get over this difficulty by obtaining the cranial capacity of the skull and multiplying it by the co-efficient 0.87, first suggested by Manouvrier, by which process we obtain a reasonably accurate estimate of the weight of the brain.

Now from the various weighings and measurings we find that the average weight of the male European brain is 1,361 grammes and of the female 1,290. The weights of the Negro brains are not much lower. The difference ascertained by Manouvrier—from estimation of weight as

deduced from cranial capacity—between modern Parisians and the lowest races examined was 196 grammes. But weighings even of individuals of the same race give very curious and conflicting results. For example, one observer from the weighing of twenty-eight brains obtained an average for the Englishman of 1,388 grammes. Another observer, from a series of 425 brains, obtained an average for the same race of 1,354 grammes. The difference between these two averages is greater than the differences between the average weight of the European brain and that of the brain of Annamites, as determined by a small series of actual weighings; and it is not much less than the difference between the average European brain and the average Negro brain as determined by actual weighings. As a matter of fact, within limits always, the size and weight of the brain is but little correlated with the intellect of its owner. Even from the physical point of view, the larger part of the brain has little to do with the question, for it is the cortex, with the contained neurons, cell, axis-cylinder and prolongations, which really counts, and there is no means of ascertaining what the variations of weight of the cortex are (it is perhaps usually about 37 per cent. of the brain weight, but this figure must have many variations) from the cranial capacity, or even from the brain itself, still less of enumerating the neurons which it contains or the connections which they possess. "How far are we, then," says Deniker, "from the true appreciation of cerebral work, with our rude weighings of an organ in which, with one part that would assuredly help us to the solution of the problem, we weigh at least three other parts having nothing, or almost nothing, to do with it? And even if we succeeded in finding the number, the weight, and the volume of the neurones, how are we to estimate the innumerable combinations of which they are capable? The problem appears almost insoluble."

Within limits, then, the size of the brain has little or no correlation with the intellectuality of its possessor. But within what wide limits. Let us take the lower limit and see how small a brain may be associated with average, or even more than average, abilities. I leave aside the

question of the brains of small and pigmy races, though on that point it may be said that the Andamanese and other small races appear to have intelligences fully as great as those of other savage, uneducated and undeveloped races. But I will take another instance which will bear out the point which I wish to make—that the size of the brain is not an index to the intellectual capacities of its owner. Amongst the dwarfs who have been publicly exhibited there was in existence some few years ago a little creature of the name of Paulina Musters, better known as “Princess Paulina.” She was twelve inches in length at the time of her birth, and at her death—which took place in her nineteenth year—she measured but nineteen inches, being thus the size of an ordinary baby. Her usual weight was from seven and a half to nine pounds. She performed many feats when exhibiting herself, and, more than this, is described by the medical man who attended her in her last illness as being “of a good general education and speaking four languages—her native Dutch, French, German and a little English.” The length of her head from chin to forehead was only five and a half inches, and though her brain was not examined after her death, one can imagine what a tiny structure it must have been when we consider that forty-five ounces is an average weight for a female brain and that her body only weighed from 120 to 144 ounces. Yet she was able to do with it as much or more than others do with brains probably three or four times as heavy. One other curious point in connection with this little woman must not pass unnoticed. All medical men know that children must be given smaller doses of medicine than adults; sometimes, in the case of powerful drugs, very much smaller doses. I suppose if one were to be asked why this is, one would say that it is because children are smaller and their bodies have not the resisting force inherent in those of larger size. When the doctor was called in to see Paulina he found it necessary to administer heart stimulants, and he did what I am sure any other medical man would have done, prescribed them in children’s doses. To his surprise he found that they did not act as they would have done in the case of a child, and he was obliged to ad-

minister the full adult dose in order to secure the effect which he desired. Here the body was as small or smaller than that of most children, so that we can only explain the facts by supposing that the resisting power was in the nervous system, and that that system had the adult powers though it fell so far short of the adult size. Powers of this kind, whatever they may be, cannot then be measured by the size of the organ with which they are associated. They belong to a region where weights and measures avail us nothing.

We have already seen that the shape of the skull, so far as the cephalic index is concerned, and the same is true—within limits—of the altitudinal index, has no bearing upon the intellectual powers. We may go further than this and say that extreme and unusual shapes of skull in otherwise normal and non-pathological persons do not interfere with the operations of the brain. Fashion has here dictated for us a series of experiments which no medical man would ever have dared to carry out. Amongst many races the fashion of modifying the shape of the head by keeping it wrapped in tight bandages during the period of growth has held sway, and the way of applying these bandages with the consequent distortion has been varied in several directions. In France, and more particularly in South America, among the indigenous natives of that part of the world, strange shapes of head have been produced by these means. The Natchez Indians, the Aymaras, the Toltecs and the Chinchas have all adopted these means of modifying the head, and have produced, now an exceedingly flattened, now an unduly high, a grooved or a trilobed cranium. The custom was so prevalent as to have been actually forbidden by the Synod of Lima in 1585, and again interdicted by the Governor of the same place nearly two hundred years later. These actions were dictated by the supposed evil influence produced upon the health by this treatment of the head, and it is possible that it may have predisposed to some complaints, though there does not seem much evidence that it did so. But what effect had it upon the mental powers? None, so far as we know from the records of the French examples, whilst so far as regards

the American cases, Topinard, when considering this point, says that it is to be remarked that the races of America which had the least respect for their cranial form were those who, like the Aymaras and the Toltecs, had attained the maximum of prosperity in the new continent and have left the most marvellous monuments behind them.

Turning now to the question of the oldest known skulls, one is first confronted by the difficulty of coming to a conclusion as to the real age of any given example, of the time, that is—even, be it particularly observed, the *relative* time—at which its former owner lived upon the earth. For collocation of objects does not always mean contemporaneity. To take an instance which will make my meaning clear, a murderer might bury the remains of his victim, unclothed and destitute of any accompanying objects, in a bank of glacial drift, perhaps even amongst the remains of the elephants of an early age. Years afterwards excavation might accidentally reveal the existence of the skeleton of the victim. Would it be right to regard it as having belonged to the date of the mammoth because the two sets of remains were found together? I have selected a not very likely instance, though a possible one, but any person can easily imagine for himself a score of different ways in which the bones of a man of very much later date might be found in relation of locality to objects of an earlier period. Hence the first thing that one has to do in the case of any given find of human remains, which might be assumed to belong to a remote period, is to make certain that it is to this period that they do belong, and not to one much later. As we shall see from some of the instances I shall bring forward, this is by no means an easy matter, and as a result there are very wide divergences of opinion even amongst those most competent to speak on such matters, on this very point of age. When Huxley wrote his *Man's Place in Nature*, in 1863, one of the two skulls to which he directed most of his attention was that found at Engis, in the valley of the Meuse, in Belgium. This skull, he assigns, on the high authority of Sir Charles Lyell, to the mammoth period. Yet according to Deniker, a writer of

the present day, this skull only possibly belongs to the Magdalenian period, which is much nearer our own time than the Mousterian or mammoth era, and no one would, I suppose, now claim that the Engis skull was one of the most ancient group. Some have even thought that it may be neolithic. Again, according to Topinard, Boule, and most other authorities, the remains found at Castelnedolo in Italy are purely an interment, as to the date of which no certain opinion can be formed, whilst Sergi still maintains that they may be the remains of tertiary man. It is obvious that it would be very dangerous to found any theory on data so uncertain as these, and I might go further and point to the Cro-Magnon, Cannstatt, Furfooz and Solutré skulls, all of which have at one time been assigned to a considerably earlier period than would now generally be allowed to them. As a matter of fact, out of forty-six skulls which have at one time or another been claimed to be quaternary, Deniker, one of the most recent authorities, only admits seven as certainly belonging to that period. Amongst those he does not even reckon the Neanderthal skull, over which so much ink has been shed. This celebrated skull was the second dealt with by Huxley in the book mentioned a few lines above, and for various reasons some space must be devoted to it, even though it be not now admitted by all to belong to the most ancient times. Some do still assign to it a very early date, Sergi, for example, going so far as to say that "it is definitely accepted that the Neanderthal skull is the most ancient witness to the appearance in Europe of man with well-defined osteological characters." It is rather curious that the book from which this extract is taken should have appeared in the same series as that in which Deniker's book also appeared in the previous year (1900), where the statement occurs that "perhaps we should refer to this (the Mousterian) period the skulls which cannot be definitely traced to a certain alluvial bed, like those of Neanderthal, &c." But I shall show very shortly how wide have been the divergences of opinion in connection with this skull. It is an incomplete fragment of a skull, the vault or vertex has very prominent ridges above the eyes

and a very small altitude. This skull was found in 1857 in a cave in the Neanderthal, near Dusseldorf, and on its first discovery was declared to be that of a being, if man at all, of a race inferior to any now existing upon the earth. But, by degrees, more careful examination led to the adoption of totally different opinions. Setting aside the statements of those who saw in it a pathological skull, and there were those who held that view, it soon became clear that it was a skull which in many respects resembled those of persons still in existence upon this earth, not to speak of others whose remains are left to us. Huxley declared that this skull was in no sense intermediate between the skulls of men and apes, and Sir William Turner showed that its characteristics are closely paralleled both in skulls of existing savage races and even in occasional specimens of modern European crania. Moreover, he claims that the large transverse parietal diameter—or breadth, as we might put it—compensated for the brain space lost by the retreating forehead and flattened occiput. Perhaps, however, Schwalbe's conspectus of the differences of opinion as to this skull, published in his paper of 1901, will, more eloquently than anything else, illustrate the conflict of opinion which has raged round it. And it may be added that other views as to this skull might have found a place in this conspectus. Here then is the list of opinions :—

I.—It is no typical skull, but is a modified individual type.

1. The modification has occurred through too early union of the sutures which separate the individual bones of the skull from one another.—Barnard Davis.

2. The skull belonged to an idiot.—Blake, C. Vogt (at one time), Pruner-Bey (at one time), Hölder, Zittel.

3. The skull shows so many pathological changes, as indeed does the whole skeleton, that it cannot be taken as the type of a race.—Virchow (1872), Ranke.

II.—The skull is one belonging to a still existing race.

1. It is quite a recent Kossack skull.—Mayer.

2. It belongs to a historic race.

(a) Old Kelt or German.—Pruner-Bey (at one time).

(b) Old Dutch or Frisian.—R. Wagner.

(c) Frisian.—Virchow (1876).

III.—The skull belongs to a primitive human race, but is connected by intermediate forms (neanderthaloid) with the lowest existing primitive races.

1. Shows similarity to Australians.—Huxley, Lyell, C. Vogt (at one time), Quatrefages and Hamy.

2. Belongs to the oldest palæontological dolichocephalic race, the Cannstatt race.*—Hamy, Quatrefages and Hamy.

IV.—It belongs to a race differing widely from existing races, the Neanderthal race.—Schaafhausen, Fraipont and de Lohest, de Mortillet, Sergi.

V.—The skull belongs to a form which differs specifically and *perhaps generically* from all recent human races.—King, Cope, Schwalbe. I need not comment upon the impossibility of founding any certain arguments on a skull concerning which scientific men have so much differed, and concerning which some of them have even maintained at different times wholly different theses.

Yet, in the most recent text-book on Zoology,† I find the following statement: “Man is not known fossil till the Pleistocene. He is there represented by *H. sapiens*, and by an extinct species, *H. primigenius*, Schwalbe (*neanderthalensis*) from the Neanderthal (1856), from Spy (1885), and from Krapina in Croatia (about 1899), and possibly from other localities. This extinct species is not thoroughly known, but it clearly belongs to a lower grade of organisation than *H. sapiens*.” Whether, in the teeth of the extraordinary divergence of opinion, not merely as to relative date, but as to general characteristics, which the conspectus just given so clearly betrays, a dogmatic assertion of the kind just quoted is in any way justifiable, my readers can judge for themselves.

Let us now pass to the consideration of the various skulls

* According to Deniker, there are no data which make it possible to assign any date to the Cannstatt skull.

† By Adam Sedgwick. 1904.

which may be reasonably assigned to the Mousterian period, and to one other skull which has attracted a great deal of attention in late days—that discovered at Trinil in Java.

The two Spy skulls were found in 1886 in a terrace at the mouth of a cave in the province of Namur in Belgium. According to Boule, they are satisfactorily dated and clearly Mousterian. They are dolichocephalic and present features which connect them with the least developed races of men. Even Cope, who, as we have seen, is a supporter of the view that the Neanderthal skull is specifically different from the skulls of existing human races, admits, in connection with the Spy skulls, "that there is still, to use the language of Fraipont and de Lohest, an abyss between the man of Spy and the highest ape." With the skulls in question were found certain other parts of the skeleton. It was claimed by their discoverers that certain anatomical characters of the lower end of the femur or thigh-bone, and of the upper end of the tibia or shin-bone, were of an ape-like character, and that the man or being to whom they belonged could not have stood upright. Advancing knowledge has completely overthrown this view, for Thompson, Manouvrier, and Charles have shown that the characters in question, instead of being in any way associated with an inability to stand upright, were simply the result of the customary posture of squatting, which many, if not most, modern savages adopt when at rest, and which was, no doubt, adopted by these early savages also. The extreme inaccuracy of the view first put forward and its complete refutation have been well illustrated by Manouvrier's observation, that the retroversion of the head of the tibia—the feature in question—is often met with amongst modern Parisians in a degree superior to that exhibited by anthropoid apes.

The Eguisheim skull was discovered in 1865 in undisturbed relation with bones of *Elephas primigenius*, *i.e.*, the mammoth. It has prominent ridges above the eyes and a retreating forehead, is very dolichocephalic, and has simple sutures which are nearly effaced. It has been very fully described by Schwalbe, who says that the frontal

region is less receding than the skulls of the Neanderthal group. In fact, in some respects it resembles the skulls of the modern Alsatians, and in all respects it approximates to the ancient dolichocephalic race of Bollweiler, which Collignon connected with the Cro-Magnon (a probably meso-lithic) race.

The Olmo skull is believed by Deniker to be Mousterian. It was found in 1863 fifty feet below the surface in a blue lacustrine marl-bed. De Nadaillac and Boyd Dawkins consider this to be a neolithic skull, because a flint arrow point was found near it, others (*e.g.*, Mortillet) think it is Mousterian. d'Acy thinks it is pre-Mousterian and the most ancient of all known skulls, but most careful persons would agree with Salmon that "judgement must be suspended on this find, surrounded as it is by so much doubt."

The Podbaba skull was found near Prague in 1883, in undisturbed brick-clay 13 feet deep, near remains of the mammoth, &c. It resembles the Neanderthal type in the large ridges above the eyes and in the depressed frontal region.

The Predmost skull, found in Moravia, is of the same period and of similar characters as the last.

The Krapina skulls were discovered a few years ago in a grotto on the banks of the river Krapinica, in Croatia. As we have just seen, they have been claimed to be relics of the "extinct" race of *H. primigenius* (Schwalbe). Since the work in which that claim is made has appeared, a paper on these bones and the relics found with them has been published in *L'Anthropologie*, the leading French journal on the subject of prehistoric antiquities. It is interesting to read the description there given. Fragments of ten or twelve skulls have been discovered. "Les sinus frontaux étaient bien développés, et ces crânes sont caractérisés par de très fortes arcades sourcilières; néanmoins, le front est haute et porte des bosses pariétales très développées. Il n'y a qu'un seul individu à front bas et fuyant. En résumé, il s'agit à Krapina d'une race ancienne très intéressante, de grande taille, qui n'a pas de véritables caractères pithécoïdes. Elle se distingue de la

race de Spy par son hyperdolichocéphalie et par la hauteur du front. Nous ignorons jusqu'à quel point beaucoup de ses peculiarités ostéologiques peuvent être considérées comme propres à une 'race,' jusqu'à quel point elles sont individuelles et due seulement aux conditions difficiles de la vie primitive." It would be interesting to know in what respects this race, or the group of skulls under consideration, to use a non-committal term, can be said to belong to an "extinct" species, and why they should be grouped in that species with the Spy skulls, from which they are expressly said to differ in two very important characters, and with the Neanderthal cranium, from which also they appear to differ in a marked manner.

Such, then, are the most important skulls which have been allotted to the earliest period in Europe, and it only remains to deal with the remarkable remains discovered a few years ago in Java by Dr. Eugen Dubois. These finds were made in a probably Pliocene deposit, and consisted of (1) a molar tooth, (2) a fragment of skull found one metre distant from the tooth. These discoveries were made in 1891. In the following year were found (3) a femur at fifteen metres distance from the skull, and (4) a second molar tooth at three metres from the same. It is, of course, by no means certain that all these portions of bone belonged to the same body, nor can that question ever be definitely set at rest. It is also a curious fact, as the discoverer of the fragments pointed out, that during five years' work over an area some hundreds of square miles in extent, these were the only fragments of the kind discovered. Concerning the actual nature of these remains there is the most extraordinary divergence of opinion, a divergence which renders it absolutely hopeless to count this skull in the building up of any theory, since opinions differing from one another *toto coelo* have been set forward by men of equally great distinction and equal right to come to a conclusion on the matter. I will leave aside the question of the femur; and with regard to the molars, which are unusually large, will only quote the opinion of A. Keith, that, from the size of the tooth, it is clear that the animal which possessed it must have had a long palate and

very large temporal muscles, whilst the fragment of skull shows only very small indications of this muscle. I will turn to the fragment of skull itself, that being the subject with which we are now concerned, and will quote first of all Dubois' own summary of the opinions concerning it as given in his paper published by the Royal Dublin Society: "Whilst on the one side W. Krause, at the January meeting of the Berlin Anthropological Society, stated, as his opinion, that the skull-cap belonged without any doubt to a large ape, and on another occasion declared it to be that of a hylobates; whilst Waldeyer stated that the skull-cap might be attributed to a hylobatide, and again (at the Anthropological Congress of Cassel) that it could only have belonged to a higher form of anthropoid ape. Professor Cunningham, at a meeting of the Royal Dublin Society, regarded the cranium as undoubtedly human; and also Sir W. Turner and A. Keith considered it as a human remnant. Rudolf Martin is of the same opinion, and finds a total conformity in all real points with the human skulls of Neanderthal and Spy. The reviewer in *Nature* considers it as that of a microcephalic idiot. And more recently Topinard declares the skull-cap to be human and Neanderthaloid. He considers *la question jugée*, whilst nearly at the same moment as his article appeared three other famous French anthropologists, MM. Hamy, Manouvrier and Verneau, declared, after having examined the skull itself, that it could not be human. At the Leiden Zoological Congress Virchow declared the Java skull to be an ape skull. In the opinion of Sir William Flower and Professor Marsh, who were present at the same session, it cannot be human, nor can it be regarded as that of a true ape." To this medley of opinions I will add the statements of two of the authorities quoted above. Keith says that the strong keeling along the metopic and anterior parts of the sagittal sutures (*i.e.*, the median longitudinal line of junction of the cranial vault) suggest that the bones found themselves in a position to expend a good deal more osseous matter after the brain had ceased to make any demand upon them, so that it would be necessary to examine similar specimens

from the same locality—which, by the way, are not forthcoming—in order to obtain assurance that it was the skull of a normal individual. Sir William Turner, after pointing out the extreme difficulty that there is in arriving at even an approximate estimate of cubic capacity from so imperfect a fragment of skull, goes on to state that, accepting Dubois' estimate as correct—it is probably not an over-statement of the capacity—"three Australian women were below it in capacity, and a considerable number were only a little more capacious," and other savage races have, an equally small capacity. "It follows, therefore," he continues, "that a human cranium, smaller in its capacity than 1,100 cc. (the estimated cubic capacity of the Trinil specimen), is yet sufficiently large for the lodgement of a brain competent to discharge the duties demanded by the life of a savage." But the divergences of opinion are perhaps best shown by figures prepared by M. de Mortillet, and tabulated by him in a book published some little time ago, as to the opinions which had up to that date been expressed respecting the fragments discovered at Trinil. Here are the opinions as given by twenty-one observers.

The Remains.	Belong to Man.	To an intermediate type.	To a monkey.
2nd Molar	—	5	2
3rd "	4	8	6
Femur	13	6	1
Skull	6	8	6

I have now said enough to give a fair idea, I hope, of the earliest skulls at present known to us, of the skulls which we must examine if we are to come to any opinion as to the question of the development of man's corporeal possessions. What do we learn from them? In the first place, that there is a doubt and uncertainty about some of them, not only as regards their nature, but as regards their date. We learn also that these doubts and uncertainties are entertained by leading authorities on the subject, a fact which renders it absolutely impossible to utilize, at least at present, any such skulls as the foundation of a firm edifice of argument. Then, in the next place, we learn of those skulls whose date and character are least in doubt that they are clearly human skulls, closely resembling in all salient features the skulls of men and women living at

this day, and in no sort of sense intermediate between men and apes.

Huxley, in 1863, admitted that "the fossil remains of man hitherto discovered do not seem to me to take us appreciably nearer to that lower pithecoïd form, by the modification of which he has, probably, become what he is."

Twenty-six years later, in 1889, Virchow,* one of the greatest anthropologists and men of science of the last century, was summing up—with the evidence of all the skulls mentioned in this paper, except that of Trinil, before him—the question of the origin of man's body. What is his verdict? Speaking at the twentieth general meeting of the German Anthropological Association, at Vienna, he alluded to the first meeting which the society had held. At that time, he says, "no one doubted that the proof would be forthcoming, demonstrating that man descended from a monkey, and that this descent from a monkey, or at least from some kind of animal, would soon be established. This was a challenge which was made and successfully defended in the first battle. Everybody knew all about it and was interested in it. Some spoke for it; some against it. It was considered the greatest question of anthropology. Let me remind you, however, at this point," he proceeds, "that natural science, so long as it remains such, works only with real, existing objects. A hypothesis may be discussed, but its significance can only be established by producing actual proofs in its favour, either by experiments or direct observations. This Darwinism has not succeeded in doing. In vain have its adherents sought for connecting links which should connect man with the monkey. Not a single one has been found. The so-called *pro-anthropos*, which is supposed to represent this connecting link, has not as yet appeared. No real scientist claims to have seen him. Hence the *pro-anthropos* is not

* It is now the fashion of some writers to state that Virchow's "vast knowledge and range of thought have been somewhat neutralised by his excessive conservatism." But this is only a roundabout way of saying that Virchow's views do not agree with those of the writers in question, and that Virchow's opinion in consequence is not worthy of being taken into consideration.

at present an object of discussion for an anthropologist. Some may be able to see him in their dreams, but when awake they will not be able to say they have met him. Even the hope of a future discovery of this *pro-anthropos* is highly improbable; for we are not living in a dream, or in an ideal world, but in a real one." Three years later the same great authority maintained the same position, saying of development: "And so, in the case of man, we are repulsed all along the line. All the researches undertaken with the object of finding continuity in progressive development have been without result; the *pro-anthropos* does not exist; the man ape does not exist; the missing link remains a phantom." Again I would point out that at the time this was written Virchow had before him all the evidence which we have to-day, except that of the Trinil skull. This skull he subsequently saw and proclaimed to be that of an ape; and he would be a bold man, in the face of the divergent opinions which I have recapitulated above in connection with that much-debated skull, who would maintain that it had made much difference to the controversy. It is not even counted in the matter in Sedgwick's Zoology, from which quotations have been made above. In fact, so obvious is it that the skulls of these ancient races—be the exact date of their habitation of this world what it may—are nothing more or less than the skulls of human beings; that Kollmann, the distinguished Swiss anatomist, has proclaimed that man is a *Dauertypus*, or "persistent type," which has not varied since quaternary times, those, by the way, being the first times when we come in contact with anything like human remains or, indeed, with any certainty, in contact with any implements which can be legitimately considered as of human manufacture. To pursue this point further would lead me in directions other than those which I have marked out for this paper, though the obvious suggestions which arise are well worthy of consideration and discussion. I will sum up what I have tried to lay down by saying that science can only deal with facts, and that all theories which are not fully supported and buttressed up by solid evidence may be fascinating, inspiring, probable, what you please, but that they remain

only theories and nothing else. This seems a simple elementary statement, but it is one which is too often forgotten by a certain class of writers.

Well, in respect of one particular theory I have tried in these pages to sift the evidence and give the views of the most credible and recognised authorities in connection with one line of argument alone—it must be admitted, however, a very important line of argument.

I have carefully limited myself to this single point, and must not be taken as making any statements to the right or to the left of it when I say that, so far as the cranio-logical evidence goes, those who desire to prove the evolution of man's body from that of a lower form have completely failed to make out their case.

BERTRAM C. A. WINDLE.

ART. II.—ST. ATHANASIUS AND POPE JULIUS I.

IT is quite common to find well-read Englishmen speaking as though the history of Arianism was a difficulty in the way of the defenders of the Roman Primacy. They talk as if Rome had but an unimportant share in the troubles of the fourth century, and as if no testimony to the authority of the Papacy could be drawn from the relations between the East and West during the controversy.

This curious notion has its root, of course, in the Anglican manuals of history, in which the action of the Papacy is either ignored, or where this is impossible, minimised. In the following paper it will not be possible to go through the whole period of the Arian distress. I shall confine myself, therefore, to the time which elapsed between the Council of Nicaea in 325 and the Council of Sardica in 343 or 344. During these years the West was in peace, and all the troubles were caused by the Arianizing Court party in the East.

The first Œcumenical Council seems to have been Constantine's own idea, and he expected peace to follow the condemnation of Arius by so large a body of Bishops as that which met at Nicaea. The heresiarch himself was exiled, as were also the two Bishops who alone had refused to sign at the Council. Soon afterwards the famous Bishop Eusebius of Nicomedia and Theognis, Bishop of Nicaea, who repented the signature which they had made through fear of the Emperor, were also exiled. In 328 St. Athanasius became Bishop of Alexandria.

It was not long, however, before the exiles were recalled, through the influence, it is said, of Constantine's sister

Constantia, the widow of the Emperor Licinius. In 330 the party of Eusebius was able to procure the deposition on false charges of the orthodox St. Eustathius of Antioch by a Council held in that city. Various attempts were made to discredit Athanasius, whose See was yet more powerful and who was also the Bishop of the Alexandrian priest Arius, whom he steadfastly refused to receive back to communion. At length Constantine was persuaded that peace should precede the solemn opening of the great church he was building at Jerusalem, and he consented to the summoning of a council at Tyre in 335, at which the accusations against the Patriarch of Alexandria were heard. Athanasius attended, accompanied by forty-nine of his suffragans, but when he saw that he could expect no justice, he retired with them and was condemned in his absence.*

At a synod of the same Bishops at Jerusalem immediately afterwards, Marcellus of Ancyra, whose views appear to have been really heretical, was deposed also, while Arius and his followers were received back into communion. Athanasius went to Constantinople and appealed to the Emperor for protection from his enemies. Constantine ordered the Bishops who had been at Tyre to come to Constantinople. The more orthodox Bishops were kept away by intimidation, and the Eusebians alone answered the summons. Athanasius was exiled to Trèves, where he was well received by the Emperor's son, afterwards Constantine II. Arius was to have been solemnly received back into the Church at Constantinople, but this was prevented by his sudden death, which was looked upon as a miracle. The aged Bishop of that city having died, his orthodox successor, Paul, was banished, by the intrigues of Eusebius of Nicomedia. It was Eusebius who baptised Constantine on his death-bed at Nicomedia in 337.

Thus the work of the Council of Nicaea was being insidiously destroyed in the East. Eusebius and his followers were not professed Arians, though they showed no horror at his doctrines and tried to steer a middle course

* It is unnecessary to relate here the well-known accusations and the triumphant disproofs of them.

between Arianism and Orthodoxy. It must be remembered that up to this time they were in full Catholic communion, and were accused of heresy only by the victims of their unscrupulous intrigues. To Athanasius, conscious of their determined enmity, it was clear that the Eusebian party was aiming at the subversion of the Nicene faith by gradually depriving it of its main supports. By absurd and incredible charges they had emptied the most powerful Sees of the East—Alexandria, Antioch and Constantinople, and had exiled the champions of the truth. Probably the vast number of Eastern Bishops was devoted to the doctrine taught at Nicaea. But they understood as little as Constantine the real views and intentions of Eusebius and his friends. They did not know the truth concerning the accusations brought against Athanasius, Eustathius and Paul, or against Asclepas of Gaza or Marcellus of Ancyra. Plenty of mud was thrown, and some of it stuck. Besides, the Council of Nicaea was not to the men of those days, as it is to us, the first and most venerable of a long series of Œcumenical Councils received by the whole Church. It was to them simply a particularly large and representative assembly recently held at the Emperor's wish in order to pacify the Church by the condemnation of Arius. The Council might well have been imprudent, some thought, in employing the word *ὁμοούσιος*, for this expression was said to have been disapproved by the Council of Antioch, which condemned Paul of Samosata in 269. The Arianizing faction was thus able to pose as orthodox, and it was said that Arius himself had made a sufficient recantation.

After the death of Constantine all the banished Bishops were permitted to return ; yet this was the beginning of a worse period for the East. The sons of Constantine divided the empire, the semi-Arian Constantius became Emperor of the East, while the West was at peace under Constantine II. and Constans. Bishop Paul of Constantinople was soon sent again into exile, and Eusebius of Nicomedia obtained possession of the See of the imperial city. In 339 his party was bold enough to set up an excommunicated priest, one of the original followers of Arius, called Pistus, as Bishop of Alexandria, on the ground that

Athanasius had been deposed at Tyre; and they sent an embassy to Rome to Pope Julius to give an account of the accusations against Athanasius and to ask that the communion of Rome should be given to Pistus.

Up to this point the troubles had been only in the East. It is to be noticed that no ecclesiastical law yet existed with regard to the trial of Bishops. A synod like that of Tyre had no jurisdiction over a Patriarch of Alexandria; it was, from the Church's point of view, a purely moral force. But the Emperor had looked upon synods as ecclesiastical juries, and had punished with the secular arm the secular offences of which the deposed Bishops were unrighteously convicted. The Eusebian party further used the imperial power to thrust Arian Bishops into the Sees which they had made vacant. But they were quite well aware that they were not *en règle*. It is for this reason that we find them the first to appeal to the Pope. If they could persuade Julius and the Western Church to believe the charges brought against the victims of their slanders they would have right as well as might on their side.

"But they could not deceive that See," as St. Augustine said on another occasion. Pope Julius acted with a due sense of justice. To the disgust of the Eusebians, he at once sent to St. Athanasius the alleged proofs of his guilt, which had been forwarded to Rome, and which the accused himself had not been allowed to see. Athanasius assembled in consequence a great Council at Alexandria of more than eighty Bishops, which addressed to Julius and to all Bishops a lengthy defence.* This letter was taken to Rome by envoys of Athanasius. When their arrival became known to Macarius (the priest who had brought the letter of Eusebius), he left hurriedly in the night. His companions, two deacons, were unable to reply to the statements of the Egyptians, so they demanded a synod, and requested the Pope himself to be judge.† Julius made

* Ath., *Apol.*, 3-19.

† It is best to give the words of the authorities (Athanasius, *Apol. c. Arian*, 20): "The Eusebians (or Eusebius) also wrote to Julius, and thinking to frighten us, they asked for a Council to be called, and that JULIUS HIMSELF, IF HE WISHED, SHOULD BE JUDGE." Socrates, *H.E.*, ii., 11: "Eusebius having accomplished what he desired, sent an embassy to Julius,

no objection to this, and at once wrote both to the Bishop of Alexandria and to his accusers summoning them to a synod, the place and time of which they themselves could decide.

Meanwhile the Emperor Constantius had intruded another Bishop at Alexandria, Gregory the Cappadocian, with the greatest violence. Athanasius escaped and obeyed the summons of the Pope,* arriving at Rome probably just after Easter, 339.†

The accused having presented himself, but his accusers, whose representatives had demanded the council, not having put in an appearance, St. Julius sent them another summons, fixing the end of the year as the limit of his patience. The Eusebians retained the legates until the term was passed, and only allowed them to return in the January following (340), bearing a letter from their meeting

Bishop of Rome, calling upon him TO BE THE JUDGE of the charges against Athanasius, and to SUMMON THE CASE TO HIMSELF." Sozomen, *H.E.*, iii. 7: "Eusebius . . . wrote to Julius that he SHOULD BE JUDGE OF WHAT HAD BEEN DECREED AT TYRE." Here Sozomen copies Socrates, who has himself misunderstood the passage of Athanasius. This last must be interpreted by another passage of the same Saint, *Hist. Arian ad mon.*, 9: "The priests sent by them also asked for the same thing (viz., a synod) when they saw that they were refuted." So the letter of St. Julius (*Ap. Athan. Apol. c. Arian*, 22): "Those who were sent by you Eusebius with letters (I mean the priest Macarius, and the deacons Martyrius and Hesychius), when they were here, not being able to reply to the priests of Athanasius who had come, but being confuted and convicted in all points, thereupon asked us that a synod might be convoked, and to write to Alexandria to Bishop Athanasius and to the Eusebians that the just judgement might be arrived at in the presence of all." From all this it is clear that the letter of Eusebius had not asked for a synod or for the Pope as judge. This was only an insincere pretext to avoid an immediate condemnation.

* *Athan.*, *Apol. c. Ar.*, 20, and *Hist. Arian*, 11; St. Julius (*Ap. Athan.*, *Apol.* 29): "For he did not come of himself, but was summoned by letters from us, as we wrote to you." *Theodoret*, *H.E.*, ii., 3: "Athanasius, knowing their plot, retired, and betook himself to the West. For to the Bishop of Rome (Julius was then the shepherd of that Church) the Eusebians had sent the false accusations which they had put together against Athanasius. And he, following the law of the Church, both ordered them to repair to Rome, and also summoned the divine Athanasius to judgement. And he, for his part, started at once on receiving the call; but they who had made up the story did not go to Rome, knowing that it would be easy to see through their falsehood." Sozomen iii., 10: "Julius, learning that it was not safe for Athanasius to remain in Egypt then, sent for him to Rome."

† So Gwatkin, *Studies in Arianism*, p. 116. Hefele (*Eng. Tr.* ii., 88) gives 340, and shifts all the events in the same way up to the Council of Sardica.

at Antioch, the tenor of which has been preserved by Sozomen.*

"Having assembled at Antioch, they wrote to Julius an answer elaborately worded and rhetorically composed, full of irony and containing terrible threats. For in their letter they admitted that Rome was always honoured as the school of the Apostles and the metropolis of the Faith from the beginning, although the teachers had settled in it from the East.† But they did not think they ought to take a secondary place because they had less great and populous churches, since they were superior in virtue and intention. They reproached Julius with having communicated with Athanasius, and complained that their synod was insulted and their contrary decision made null, and they accused this as unjust and contrary to ecclesiastical law. Having thus reproached Julius and complained of his ill-usage, they promised, if he would accept the deposition of those whom they had deposed and the appointment of those whom they had ordained, to give him peace and communion; but if he withstood their decrees, they would refuse this. For they stated that the earlier Eastern Bishops had made no objection when Novatian was driven out of the Roman Church. But they wrote nothing to Julius concerning their acts contrary to the decisions of the Nicene Council, saying that they had many necessary reasons to give in excuse, but that it was superfluous to make any defence against a vague and general suspicion of wrong-doings."

Eusebius of Nicomedia seems to have been dead when this letter was written. In the autumn of 340 the Council was at length assembled at Rome, and met in the church of the priest Vito, who had been Papal Legate at Nicaea. Not only Athanasius, Patriarch of Alexandria, and Marcellus, Bishop of Ancyra in Galatia, were present, but also many Bishops from Thrace, Coelesyria, Phœnicia and Palestine, who had taken refuge in Rome. Besides, deputies came from Alexandria and elsewhere, complaining of the continued acts of violence and barbarity perpetrated in the name of the Eusebian party. Priests from Egypt

* iii., 8. Socrates merely has: "They complain with great acerbity to Julius, declaring that he must make no decrees if they wished to expel some from their Churches, for they did not contradict when (the Romans) drove Novatus from the Church," ii. 15. Both historians mistakenly place this letter after an imaginary restoration of Athanasius and others to their Sees by the Pope.

† Viz., Peter and Paul. Compare the inscription of St. Damasus at the Platonia: "*Discipulos Oriens misit, quod sponte fatemur.*"

and Alexandria deplored that many Bishops were prevented from coming, and some, even confessors, were beaten and imprisoned, while the Catholic people were oppressed and persecuted. Bishops had been exiled for not communicating with the Arians. Similar outrages had occurred at Ancyra in Galatia.

The Council gave peace and communion to Athanasius and Marcellus, the orthodoxy of the latter being warmly upheld by Athanasius and Julius. At the instance of the Bishops, the Pope at length replied, in the name of all, to the unseemly letter of the Eusebians. His lengthy and important epistle is preserved complete in St. Athanasius's apology.*

The letter from the Easterns, says St. Julius, was improper and proud, in answer to his own letter, which was full of love; even their apparent flattery was ironical. Out of charity Julius had not published their letter for a long time, until he was forced to give up all hope that any of them would attend the Council. Their studied eloquence was of no value. They ought to have been glad of a synod, even had it not been demanded by their own envoys. The Council of Nicaea had set the example of revising the decisions of former synods. "If you say that every Council is unalterable, who is it, pray, who sets Councils at nought? The Arians were expelled by that of Nicaea, and yet they are said to be received by you. They are condemned by all, while Athanasius and Marcellus have many defenders. In fact, Athanasius was not convicted of anything at Tyre, and the acts in the Mareotis were invalid, being drawn up by one party only." The Pope then speaks of affairs at Alexandria, of envoys sent to Rome by the usurping Gregory, and of the intruded Bishop, Pistus. The Eusebians asserted that the Western condemnation of

* Tillemont says of this letter: "St. Athanase nous l'a conservée toute entière; et on peut dire sans flatterie, que c'est un des plus beaux monumens de l'antiquité. On y voit un génie grand et élevé; et qui a en même temps beaucoup de solidité, d'adresse, et d'agrément. La vérité y est défendue avec une vigueur digne du chef des Evêques, et le vice représenté dans toute sa difformité. Mais l'aigreur de ses reproches y est tellement modérée par la charité qui y paroist partout, que bien que la force et la générosité épiscopale domine dans cette lettre, on voit néanmoins que c'est un père qui corrige, non un ennemi qui veut blesser." Vol. vii., p. 278 (*St. Jules*, art. 8).

Novatian, and the Eastern condemnation of Paul of Samosata, had been respected by all, and subject to no revision. Why, then, did they not similarly respect the Council of Nicaea? They had violated that Council also by frequent translations of Bishops from See to See. Bishops, they said, were not measured by the greatness of their cities; why, then, were the Eastern Bishops not content with a small city (this refers, above all, to Eusebius, who from being Bishop of Berytus had changed to the city of Nicomedia, where the Court frequently was,* and then had usurped the See of Constantinople, the newly-founded capital). They complained that the time appointed was too short, but they kept the legates till January. This letter, like the former one, was in the name of all; but the former was addressed only to those who had written to Rome. "Our admission of Athanasius and Marcellus to communion was not rash. We had the former letter of Eusebius, and now this letter of yours, and the letter of the Bishops of Egypt and of others in favour of Athanasius. Your first and second letters did not agree; the Egyptian Bishops were on the spot. Arsenius is still alive, and the evidence from the Mareotis is a mere party statement. Athanasius waited here a year and a half, and his mere presence puts his accusers to shame, since he showed his confidence by obeying our summons. Is it we or you who act against the canons, when you ordained a Bishop at Antioch, thirty-six stages distant, and sent him with soldiers to Alexandria? If Athanasius had been really convicted at Tyre, you should have made another Bishop years ago, when he was exiled in Gaul."

"When we had sent to summon a Council you could not prejudice the matter. The violence exercised at Alexandria is terrible, and you call it peace! As for Marcellus, he denied your charges; his confession was approved by the priests Vitus and Vincentius (the Papal representatives at Nicaea). Eastern as well as Western Bishops were at the Council, and deputies from the East, complaining of violence and that Bishops were prevented from coming by

* Libanius tells us that Nicomedia yielded to no city in beauty, and to four only of the world in size.

force or banishment. We hear that only a few are the causes of this schism. If you really believe that anything can be proved against Marcellus and Athanasius, let any come to accuse who wish to do so, and we will have a fresh trial." The next sentence I will give in full :

"For if really, as you say, they did some wrong, the judgement ought to have been given according to the ecclesiastical canon and not thus. You should have written to all of us, that so justice might have been decreed by all. For it was Bishops who were the sufferers ; and it is not obscure Churches which have suffered, but Churches which Apostles in person ruled. With regard to the Church of Alexandria in particular, why were we not consulted? Do you not know that this has been the custom, first to write to us, and thus for what is just to be defined from hence? If, therefore, a suspicion of this sort fell upon the Bishop of that place, it was necessary to write to the church here. But now, though you gave us no information, but have done as you pleased, you ask us to give our agreement, though we have not ourselves condemned. These are not the statutes of Paul, these are not the traditions of the Fathers ; this is another rule, a new custom. I beseech you to bear willingly what I say, for I write for the common welfare, and what we have received from Blessed Peter the Apostle, that I declare to you."

This famous passage plainly declares that "the Church here" (not the Church of the West, as a whole, but obviously the Church of Rome), and no other, was able to judge the Bishop of Alexandria, who ranked in order next after the Pope. St. Julius solemnly states that he is giving the tradition handed down from Peter, as the successor of whom he speaks. But the first part of the quotation is more general ; it says that, "according to the ecclesiastical canon," in a case of deposition of Bishops on such a large scale, the whole West—"all of us"—should have been consulted.

It is extremely interesting to see how this sentence was understood a century later by two Eastern historians. Socrates thus commences his summary of this famous letter :

"Julius, writing back to those who were assembled at Antioch, reproved them, first, for the bitterness of their letter, then for acting contrary to the canons, because they had not invited him to the synod, since the ecclesiastical canon orders

that the Churches shall not make canons against the judgement (παρὰ γνώμην) of the Bishop of Rome" (ii. 17).

Sozomen has evidently copied him :

"He wrote blaming them for making stealthy innovations in the Nicene dogma, and for not inviting him to the synod, contrary to the laws of the Church, saying that it was a sacerdotal law that what was done against the will of the Roman Bishop was null and void" (iii. 10).

The statement that Julius complained of not being invited to their council is a mistake. The famous assertions that the ecclesiastical law invalidated any canons which were disapproved by the Bishop of Rome is doubtless implied in his letter, but it is not stated. It is interesting to see that the two Greek historians of the following century read into the letter of the Pope the claim which they thought it natural he should make. They also state that Julius, by letter, restored other Eastern Bishops to their Sees, "by reason of the prerogative possessed by the Roman Church," "on the ground that the care of all belonged to him, on account of the dignity of his See," but these letters are lost,* and there is evidently some confusion.

Meanwhile the famous synod in *Encæniis* met at Antioch. It consisted of a large number of Bishops (Prof. Gwatkin thinks about ninety), who were for the most part conservative and orthodox. They drew up twenty-five canons, and anathematized Marcellus and anyone who should hold with him,† and had no idea that the condemnation of

* Socrates ii. 15 : "ἄτε προνόμια τῆς ἐν Ρώμῃ Ἐκκλησίας ἐχούσης"; Sozomen iii. 8 : "οἷα δὲ τῆς πάντων κηδεμονίας αὐτῷ προσηκούσης διὰ τὴν ἀξίαν τοῦ θρόνου." The *ἄτε* and *οἷα* give the reason alleged by Julius in his letters. Dr. Bright, Bishop Gore, and others have actually asserted that we should understand Socrates and Sozomen to reject the claims he made. Of course there is no trace of any such intention on their part. Dr. Bright had conveniently forgotten the similar passage of Socrates, ii. 8 : "Nor was Julius present (at the Council of Antioch), the Bishop of great Rome, nor had he sent anyone in his place ; although the ecclesiastical canon orders that the Churches may make no decisions (i.e., binding œcumenically) without the approval of the Bishop of Rome" (Καίτοι κανόνος ἐκκλησιαστικοῦ κελεύοντος, μὴ δεῖν παρὰ τὴν γνώμην τοῦ επισκόπου Ρώμης τὰς ἐκκλησίας κανονίζειν). This is a perfectly clear statement of the Church's law as it was understood at Constantinople at the beginning of the fifth century, a hundred years after Nicæa. Socrates is here not quoting from any other writer, but stating a fact as he knew it to be. This makes it entirely inevitable that his own view coincides with the opinion he attributes to St. Julius in ii. 15 and ii. 17, quoted above.

† Probably they had not received the letter of Julius and his Council.

Athanasius at Tyre could have been unjust. They also signed three creeds, the first a vague one, evidently proposed by the Eusebian party, and considered insufficient by the rest; the other two being in parts perfectly explicit, but in other parts less satisfactory, and of course avoiding the Nicene *ὁμοούσιος*, which many of the most orthodox believed to be ambiguous and unserviceable. It seemed to the Easterns that Arianism had been condemned once for all at Nicæa, while Arius himself was said to have submitted and to have been reconciled. The Eusebians did not teach the doctrines of Arius, but promoted a moderate and undefined medium between the Nicene dogma and pure Arianism. The Eastern Bishops seem to have had a very uncertain grasp of the theological question. While Alexandria and Rome possessed a perfectly definite tradition with regard to the Three Persons and One God, the Easterns seem to have had no such knowledge. They appear to have inherited a theological position similar to that of some of the second century apologists, or of the author of the *Philosophumena*, and many others, which made the Word of God His image, and divine, and yet not one with Him, while their doctrine of the Holy Spirit was quite undefined. The Monarchian controversies of the third century had been caused by a revulsion from this attitude of many within the Church. The *Philosophumena* describe Pope Callistus as a kind of Monarchian, evidently because in condemning Monarchianism he had asserted the unity of the Father and Son as one God. Similarly the Eusebians denounced the chief upholders of the Nicene doctrine as followers of the Monarchianism of Sabellius, who made no real distinction between the Divine Persons for fear of injury to the perfection of the unity of God. The large number of Eastern Bishops who were deceived by this are called "Conservatives" by Professor Gwatkin, but it was a conservatism based on ignorance. At Alexandria the predecessors of Athanasius, Alexander and Peter, had taught as he did, and he has proved the same of the great Dionysius in the middle of the third century, and of his namesake at Rome. The teaching of the Nicene faith was clearly conservatism in the West and in Egypt.

Arianism was the exaggerated expression of tendencies which had long been latent in the Antiochian provinces and Asia Minor, and the revulsion against it in those provinces was but slight, except when presented in the blasphemous form given to it by Arius before Nicæa, and later by the Anomæans. With these the bulk of the Eastern Bishops never communicated; but the Eusebians, the original court-party, and their successors in court favour, the Homœans, found these well-meaning prelates an easy prey. They were assured that the real danger was not Arius, who had repented, but the criminal Athanasius, and the Sabellian Marcellus. The doctrine of the latter was doubtless incorrect (to take a mild view), but it was not Sabellian. Thus, though the great synod in *Encænîs* was dominated by the Eusebians, and though its creeds fall short of the Nicene standard, yet the Bishops who composed it were not heretics in intention, and St. Hilary called it an assembly of Saints.

In spite of the statements of Socrates and Sozomen, it seems most unlikely that any of the dispossessed Bishops could have been actually restored to their Sees after the Roman Council, for Constantius was wholly given over to the Arianizing party, though the historians may be right in stating that the Pope gave them letters which authorized their restoration. St. Athanasius, at all events, remained in Rome for more than three years altogether, and he apparently superintended there the writing of a Bible for the Emperor Constans. Modern scholars believe this book is to be identified with the most famous of all biblical manuscripts, the *Codex Vaticanus*, B.* In the fourth year of his exile he was summoned to the Emperor at Milan, who had decided to follow the suggestion of Pope Julius, Hosius of Cordova, and other Bishops, and write to his brother Constantius, the Emperor of the East, in order to arrange for the meeting of a great synod of East and West, in which all difficulties could be smoothed away. Constantius agreed, and Sardica, on the borders of the two empires, was appointed for the place of meeting.

* Athanasius, *Apol. ad. Const.*, 4. So Rahlfs, Zahn and others.

The Council apparently met in the summer of 343.* Sardica was just within the dominions of Constans, though only some fifty miles from Constantinople. This was disastrous for the Eusebians, the Court party, who could do nothing without a "Count," St. Athanasius says, to control the proceedings in their favour. The Easterns, who numbered seventy-six, shut themselves up in a palace and demanded that the deposition of Athanasius and Marcellus should be received without discussion, repeating their complaint that one Council had no right to revise the acts of another. This amounted to a denial of the right of the Pope and his Roman Council to try the case once decided at Tyre. It did not admit the right of a Bishop to any appeal from his first condemnation, and left St. Athanasius at the mercy of his shameless accusers. The majority of Bishops, probably about ninety-four or ninety-six, refused to agree, and the Easterns retired in a body on the plea that the development of the Persian war of Constantius rendered it impossible for them to be away from their flocks. They stopped, however, just within the border of the Eastern Empire at Philippopolis, and composed an encyclical letter, which was written after the Western decisions,† so that their haste was evidently a mere pretence. This letter informs us that the Council was summoned by the wish of Julius of Rome, Maximus of Trèves, and Hosius of Cordova, whom the heretical assembly proceed to condemn, and especially Julius as the *princeps et dux malorum*.‡

Meanwhile the orthodox Bishops had acquitted Athanasius and Marcellus, judging that the latter had been misrepresented. They wrote to the Church of Alexandria informing them of the acquittal of their Bishop, and to the Bishops of Egypt and Libya and to all Bishops of the world, and also a special letter to St. Julius. The contrast with the heretics is striking. These had excommunicated the Pope, and had addressed their conciliar epistle to the pseudo-Bishop Gregory of Alexandria, who had been intruded by the

* So Gwatkin, p. 124. Hefele shifts it to the following year (ii., pp. 86-9). I have repeated a few sentences from the account of the Council which follows, in *Bishop Gore and the Catholic Claims*, ch. vi.

† Hefele thinks not.

‡ Mansi, iii. 126. *Hil. Frag.* 3.

secular power, and actually to the Donatist Bishop of Carthage—so far had they receded from all decency. The orthodox Bishops, on the other hand, in communion with the great Athanasius, and presided over by the venerable Hosius, together with two priests as papal legates, wrote a special report of their proceedings to the Pope. They excommunicated eight of the chiefs of the Eusebian party, and the intruded Bishops of Alexandria, Gaza and Ancyra, and invited all Bishops to sign their encyclical. To the Pope they wrote :

“What we have always believed, that we now experience ; for experience proves and confirms what each has heard ; true is that which the most blessed teacher of the Gentiles, Paul the Apostle, said of himself : ‘Do you seek a proof of Christ Who speaketh in me?’ Though of a surety, since the Lord Christ dwelt in him, it cannot be doubted but that the Holy Spirit spoke by his mouth, and was heard through the instrumentality of his body. And you likewise, beloved brother, though separated in body, were present in mind and agreement and will, and your excuse for absence was good and unavoidable, that the schismatic wolves might not steal and rob by stealth, nor the heretic dogs bark madly in the excitement of their wild fury, or even the crawling devil pour forth the poison of blasphemy. For this will seem to be most good and very proper, *if to the head, that is to the See of Peter the Apostle, the Bishops of the Lord shall refer from all provinces.** Since therefore all that has been transacted and decided is contained in the documents, and can be truly and faithfully explained by word of mouth by our beloved brothers and fellow priests, Archidamas and Philoxenus, and our dear son, the deacon Leo, it seems almost superfluous to write it here.”

Then follows an account of the doings of the Council, somewhat shorter than in the other letters. The Pope is asked to publish the decrees in Italy, Sicily and Sardinia.

* It has been suggested by several writers that this clause should be omitted as an interruption of the sense, and therefore an interpolation. This, however arbitrary, would be convenient for some people's views. But the connection is not difficult to see : Julius was right to be unwilling to leave Rome, for there would have been no head there who could keep in order from thence the schismatic wolves and heretic dogs. The suggestion of this excuse is merely complimentary, for it does not seem to have been the reason given by Julius himself ; and, in fact, his presence at Rome during the few months of the council and the journey thither and back could hardly have been fraught with great danger to the cause of orthodoxy ! But it should be noted how the authority of the Roman See is connected here, as always, with St. Peter.

In each letter the refusal of the Eusebians to obey the summons to Rome is emphasised.*

A number of canons was drawn up† concerning discipline, the most important of which are those which deal with the question of appeals of Bishops. Apart from the Council of Arles there was practically no canon law in the West, except those decrees of custom vaguely referred to as "the ecclesiastical canon." In practice it is probable that all the more serious matters came before the Pope, and the evolution of a system of Metropolitans was only just beginning in the Western Church. In the East several Councils had published canons, and the Council of the Dedication at Antioch had just drawn up twenty-five, one of which appeared to be aimed at Athanasius. It had attributed considerable power to the Metropolitans, and had allowed to a Bishop an appeal to the neighbouring Bishops from a condemnation by his comprovincials, if their verdict was not unanimous; but if unanimous, it was irreversible.

It was natural that a larger right of appeal should be desired by the orthodox at Sardica, and that they should keep in view the present situation. The hope of orthodoxy was in the West, where the Bishops, almost without exception, adhered to the Nicene settlement, where the Emperor supported them, and where the admittedly indefectible faith of the Roman Church formed a rallying point. Every heresy had beaten against that Church, but in vain. And now its Bishop had exercised his prerogative in annulling the decisions of the Council of Tyre, in summoning both the Patriarch of Alexandria and the Eusebians to Rome, and in restoring the ejected Bishops to their Sees, even though he could not give effect to this latter decision. The

* In the letter to Julius: "Sed et conventi per presbyteros tuos et per epistolam ad synodum quae futura erat in urbe Roma, venire noluerunt." To the Church of Alexandria: "καὶ διὰ γραμμάτων καὶ διὰ ἀγράφων ἐντολῶν ὑπεμνήσθησαν οἱ τῆς ἐώας καὶ ἐκλήθησαν παρεῖναι," and to all Bishops: "καὶ εἰ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα ἐκ τοῦ κληθέντος αὐτοὺς παρὰ τοῦ ἀγαπητοῦ ἡμῶν καὶ συλλειτουργοῦ Ἰουλίου, μὴ ἀπαντήσαι, καὶ ἐκ τῶν γραφέντων παρὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ Ἰουλίου, φανερά τούτων ἢ συκοφαντία πέφηνεν. ἦλθον γὰρ ἂν εἰπερ ἐθάρρουν οἱς ἐπραξαν καὶ πεποιθήκασιν κατὰ τῶν συλλειτουργῶν ἢ μῶν."

† Their genuineness was recently shown in the *Journal of Theol. Studies* (April, 1902), by Mr. C. H. Turner, against a *Tendenz-schrift* by Dr. Friedrich.

Council had met at his desire, and it is highly probable that the canons proposed to the Council by Hosius had been previously drawn up at Rome under the direction of Pope Julius. The first canon of all has verbal reminiscences of his letter to the Eusebians. It re-asserts the fifteenth canon of Nicæa, which forbade the translation of Bishops, and Hosius adds, like Julius, that such translations always come from the desire to be Bishop of a greater city. At Nicæa such translations were simply declared null; at Sardica even lay communion is refused to a Bishop who has been translated. There can be no doubt that this canon was aimed directly at the late leader of the Court party, Eusebius. The canon may be presumed to have been contemplated and drafted before the death of Eusebius, more than a year previously, and it was founded upon the letter of Julius himself.

The laws for appeals have been much discussed, but their meaning is undoubtedly as follows :

Canon III.—If a Bishop has been condemned, and he thinks he has a good cause, let his judges or (if they will not) the Bishops of the neighbouring province, write to the Roman Bishop, who will either confirm the first decision or order a new trial, appointing the judges himself. (On the motion of Gaudentius, Bishop of Naissus in Dacia, it was added that when any Bishop had appealed to Rome, no successor should be appointed until the matter had been determined by the Bishop of Rome.)

Canon VII. (V.)—Further, if, after condemnation by the Bishops of the region, a Bishop should himself appeal and take refuge with the Bishop of Rome, let the latter deign to write to the Bishops of the neighbouring province to examine and decide the matter. And if the condemned Bishop desires the Pope to send a priest *a latere*, this may be done. And if the Pope shall decide to send judges to sit with the Bishops, having authority from him who sent them, it shall be as he wills.* But if he thinks the Bishops alone suffice, it shall be as his wisdom shall think fit.

* "Si decreverit mittendos esse qui praesentes cum episcopis judicent, habentes auctoritatem a quo destinati sunt, erit in suo arbitrio." So Mr. Turner reads. All editions have "ejus auctoritatem" (Canon VII. al. 5).

Father Puller's comment is: "It seems most strange that Roman Catholics should refer with any pleasure to these canons of Sardica." The reasons he gives are not new. They were repeated *ad nauseam* by the obsolete Gallican school,* and have been retailed by Anglicans, e.g., the late Dr. Bright and Bishop Gore.

To begin with, Father Puller misunderstands the Catholic view. He says:

"According to the view laid down by the Vatican Council, the supremacy of the Pope belongs to him *jure divino*, and as a consequence of that supremacy every member of the Church, whether he belongs to the clergy or to the laity, has an inherent right of appealing to his judgement in any matter appertaining to the jurisdiction of the Church" (p. 143).

The logic of this is deplorable. How can the fact that the Pope's supremacy belongs to him *jure divino* give to every member of the Church an inherent right of appeal to him? The conclusion Father Puller could have drawn was that the Pope must have an inherent right to hear appeals if he chooses. The manner in which he exercises this right and the classes of persons whose appeals he will consent to hear are questions to be settled by canon law. In the present case Pope Julius left it to the Council; though I believe the form of the Canons had been previously prepared by himself, no doubt in consultation with neighbouring Bishops, and with St. Athanasius and the other exiles who were so nearly concerned. Fr. Puller continues:

"But here we have the Fathers of the Council of Sardica carrying a resolution, so to speak, in favour of the Roman See, and determining that, in honour of the memory of St. Peter, they will in certain rare cases give the Pope a very restricted right of determining whether there shall be a re-hearing, and of appointing Bishops who shall form the court of appeal, and of deputing one or more legates to sit with them in that court. And all this is proposed by Bishop Hosius tentatively—'*si vobis placet*'—'if it please you.' On the papalist theory, the whole proceeding must appear insufferably impertinent."

* Fr. Puller quotes (p. 14, note 2): "The words of the canon prove that the institution of this right was *new*. 'If it please you,' says Hosius of Cordova, the President of the Council, 'let us honour the memory of Peter the Apostle,'" as from "Archbishop De Marca of Paris." This is unfair, for the famous "Concordia" was written by De Marca when a layman. Before obtaining the bulls for his first Bishopric he was obliged to disown the Erastianism of his lawyer days.

There are two points here to be answered. The first is that the right granted is a "very restricted right"; the second is that even this right is granted as a favour.

1. A "very restricted right" it seems to Fr. Puller, because "there was no thought of giving to the Pope any right of evoking the case to Rome," for which statement he produces the authority of Hefele. It is certainly true that the Council had no intention of doing anything so "impertinent." They did not mention this right in the canon, but they assumed it in the other documents, and their whole case against their opponents depended upon it. It is a pity that Fr. Puller has not better understood the position of affairs. The Easterns considered the Councils of Tyre and of Jerusalem to have been plenary Councils, well able to depose the Patriarch of Alexandria. They had tried to get their decisions recognised in the West by getting the Pope to grant his communion to the intruded Bishop of that city. The Pope, on the other hand, had declared, as we have seen, that the decisions of a Council in which he had no share could not be final. He summoned St. Athanasius to Rome, and that Saint obeyed him. The envoys of Eusebius, however insincerely, even asked the Pope to be judge. Julius offered the Easterns a new Council, at which he would be represented. But they replied that their Council could not be revised by another. They implied—though they did not venture to say it—that the Pope himself could not revise it. Julius then, to avoid all tergiversation, decided upon the date of the Council, and ordered that it should meet at Rome. It does not appear that they absolutely refused to obey the summons; but they made excuses, and none of them appeared.

There was no doubt, therefore, in the minds of the orthodox party at Sardica *that the Pope could summon a Patriarch of Alexandria to Rome, could order a Council to be held, could restore Bishops by the prerogative of his See, and could quash the proceedings of any Council, however large, if he had sufficient reason.* But the canons are intended to go further. It was easy for the Easterns to avoid coming to Rome when summoned. It was a long journey, communication was slow, and delays and excuses

were not hard to make. On the other hand, it meant voluntary exile to an orthodox Bishop who undertook the journey, for his See would be filled up in his absence, and the Emperor would not permit his return. At Sardica a new system was devised. After a Bishop had been condemned, and had complained of injustice, it was to be allowed for his judges, or the Bishops of a neighbouring province, or the accused himself, to appeal to the Bishop of Rome to order a fresh trial by neighbouring Bishops, with or without the assistance of a papal envoy or plenipotentiary. The enquiry would thus be held on the spot, or nearly so, and there would be no possibility of evasion. The new judges need not be more numerous than the former, and there would be no reason to demand an impossible general Council, or to apply to the Emperor for protection. It was an attempt to make the Pope's influence more felt in the East, now that the two greatest Sees, Alexandria and Antioch, were filled by Arians of the worst reputation. It was well planned, but the Easterns would hardly have accepted the innovation. As it happened, the breathing space for the orthodox marked by the Council of Sardica did not last. The death of Constans in 351 brought the violence of imperial semi-Arianism upon the West. When the death of Valens at length brought permanent peace, the canons of Sardica were out of date and probably almost forgotten. At all events they were not wanted, and, so far as we know, were never put in practice in East or West, though in the fifth century the Popes appealed occasionally to the principles contained in the canons, under the mistaken belief that they were Nicene.

The "restricted right" is thus seen to be a proposal for the attribution to the Pope of most extraordinary powers, over and above his admitted right of hearing appeals at Rome in a Council called by himself.* The Pope is to

* Father Puller has elaborately shown (for this I thank him) that the Sardican canons were eventually included in many Eastern collections, and were recognised as binding in many Eastern provinces. From this it follows, of course, that the principle involved in them was not disapproved. But appeals to the Pope went on in the old way, and I am inclined to think that the *precise* form for appeals laid at Sardica was probably *never* observed or needed in East or West.

decide whether he chooses to confirm the decision or to appoint a commission to try the case again, and he is left absolutely free to appoint judges, or the Bishops of a neighbouring province to sit, with or without a legate, "at his own most wise discretion." It seems to me perfectly inconceivable that such immense and undefined authority could have been given to a mere honorary primate, in whom no superior jurisdiction was recognised. On the other hand, when we remember that the Council already admitted the Pope's right to summon the case to his own court, if he thought justice was not being done, the extension of this principle by the new canons is comprehensible and natural. It is quite clear that the Pope was looked upon as having a duty of general guardianship over the whole Church, his rights being somewhat vaguely understood in the East, and rather more clearly realised in the West. But in the very lowest view, we must conclude nobody to have been surprised that the Pope should intervene where injustice needed to be enacted, and it was for the most part considered to be his duty. The very highest view, on the other hand, would not be so ridiculous as to suppose the Pope to be infallible in any act of jurisdiction; it might be right to disagree with him, or even to avoid his judgement when he seemed to be prejudiced. This was the view taken by the not unorthodox Bishops at the Council of the Dedication at Antioch. They believed the Pope and the Westerns to have been circumvented by Athanasius and Marcellus; they ignored the former, and excommunicated the latter with all his adherents, among whom they did not, of course, count all the Bishops of the Roman Council.

In this fashion the whole history is clear. On Fr. Puller's supposition that the Pope was a dignitary of great influence but of no real superiority, the whole becomes incomprehensible. On what ground, if we admit this, could Julius summon the Patriarch of Alexandria to Rome? On what ground could he summon Eusebius and his friends? How had he the right to insist upon a Council, and then upon a particular time and place for that Council? What right had he to review the decisions of Tyre and Jerusalem? Why did nobody protest against his claim to

restore Bishops? If St. Athanasius did not believe the Pope to be at least a general overseer of the Church, was it not unworthy of him to utilise the pretensions of Julius for his own purposes? If Hosius and the leaders of orthodoxy at Sardica, the men to whom Christendom owed the preservation of the Nicene faith, thought Julius's claims preposterous, is it conceivable that they would have given him the enormous powers he was intended to wield under the new canons?

Such questions might be multiplied. Let us turn to the second point we had to answer:—the “very restricted right” was granted to Julius as a favour. Part of the third canon runs thus* :

“Hosius, the Bishop, said . . . If any Bishop shall have been condemned in any matter, and thinks that he has right on his side, so that a new trial should be made, if it please you, let us honour the memory of St. Peter the Apostle, and let the Bishops who have judged the case, or those who dwell in the neighbouring province, write to [Julius] the Roman Bishop; and if he shall determine in favour of a new trial,” etc.

In former times it has been argued that the grant was to Julius personally, not to the Bishop of Rome. But the word “Julius” is absent from all MSS., except those representing the collection of Dionysius Exiguus.† It is therefore a mere explanatory addition, of which we need take no account. “*Si vobis placet*” implies that the Council is asked to approve, modify or reject the proposal. Why not? Even in the extreme case of rejection there could be no “impertinence.” As for the famous words “*sanctissimi Petri Apostoli memoriam honoremus*,” “let us honour the memory of St. Peter the Apostle,” I have no objection whatever to their being taken to imply the gift of a new right, and the brothers Ballerini admitted this interpretation. But I cannot see that they do naturally imply that a new right is given, and not a new way of putting an old right in practice. Anyhow, they mean one thing which Fr. Puller must not pass over so lightly—that the

* Best Text given by Turner, *J. T. S.*, April, 1902, p. 396.

† So Turner, *l.c.*, p. 376.

powers given to the Pope in the canons are not given to the Bishop of the imperial city, but to the successor of the Prince of the Apostles, who was the Foundation of the Church and the Shepherd of all Christ's sheep. Fr. Puller has no right to blink the plain meaning of the words, by which a duty is laid upon the successor of Peter of exerting a superiority which all acknowledged in the coryphaeus of the apostolic choir.

It seems "most strange" that Fr. Puller should "refer with any pleasure to these canons of Sardica!"

The Council was not œcumenical, for the retirement of the Eusebian party had left it with less than a hundred members, and mainly Western. But it was of a broadly representative character. The most eminent Bishop of the day, Hosius of Cordova, was its president. St. Julius was represented. St. Athanasius voted in it, and stood for the united voice of the ninety Bishops of Egypt who were his suffragans, and who held his views. In the letter of the Council to Alexandria, preserved by the Saint, it describes itself as composed of Bishops from Rome, Spain, Gaul, Italy, Africa, Sardinia, Pannonia, Mysia, Dacia, Noricum, Tuscany, Dardania, the second Dacia, Macedonia, Thessaly, Achaia, Epirus, Thrace, Rhodope, Palestine, Arabia, Crete, and Egypt.

JOHN CHAPMAN, O.S.B.

ART. III.—RELIGIOUS INFLUENCES IN LONDON.

1. *Life and Labour of the People in London.* By CHARLES BOOTH. First Series: "Poverty," 4 vols. Second Series: "Industry," 5 vols. Third Series: "Religious Influences," 8 vols. and map. London: Macmillan and Co. 1902.
2. *Poverty: "A Study of Town Life."* By B. SEEBOHM ROWNTREE. London: Macmillan and Co. 1903.

PART II.

A CONSIDERATION of the work of the Salvation Army presents a difficulty. There should be no reasonable refusal to acknowledge that, merely as a philanthropic or social institution, the Salvation Army has done and is doing a real work, good in its way and within certain limits. It has lessened drunkenness, but cannot claim a monopoly in this excellent result. It has endeavoured to raise the "submerged tenth"; and in some cases it has certainly given a start to those it found in the depths of despair and degradation, enabling them to pursue a better life of self-respect and hopefulness. We are constrained to admit, with Mr. Charles Booth, that the creation of his namesake "General" Booth "at any rate must be placed among the most remarkable developments of the kind that the world has ever seen."* But notwithstanding material and numerical progress, it lives by

* *Life and Labour of the People in London.* Third Series, vol. vii., p. 332. Unless otherwise specified, the references will all be to vols. of the Third Series.

appeal to the elementary emotions. The evidence available concerning it, of which there is plenty, all points downwards: loss of spirituality is succeeded by emotionalism, tending to degenerate into sensuousness. It is of the earth, earthy. Upheld as it is by the personality of its remarkable originator, it may safely be prophesied that after his death it will sooner or later split into sections, and its present power and hold over that section of the masses to which it appeals will in consequence dwindle. Within recent years signs have not been wanting that the dangers of a split have been very real; hence the extraordinary demonstrations held last summer in London, when there was a "gathering of the clans" from the uttermost parts of the earth, have been recognised as a clever "boss" advertisement to attract recruits and funds. The permanent good of such "revivals" is highly controvertible; and the corybantic antics of the venerable "General," in the excess of his zeal and fervour, dancing with a "mammy" negress and hugging her before the vast applauding multitude is, to say the least, unedifying. How God's cause can be supposed to be furthered by such exhibitions passes the comprehension of sane individuals. Mr. Booth, had he had an account of these latest exhibitions before his eyes when he wrote, might have added a few useful sentences to his analysis of the Army and its work as presented in the following pregnant passages. As he sees it, the Salvation Army "has three aspects: that of a Gospel mission, that of a religious community, and that of an organisation for social work; but these, though distinct and tending to become more so, are closely interconnected. . . . [In Salvationist methods there is] much to shock feelings of reverence for sacred things, much that might irritate the man of culture and raise ungodly laughter in the worldling. The prolonged parody of military terms . . . lends itself freely to derision, while the use of every military designation . . . up to colonel and general, strikes a further note of absurdity. But the system was deliberately adopted with a popular aim . . . Of the genuineness and honesty of the attempt there can be no question. Moreover, the

mark was hit. The Army has been entirely successful in bringing the Gospel of Salvation freshly and simply to the notice of all, and especially to the notice of the classes standing aloof. This being so, it becomes the more remarkable that, as regards spreading the Gospel in London, in any broad measure, the movement has altogether failed. . . . [As regards their open-air services] there is much to arouse curiosity; anyone unaccustomed to these proceedings would hardly fail to join the circle and linger a little. . . . But it is rare for anyone to stay long. Never have I seen the slightest sign of interest. . . . Nor is this to be wondered at. Very seldom have the spoken words either life or power. They may once have been, they may even still be, genuine expressions of feeling, but used and heard again and again, as they necessarily must be, they come to have no more effect and little more character than the utterances of a megaphone. . . . It is difficult to maintain freshness. The repetition of the same thing time after time becomes painfully mechanical both indoors and out."* This passage is specially instructive, as it characterises remarkably and closely the rantings of Hyde Park spouters and the want of result that attends their loud-lunged efforts, and is equally descriptive of the street-corner services and open-air meetings to be seen any Sunday afternoon or evening in various parts of London. Written about the Salvation Army, the following passage epitomises Mr. Booth's verdict, not only on it, but also by implication on the other manifestations of zeal just referred to: "Justified as to its faith, is it also justified by its work? If the student of these matters turns his eyes from those conducting the service to those for whom it is conducted, he sees for the most part blank indifference. Some may 'come to scoff and stay to pray,' but scoffers are in truth more hopeful than those—and they are the great bulk of every audience of which I have ever made one—who look in to see what is going on; enjoying the hymns, perhaps, but taking the whole service as a diversion.

* VII., 323, 325-6, 328-9.

"I have said that I do not think the people of East London irreligious in spirit, and also that doctrinal discussion is almost a passion with them; but I do not think the Salvation Army supplies what they want in either one direction or the other. The design of the Army to 'make all men yield or at least listen,' will be disappointed in East London. On the other hand, they will find recruits there, as everywhere else in England, to swell the comparatively small band of men and women who form the actual Army of General Booth, and who may find their own salvation while seeking vainly to bring salvation to others. Not by this road (if I am right) will religion be brought to the mass of the English people."*

The general result, therefore, may be summed up in one sentence. In Mr. Booth's mature opinion the Salvation Army "is now of little importance as a religious influence, but has turned towards its 'social wing' the marvellous energies and powers of organisation, and the devoted work it commands."† Mr. Booth agrees with us Catholics that as a religious force it is an illusion; and referring to the fine centre possessed by this body in Clapton, is compelled to admit, notwithstanding much active work in progress there, that "with them, no less, and perhaps even more than with all the rest, it is their own religious life that is spun and woven; and what they would persuade themselves and others to believe as to their religious work in the world, and its influence as a Gospel deliverance, is but part of an extraordinary illusion which begins to stand unveiled before us."‡

There remains to notice certain nondescript individual work hanging on the fringe of the Church of England and "the churches." Men whom we must suppose fired with zeal, start a work of evangelisation on their own account. They do not label themselves as commissioned by any particular denomination. Their work, therefore, properly comes under the designation of individual effort, even though they themselves may be members of, say, the Established Church. Mr. Booth writes at length

* I., 126.

† II., 42.

‡ I., 95.

about this numerous body of enthusiasts, for that they undoubtedly are. It would be impossible to enumerate them. Some are educated men with university degrees, though the majority are to be reckoned amongst those who have had no previous training whatsoever. The "call" they have felt within themselves is sufficient commission and preparation. But whatever their intellectual equipment, whatever the particular aim set before each one of these evangelists, the work has been, and is, spasmodic, unorganised. It grows and decays with its originator. In so far as it is a genuine effort to reach and to better the untouched masses it cannot but appeal to our sympathy as a work of Christian charity; but as an aid to religion it is doomed to failure from its own inherent weakness. It lacks the support of the Gospel sanction: "How shall they preach unless they be sent?"* Mr. Booth does not, of course, view the failure of these efforts from our standpoint; he nevertheless recognises the fact. While acknowledging that the work is futile, he justly remarks that "the influence of the Gospel is over those who *work*, and only to a very small extent over those for whom they work. The workers, whose lives the Gospel really reaches, are mostly of an altogether different class from those they serve."† In Mr. Booth's opinion, the rôle filled by the missions leaves much to be desired, and that opinion is based on what he has heard from various quarters, from those whom he thinks competent to judge. "It is generally admitted," he says, "that 'mission work has become harder and harder as the people have become used to it.' 'Methods which once attracted have become stale.' 'Lantern services, for instance, are no longer so effective.' 'Brass-bands and negro evangelists are played out: the extraordinary has become the ordinary and no longer attracts.' It is being discovered by some that 'converted coal-heavers do not really do as good work as regular ministers and clergy'; and in another quarter we hear that the 'converted prize-fighter element is being dropped.' One witness even attributes the prevalent lack of religion

* Rom. xviii., 15.

† II., 195.

to a reaction against these sensational forms, but they are nevertheless still a great deal used. At one mission we hear of interesting and instructive (temperance) addresses entitled 'Catch 'em alive.' At another, the missionaries go familiarly by nicknames, of which they are proud, such as 'Salvation Jack,' 'Banjo,' and 'the Bishop.' 'Street preaching by uneducated men brings religion into disrespect,' says one. . . . The wholesale distribution of tickets for treats 'in order to show large totals' is strongly condemned, and the Ragged School Union is mentioned as a sinner in this respect. It is one of the undesirable features in the advertising system on which 'In His Name' they obtain their great income. But they do not stand alone in allowing the end to justify the means adopted to collect money for charitable objects. There are worse examples."* Anything that could be said by a Catholic in rebuke of such a system could not surpass the scathing condemnation conveyed in the foregoing words : it stands self-convicted.

Under the head of "missions" several references are made in Mr. Booth's volumes to the revivalist meetings held occasionally by the various Nonconformist bodies. These may be likened to our own retreat missions, both as to method adopted and, to some degree, as to the effect intended to be produced. It would ill-become anyone amongst ourselves to cavil at our own missions. At the same time, it is recognised that recourse should be had to them but seldom, lest the impression they create should stale by too frequent repetition. As it is, they too often stir up an excitement for the moment, only too surely to be followed by the inevitable reaction. It is excellent that backsliders should be reclaimed ; still, the value of the reclamation may be seriously doubted when Patsy or Biddy is as slack as ever about assisting at Sunday Mass within a month of making most solemn promises to reform. Every priest who has had a mission in his parish will endorse these remarks and illustrate them from his own sorrowful experience. Mr. Booth stigmatises the Protes-

* VII., 292-3.

tant, or, rather Nonconformist, variety as creating an unwholesome spiritual atmosphere, and quotes a Bible Christian minister as distinctly stating that great united missions do more harm than good. "They . . . are for the religious, a spiritual debauch." This opinion may be of some value in face of the Torrey-Alexander mission held early this year at the Albert Hall, and of the so-called Welsh revival conducted by Mr. Evan Roberts. A Presbyterian, speaking of sensational methods generally, remarks, "There is a spiritual as well as a spirituous dram-drinking," and then varies the metaphor by saying "you can raise the thermometer by putting your finger on the bulb."* Such strictures are not without their application even in our own body. It would be unprofitable to follow Mr. Booth in his study of the various types of missions, but the following description which he gives of one conducted in a lodging-house may serve as an example of scores of others, different though their objective may be; and the want of success of this one is symptomatic of the rest. "The inaugurator . . . while grieved that 'so little comes' (of these services from a religious point of view) . . . 'yet thinks they help to humanise.' He speaks of the lodging-house audiences as very attentive. I should rather say, so far as I have myself seen, that the services are accepted with good-humoured indifference, tempered by occasional dissentient grunts from those who listen at all. Cooking and eating proceed undisturbed; men come and go; . . . their religious value must be sought for mainly in the exemplary devotion shown by those who, Sunday after Sunday, pursue this seemingly hopeless work for Christ's sake."† Another widely known example of mission work is that so successfully conducted by Dr. Barnardo for now quite a number of years. But it is well to note Mr. Booth's conviction that it should rank as a charitable or philanthropic, rather than as a religious institution. "It is beyond question," he says, "the greatest charitable institution in London, or, I suppose, in the world, and its success has been deserved. The

* VII., 153.

† II., 18.

management has been stamped with the impress of a most remarkable personality, and may not have been free from faults, but they have been the defects of its qualities. It is easy to cavil; but there are few charities in favour of which so much, and against which so little, can be said. . . .”*

Another phase of individual effort is represented by the numerous Bible classes which have been formed here and there. Originally representing one of the activities of some church or mission, it would seem that, not infrequently, they have isolated themselves, and in their operations tend to become separate congregations or churches apart. Their aim may be good; but from the Catholic standpoint they can be productive of little else than harm. It is impossible to suppose that, how great soever the goodwill of the members, their want of education and training can end in anything but spiritual disaster when expended on such difficult and intricate work as is biblical criticism. The reasoning—if it may be dignified by such a term—cannot but be crude; and the spirit of self-complacency, self-sufficiency, and conceit necessarily engendered must be most harmful. A man who has accustomed himself to interpret and expound the Scriptures in this way to his own entire satisfaction is unlikely, except through a miracle of divine grace, to submit himself to any other authority outside himself. The tendency is rather to create new splits, new sections, new sects. A rising light as a biblical commentator will want to become a leader, and will be sure of finding some following. Mr. Booth's description of one such class may well represent all: “What it does is to provide a very strong religious diet for those whose souls demand it; and who find what they need, not in priestly guidance, nor in sitting under some gifted teacher; not in the solemn services of the church, nor in congregational enthusiasm, nor in mission fervour; but in open, equal, individualistic, democratic debate on the meaning of the Word of God, and in the interchange of spiritual experience. . . . As a religious exercise

* II., 46-8.

this system is open to the charge that it tends to feed personal vanity, the pride of eloquence, of argument, or still worse, leads to the pose and self-importance of public confession.* Mr. Charles Spurgeon is cited as regarding "the multiplication of small missions as an evil," and he mentions, "as one objection to them, the swollen self-importance they induced among precocious young people. He considers training necessary for work of this kind, and has a 'preachers' class' expressly for young men qualifying to take mission-hall services."† Such a class, however, cannot dispose of the initial objection against the inherent uneducatedness of the social grade from which these preachers are drawn. They have to earn their bread; they have not had time to learn even their own mother-tongue properly; much less can they find either the time or the means to equip themselves with the essential knowledge which alone could justify them in posing as spiritual leaders and guides. "If the blind lead the blind" disaster is as sure to follow now as when the aphorism was first uttered.

The evil of drink, though undoubtedly less than it was some years ago, nevertheless still cries aloud for remedy, and all denominations have in a certain sense united in a crusade against it. We have our League of the Cross; and outside the Church every parish or congregation has its Band of Hope, its Lodge of Good Templars, or similar institution, pledged to wage relentless war against this curse of the country. The success attained may vary, but the efforts are untiring. While we cannot but thankfully recognise the earnestness of those who direct this struggle against the demon of drink, we are perforce led to realise that danger lies even in these attempts to "serve the brethren." Though temperance, wisely preached, is capable of effecting untold good, its advocates only too frequently let zeal outrun discretion, and, in consequence, as often as not only succeed in repelling where their sole aim is to attract. Mr. Booth has clearly grasped this fact, and endorses the opinion of a certain missionary who

* II., 138.

† V., 55-6.

stated to him that "teetotalers do not help temperance reform by looking down on those who take alcohol—regarding total abstinence as a kind of gospel."* Another danger besets these temperance societies which has been already noticed in connection with Bible classes: the tendency to make them take the place of a church, and thus to multiply sects. In such circumstances it is useful to bear in mind Mr. Booth's excellent remarks on the subject of temperance work: "Christian people are not agreed," he remarks, "as to the best cure [for the evil of drink], and a religious mind no more implies total abstinence (though it may imply sobriety) than either sobriety or total abstinence implies a religious mind. The disconnection between these societies and religion is shown by the fact that they differ hardly at all, whatever the flag they fly. Low Church or High, Protestant, Nonconformist or Roman Catholic, or mission of whatever type, all employ much the same methods in seeking to deal with the same evil, and all equally fail."†

It will be perceived that, call it what we may, Mr. Booth's attitude towards the work of "the churches" practically resolves itself into one of indictment. Missions are futile, if not entirely failures; Bible classes do not serve a really useful purpose; temperance work is apt to end in cleavage; the training of preachers, in his mind, leaves something to be desired. All these things serve mainly to feed the hysterical strain that is to be found in human nature when not under careful control. We Catholics have been the butt of much obloquy because our ceremonial has been branded by those outside the Church as pandering to the senses. Nemesis is now to overtake our detractors, battering them with their own weapons. There are things that have drawing power, and things that have not. People crave to be interested without the strain of mental exertion on their own part. To stay at home and read a book may be edifying and instructive; but the average man or woman does not usually seek edification or instruction, but rather for some form of excitement to

* V., 24.

† VII., 20-21.

break the monotony of life. Even religious organisations minister to this craving. Even Puritanism in all its ramifications, in spite of its striving after a purely spiritual worship, has come to recognise that there are wants in human nature which, though standing on a lower plane, are legitimate and therefore may not be ignored. It is not necessary to enquire what the Nonconformists of one hundred years ago would have thought of Pleasant Sunday Afternoons, such as are now common in Nonconformist places of worship, or how they would have regarded the development of Nonconformist architecture and worship on the æsthetic side. With the Pleasant Sunday Afternoons (usually called P.S.A.) we have no quarrel, for we frankly look on them as a decent and orderly way of passing the time. But as an aid to religion they assume a proportion altogether different, and need to be weighed in a different balance. Mr. Booth thus describes their operations: "The ostensible object is always to reach those who do not come to church. . . . As regards the meetings to which both sexes and all ages are invited, the primary object, that of reaching the non-church goer, is hardly ever attained. . . . The 'hearty welcome' offered is regarded by outsiders with suspicion; 'in vain the net is spread.' It is only otherwise when the music given is so attractive and the number of strangers so great that individuality is lost; and then any religious value is probably lost too. And whether those who come are members of the congregation itself or of other congregations or are outsiders, these services amount to little more than the provision of an innocent form of amusement for Sunday afternoon. From the religious point of view they are important only as a symptom of congregational life."* In order exactly to understand the scope and procedure of a P.S.A., we need but to conjure up the picture portrayed by Mr. Booth, who tells us that the object is "to bring together as many men as possible on Sunday afternoon to a meeting that, to me, seems to lack all the essentials of religion. Some of the forms are

* IV., 147.

indeed retained. Prayer is offered, and a lesson read, and hymns are sung; but never for one moment does the impression of 'an entertainment' pass away. No feelings of reverence are aroused. An orchestra plays for half-an-hour before the 'chair' is taken, and also occasionally during the meeting, and there is usually a lady soloist. . . . The address is generally on some social question."* The methods of the churches which have adopted the P.S.A. and similar attractions do not meet with universal favour even amongst the Nonconformists. A minister of one of these sects told Mr. Booth that these services "do not reach the class aimed at. He even thinks that missions do more harm than good to the cause of religion, merely affording the 'opportunity for a spiritual debauch,' to those given that way; while Saturday concerts, instead of drawing in the 'public-house and drinking lot,' attract mainly church and chapel-goers; 'serving only to feed' (and here I think he is rather hard on the people) 'that inordinate love of pleasure which is the greatest hindrance to religious work'; and by late hours on Saturday likely to 'unfit them for their Sunday duties.'"[†]

Thus it must be admitted that an unwholesome and unreal spirit is engendered, which shows itself in a variety of ways. A false note is struck in the reports issued periodically by the chapels for the encouragement of their supporters. The unctuousness characteristic of this class of literature leaves a nasty savour, as it were, in the mouth. It is best known by the short expressive word "cant." As an example, a passage from a report of a Baptist "Zion," quoted by Mr. Booth, may be given here: "Unity abides in our midst. The services are fairly well attended. All our institutions are well sustained. The spirit of prayer is mightily manifested, and we are looking forward to showers of blessings."[‡] Attention is also called, with some disgust, to "a Bible woman nurse, whose work . . . ('always ready to speak a word for the Lord Jesus to her patients') is referred to rather unctuously in one of the minor reports. I do not doubt," says Mr. Booth, "that

* IV., 148.

† V., 122.

‡ V., 33.

this work, though probably rather futile on its religious side, and described in what is to me rather trying language, is the outcome of a genuine Christian endeavour.* Nevertheless, he confesses that he turns to other subjects with a sense of relief.

This emotionalism shows itself, in another way, discreditable to all concerned. With a view to raise money for their philanthropic and social works, many of these bodies make sensational appeals whose terms are grossly exaggerated, even if they do not actually, as too often is the case, trespass beyond the limits of truth. Mr. Booth refers to this evil tendency many times, but let one example here suffice. A chapel near Clare Market is an active centre, and "the charitable relief given is on an equally wholesale scale. . . . A good deal is spent. . . . The neighbouring religious bodies, whatever may be their own sins in the same direction, complain that the action of the mission is far from judicious and tends . . . to the pauperisation of the people. It is said that in order to make appeals for money successful, existing evils are greatly exaggerated, and an unnecessarily bad name given to the neighbourhood; that the blackest spots are depicted and the most sensational incidents recorded, it being implied, if not asserted, by the language used that such terrible scenes are not at all unusual; that the great changes of recent years are ignored; and that an old string is harped upon, and statements repeated again and again which, if they ever were true, are true no longer. In this I only report what is freely said by others who are no less keen to serve the poor."†

Wherever Mr. Booth's volumes are opened the same conclusions are arrived at: first, that philanthropy, rather than the service and worship of God, is the aim of "the churches." Thus, in reference to the work carried on at the "People's Hall" in Deptford, he says: "Efforts are made to maintain a sense of the importance of what is done, and stirring paragraphs appear in the Annual Church Report, but the high level of past zeal cannot be

* V., 32.

† II., 179-180.

sustained. The work at this hall is an admixture of philanthropy and the Gospel, enlivened by concerts. It is claimed that at the Gospel service held at 8 o'clock on Sunday evening they reach the poorest class, 'especially on the nights when the lime-light is used.' . . . During the winter much help is given . . . 'always in connection with religious services' . . . but it may be feared that the distribution of temporary relief . . . does far more harm than good."* This passage affords a valuable illustration of other evils already discussed. The means adopted by way of evangelising the poor and ignorant mostly resolve themselves into social work. As such it may meet with approval, entire or qualified, according to circumstances; but a clear distinction must be maintained between the functions of social work and those of religion: they must not be confounded and confusedly spoken of as if they were one and the same thing. Of the Wesleyan propaganda in East Greenwich the most that can be said for it is that "it is an effort to evangelise the poor, and adopts the usual programme for this purpose, in connection with which they admit 'too much is given.' The most successful item, numerically, is the 'Pleasant Saturday Evening.' . . . To the religious services there come the accustomed faithful few on Sunday morning."† With similar evidence before us, repeated so often, it is not too much to aver that excitement, not God, is what is offered and sought for. "Everywhere and anywhere a remarkable service, or a remarkable man, suffices to attract large crowds, morning and evening, Sunday after Sunday."‡ Mr. Booth gives a clever and descriptive name to this love of novelty and excitement when he terms it "the habit of religious gipsying among chapel-goers."§ But this does not exhaust his vocabulary. Elsewhere he writes: "The efforts of the managers (of a great assembly hall are) devoted to the task of finding for their platform a succession of famous mission preachers. It is objected that they 'preach to the converted'; that only a change of religious diet or some fresh excitement

* V., 34.

† V., 65.

‡ II., 196.

§ III., 145.

is sought, and that those who come in this spirit are 'landed nowhere.' The words 'religious dissipation' and 'religious pleasuring' are used to describe the evening services. These charges are very distasteful and are bitterly controverted, but in the main they are true."*

On the strength of this multiplied evidence gathered by an unbiassed enquirer, we are brought to the point when we can say that the very spirit of which Catholicism is so often accused belongs, not to the Church, but to "the churches." They subsist and thrive on *emotionalism*, as almost their only diet. To illustrate precisely what is meant, read Mr. Booth's experience at a Wesleyan 'mission' in South London: "In the evening I . . . joined an after prayer meeting, when ten or fifteen people were present. The service was conducted with the direct aim of saving the soul of a young woman. This poor creature was prayed for and at, and moving hymns were sung and great efforts made to create the spiritual atmosphere needed to bring about the desired result. It was to me all very dreadful, and perhaps, on my part, it was monstrous to study the process in cold blood, for I was moved only to horror. On all hands the enthusiasm seemed very forced, hardly real except in a few of the kneeling women, one of whom poured forth a long, almost inaudible prayer—not real at all, it seemed to me, with any of the men, of whom there were three. There was one who practically conducted the proceedings, praying loudly and at length, suggesting and leading the hymns, and generally pushing things on; and there was the brother who actually had the young woman in hand. This brother knelt beside her and from time to time spoke to her, and then would report progress aloud: 'Our sister is very near conversion—thank God,' and so on—these remarks being responded to by ejaculations from others present. The young woman herself was not kneeling, but sat rather stolidly, I thought. However, when the man considered that the time had come, he left her and sent two women, who sat on either side of her, and finally led her off

* I. 44.

between them (like tame elephants a wild one) to the enquiry room, and then this strange service was soon brought to an end. The third man, who nominally presided, sat at a desk on the platform and said nothing, except that once, when the leader had appealed to those present for aid in prayer and no one responded, it became the president's duty to step into the breach, which he did in a rather formal way. I do not think he liked any part of the affair."* Could such an exhibition be imagined in connection with a Catholic Church, even during a "mission"? The very suggestion is revolting; and yet it is as the breath to the nostrils for these sects. We need go no further than to Wales during the past early winter for a series of extraordinary scenes in connection with the revivalist preaching of a mere boy. The boot belongs to the other leg; the retort should be flung by us, not against us.

The verdict arrived at by Mr. Booth is that failure is writ large across all these efforts—call them social, philanthropic or religious—to better the poor. He says "the story is almost the same whatever the ritual. This, of course, does not imply that the *same individuals* would be attracted, but it does seem that about an equal *proportion* of the population is influenced in each case, and in about an equal degree. If this is failure, then they all fail; but if it is success, they all alike succeed."† "The efforts of the religious bodies," he elsewhere states, "to improve the conditions of life where they are lowest, taken as a whole fail. At most what we see is a gradual humanising effect, and in this direction the influence of the schools is greater than that of the churches."‡

Even when thus placing the influence exerted by the schools above that of the churches, the low view Mr. Booth takes of the *rôle* of the school—the Sunday school, of course, in particular—would seem to be justified if our knowledge of the working classes has any value whatever. The parents send their children to school: on the week-days because they *must*, the law compels them; on the

* IV., 182-3.

† IV., 45.

‡ I., 156.

Sundays mostly for the sake of convenience, not from conviction; to earn a treat or an outing, not for the training. "Religious influence has also its chance in regard to the young. As to this the facts are very remarkable. The children of the respectable working classes, even of professed atheists, come regularly to Sunday School. The parents think it only right that they should, and the children like to come. Carefully washed and brushed, and prettily dressed, they troop to the nearest school and are abandoned, without hesitation, to the religious teaching offered there, whatever it may be. It is said by some (rather meanly) that the parents have at heart, not their children's benefit, but solely their own comfort, being anxious to get them out of the way. So, too, the rich are glad at times to send their children to the nursery. Others say that parents profit in home comfort by the docility which the children acquire. For my part I see no reason to doubt that the ruling motive is the good of the children, and the wish to do what is right and usual; but it is certain that, as amongst Protestant churches, no discrimination is exercised for or against any of their forms of religious doctrine. 'They make no invidious distinctions between the sects.' The religious bodies strive to keep Protestants and Catholics apart, and with the help of social cleavages this can generally be done; but as between all forms of Protestantism nothing of the kind is possible; the children go to the most convenient school, or, when rivalry runs high, are fought for by contending visitors. At any rate, the children are everywhere reached without difficulty, are sent freely, and attend willingly. To encourage them to maintain an allegiance to this or that school, and to attend with regularity, an outing or treat of some kind is usually provided in the summer, and perhaps a Christmas festivity.*

Hitherto the religious influences at work in London have been dealt with in this paper, in so far as they may be said to be taking effect in relation to those who are actually reached by them. But there remains a residuum—

* I., 28-9.

a very large one—of those to whom religion is an unexplored and unknown region. It is a vast problem. All the churches set out with the idea of reaching the heathen who teem within the confines of London—thousands who call not on the name of God but to garnish an oath; whose lives are a blot upon and a disgrace to our civilisation. They are the pariahs of our system. Social work and philanthropy expend themselves in a fruitless effort to better their lot: even religion after all its endeavours has been unable to prick the rhinoceros-hide of their ignorance and indifference. A London vicar says that “‘the way to reach the poor of London with the Gospel has not yet been discovered. Religion in any real sense does not enter into the lives of the great bulk of the people here. . . . They think it the proper thing to have their children baptised, marriages solemnised, and the burial service read in church, but anything further is generally conspicuous by its absence. The result is that a very small proportion ever attend any place of worship except on an occasion like a Harvest Festival or Watch Night Service.’” * He adds that ‘the efforts made by well meaning and zealous people to attract congregations by brass bands, shows, advertisements, extraordinary titles and sensational services seem only to emphasise the existing indifference.’” * This sad state of things naturally raises the question as to what can be the reason underlying this want of success. It is that the working-man lives to a certain extent in a world of his own, practically inaccessible to any but those of his own class. The clergy “‘have not succeeded spite of strenuous work in bridging the gulf between church and people. ‘I would,’ said one of the clergy, ‘die for the working-man, but I do not really understand him: I cannot speak his language and I cannot think his thoughts.’ This inability to see eye to eye with the working classes he believes to be the chief cause of the failure of the Church to touch them.” †

This influence exercised by class raises an interesting subject of debate. It would appear that Mr. Booth is to

* IV., 20.

† I., 175.

some extent right in the view he takes of what may be called "heredity" in religious belief. Before considering the lowest stratum of the social layers, it may be well to follow his classification of the population according to the several strata occupied by it. "There are some," he says, "among the oldest of English families whose traditions hold them faithful to the Church of Rome, but . . . the great bulk of those of rank and station . . . belong to the Church of England . . . not only steady supporters, but for the most part truly and warmly attached members. . . . Their devotional expression is, as a rule, cold and unemotional, but with no class is religion more completely identified with duty. . . . Doctrinal difficulties do not trouble them much; their balance is not easily upset . . . all their traditions are conservative. The part played by religion in their lives is, as a rule, by no means large, but it is constant.

"Those who come next in the social scale . . . are also mostly members of the Church of England, and supply the Church with many of her clergy. Amongst this class religious observance is usual, but the attitude towards religion is perhaps less calm than that described above. . . . There are among them many restless minds and lives with no safe anchorage, and [this] has given rise to the wild hopes of Rome for the conversion of England. . . .

"With the next social layer . . . the Nonconformist bodies . . . take the lead of the Church of England. . . . The place of religion in their lives is fully recognised. If they succeed they gives thanks to God: it is 'the Lord who prospers them.' The language they use often savours of cant, and there may be sheer hypocrisy sometimes, but in general their religion is to them a daily reality, and they are content in it and untroubled by doubt. . . . The great section of the population which passes by the name of the working classes, lying socially between the lower middle class and the 'poor,' remains, as a whole, outside of all the religious bodies, whether organised as churches or as missions. . . . As regards religious influence, the Roman Catholic poor stand out as an

exception. They constitute a class apart, being, as a rule, devout and willing to contribute something from their earnings towards the support of their schools and the maintenance of their religion; but at the same time they are great beggars, as well as heavy drinkers, and there is no sign that the form which practical Christianity takes in their case helps to make them in these respects either more self-reliant or more self-restrained."*

If, then, we eliminate the Catholic Church from our survey, as being admittedly in a class apart, the resultant verdict is that religion is after all largely a matter of class, or, in other words, of fashion of following a lead. In illustration may be cited Mr. Booth's general estimate of Clapham: "Nonconformists are more confident and more successful than the Church; but with them, too, *there is a natural class limit*. Their churches are mainly supported by the lower middle class found largely in the streets pink barred with red [in reference to a colour scheme adopted in the maps]; with the working class (pure pink) their difficulties begin; and in the very few streets that show a really poor element (blue) all religious efforts fail here as elsewhere."†

With the Nonconformist class we come in contact with the working-man who, though often religious after his own fashion, is more frequently indifferent, if not actually hostile, to religion. What his particular fashion in religion is, is lucidly explained in Mr. Booth's volumes. It is a dogmatism based on vague, ill-defined ideas, together with superstitions—for now they are little better—founded on forgotten Catholic doctrine and practice, intelligible to the most ignorant of our own poor, but mere forms handed down by tradition out of a hazy past for those outside the Church. "The lack of religious sentiment," it is said, "is partly due to the feeling of the people that the Church touches a set of subjects different altogether from those in which they are themselves interested, and that consequently they are well able to get on without its aid. It is not, they say, that the people are ignorant of religion, but that

* III., 395-6, 399, 401.† V., 177-8. *Italics mine.*

religion is divorced from conduct. . . . Meanwhile it is admitted that the use of the Church services for marriage, churchings, and baptisms, and the crowding in on the last night of the Old Year, or for a harvest thanksgiving, are simply due to superstition."*

"The religious ideas of the mass of the people are certainly undeveloped; and here I may quote the opinion of a thoughtful layman, who has had prolonged and intimate acquaintance with this class. He says: 'Among working-men a kind of sublimated trades' unionism is the most prevalent gospel, a vague bias towards that which is believed to be good for one's fellow-man.'"† Elsewhere the same ideas are expressed. "Young curates, full of enthusiasm, expect great things; but these great results don't come. The people are described as being 'uninstructed,' as 'believing vaguely in the doctrines of the Christian religion,' and as looking to be married in Church, and so forth, while 'at the hour of death they are resigned and ready to go, satisfied with a few simple religious phrases for comfort.' This easy condition of mind, it is suggested, may be connected with the very vagueness of their religious ideas."‡ A rector's estimate of the working man's religion sums up the situation very neatly: ". . . very little atheism. Most men believe in a God, to whom they ascribe their own vague humanitarian impulses and their own lax moral standard—a God who makes small demands on them for worship or right conduct, and with whom they are consequently on the best of terms. They have no sense of sin; they have nothing on their conscience; they have never done anything wrong (which means, at the outside, that they have never come within the policeman's grasp); they positively bask in the sense of the approbation of their indulgent Deity. . . . It is not, as a rule, that they object to Christianity—for the most part they call themselves Christians, and regard their religion (alluded to above) as the Christian religion. The simple fact is, they won't take the trouble either to seek for the truth or to face its consequences. . . . But is

* IV., 67.

† VII., 37.

‡ IV., 12-13.

this indifference confined to religion? Certainly not; it extends among the working class to practically every subject beyond physical needs and enjoyments. . . . They are ready to 'demonstrate' at any time and for almost any object. They will insist vehemently on Labour Representation and Progressive Programmes, but do not take the trouble to turn out even to vote." *

The negative side of this question may be stated in the following reasons, put forward to explain the working-man's objection to religion. It is not want of decent clothes, expense, or the intricacies of a liturgy which deter the working-man from church-going. It is acknowledged, too, that want of means to support religion does not keep them back, for amongst our Catholics everyone contributes something, and it is truly said: "For that which is valued the people will find the means to pay; and, on the other hand, they rarely do value that for which they pay nothing." The objection must be sought elsewhere, and it will be found that it is "a moral obstacle with which we are confronted. What the classes above seek in religion is its support; what the working-man fights shy of is its discipline. Working-men have a far more exacting conception of its ethical obligations (it may be added, as binding on others rather than on themselves). They expect a religious man to make his life square with his opinions. They like their club with its pot of beer, its entertainments, its games of cards or billiards, or the 'pub' and its associates, and a bet on to-morrow's race, but they look on these things as inconsistent with all religious profession; and every form of religious association thus becomes (if they think seriously about the matter at all) something from which, in honesty, they must hold themselves aloof.

"They are unwilling to accept a restraint that would deprive them of their every-day pleasure, and the step to denounce as hypocrites those members of religious bodies who lead mundane lives is easily made. And they are, as might be supposed, especially prone to observe instances

of a lack of Christian conduct or of just dealing among their employers, who may at the same time figure prominently as Church members.”*

This indifference is not confined to one class of working-men, or to one district of London: it is universal, common to all. A missionary in Clapham, for instance, says that it is “almost impossible to get the people to a religious service by legitimate means. ‘The world,’ he affirms, ‘hates God more than ever.’ ‘If you preach an easy-going Gospel with tea-meetings and so on, you can get the people in flocks, but if you preach the Gospel of salvation through Christ, and the complete change of life it involves, you can only get one in here and there.’ ‘Social or socio-political work fails to effect any change in the man. The working-man likes to be told he is a saint and that all employers are devils; but that sort of thing does him no good. . . . The men are indifferent, atheistic, and socialistic; the women immersed in family cares and struggles, and are, or profess to be, afraid of their husbands. ‘My husband,’ they will say, ‘says my place is at home, and if I go to the Hall, he’ll see about it.’”† Of a parish in Newington and Walworth it was stated, with cynical candour, that “the congregations are not large, but . . . no less than 800 people, young and old, went for the annual congregational outing,”‡ thus emphasising what has been charged against their class before: that pleasuring, not God, is what is sought. This low view of motive finds corroboration in a neighbouring district. The parish belonging to the Establishment is an “example of very energetic work of Low Church type. There is deep discouragement at the lack of permanent results, but no relaxation of effort, and the amount of work done is enormous. . . . Entertainments at the mission-rooms will be crammed, but every kind of effort has been tried without success to bring the poorer classes to worship. The most remarkable experiment has been an early morning service (5.30 a.m.) for railway men, with a bunch of flowers for each comer. To this service

* I., 89-90.

† VI., 48.

‡ IV., 62.

many of the men came and women also. It was hoped thus to lead them on to Church in a regular way, but such has not been the result. Here as elsewhere the attitude of the men and of the bulk of the people is one of utter indifference. 'Why don't they go to Church?' said the vicar. 'For the same reason that I don't go to race meetings: it does not interest them; they know nothing about it.'* At Hackney it was found that all the parishes "have empty churches, and the general attitude of the people is that of complete indifference. . . . A few come to Church, and many more (it is rather curiously put) 'stay away because they cannot get anything by coming'—that is, in the way of relief."† In the west the story is the same. The report about Hammersmith thus expresses it: "Indifference to church matters is spreading. . . . Of this, Sunday bicycling is said to be a symptom rather than a cause. It only makes neglect easier. . . . There are clubs for men and boys which exercise, a humanising, but admittedly no religious, influence. Variety entertainments are held with the same aim. . . . The secularisation of Sunday is felt in the difficulty of obtaining workers . . . and beyond this, in the demoralisation which results from pleasure and excitement. Here, too, an attempt is made to meet the trouble homœopathically by entertainments. . . . But, nevertheless, the reports are gloomy reading. The tide is flowing against the Church. From parish to parish we meet the same story . . . working class portion ignoring church services, and so on; and usually we find the same rather desperate resort to comic entertainments, with animated pictures, step and clog dancing, solos on the bones and other attractions, provided as items of parish organisation. Yet it should be said that the impression gained from visiting these churches, as to the genuine religious value of this work, is more favourable than that given by the clergy, so far as they have been seen. And this is not of common occurrence."‡ A Congregational missionary in Bethnal Green says that he does not "claim

* VI., 9.

† II., 78.

‡ III., 164-5.

any marked spiritual results, but recognises an effort on the part of the poor to raise themselves in appearance. Those of them who attend the services become more respectable, more particular as to cleanliness, and better dressed."* This distressing indifference is elsewhere stated in terms of attendance, which may convey more to the statistical mind than any verbal description. "As to the mass of residents in Hoxton, we hear without contradiction that not one grown-up person in thirty, or some say, not one in fifty, and some again not one in eighty, attends any religious service."† In a parish formerly served by Dr. Winnington Ingram, the present Bishop of London, "a kind of religious census was taken (during the year 1895), and it was found that only about one in eighty of the men went either to church or chapel, a proportion on which a more recent census shows no great improvement."‡

The explanations offered for this terrible state of things are various. The Ritualists have, in effect, said that if the education of the children were left to them, they would instil proper instruction and a sense of duty, and rear a God-fearing people. They have had their wished-for opportunities, yet they cannot but admit failure. "Extreme doctrines and advanced practices no doubt find some adherents . . . but the attitude of the masses on the whole question of religion seems to show that the fears of the [Protestant] Alliance [for the 'Romanising' of England] are groundless, at any rate as far as the adult population is concerned. The children are, as always, truly catholic and impartial in matters of doctrine and observance, and the after effects of the great teaching zeal shown by the Ritualists cannot be indicated with certainty. But so far as has been seen, the children no sooner leave school than they break loose from clerical guidance, and in every direction seek their liberty. As they grow up they fall into the common attitude of the people, and from religion generally, and this form of religion in particular the people hold aloof."§ With all their earnestness and the splendid devotion they have brought to the task, the Ritualists have

* II., 72-3.

† II., 118.

‡ II., 77.

§ II., 83.

not succeeded either in strengthening conviction or in implanting it where it did not exist.

What is the reason for this non-attendance at Church? "Dress is a common and perfectly sincere excuse; but it is only an excuse. The effort after a decent life, which would lead men or women to attend some place of worship voluntarily, never stumbles over this obstacle. . . . So, too, the ordinary habits of the people—the late lying in bed on Sunday mornings [etc., etc.]—are pointed to as obstacles to church-going. But time is found for all these things by those who do go to Church, except the last hour or two in bed of a morning.

"That there is at bottom nothing in the question of dress, nor in poverty generally to interfere with church-going, is shown conclusively by the Roman Catholic Churches, whose people include the very poorest. Large numbers of every class attend Mass. For the very poor, as for the well-to-do among Catholics, this is a religious duty; and though they sort themselves more or less according to class in the hour at which they come, all are ready to enter and kneel down together in the House of God. But amongst Protestants, as regards the labouring classes, church-going is rarely attained, except with the very poor in connection with relief; and then it is only the women who come."* Such an admission vitiates the value of the act: the motive is not the worship of God, an act of religion, but merely a low, if not hypocritical, form of cadging.

It may be objected that Mr. Booth takes an unnecessarily sombre view of the religion, or rather lack of religion, of the people; but it cannot be denied that with his unique opportunities for learning the real state of things, his strictures must come to be admitted. They carry weight; they must challenge enquiry if they are denied; and must be met squarely, fact by fact, with positive proof to the contrary, or accepted as at least an approximate presentment of evils as they exist.

HENRY NORBERT BIRT, O.S.B.

* I., 85-87.

ART. IV.—WHY DOES THE PROTESTANT CHURCH READ THE BOOK OF ESTHER?

“Esther (*i.e.* the Book) sent to the Wise the following entreaty, ‘Write me in the Book (*i.e.* the Canon) for all Ages.’ They sent to her in answer, ‘It is written, Have not I written three things?’”—Talmud, Megilla, 7a.

IF we were to ask any devout Protestant reader of the Bible why they accepted the Book of Esther we should probably receive for answer: “Because our Church does so.” It would be interesting to hear what answer that same Church, if indeed it could be got at so as to elicit a reply from it, would give to the same question. Why does the Protestant Church receive the Book of Esther? A harmless question and one which a Catholic could answer at once if he were asked why his Church received it.

Some one once remarked that of all the many hoaxes foisted upon a credulous world, Protestantism was the greatest. The same may be said of the so-called Hebrew Canon of Sacred Scripture which is commonly accepted by all Christian Churches other than the Catholic. We really need a lawyer like Tertullian to show up some of the fallacies which are accepted by so many as irrefragable truths. Even now his lawyer-like precision and his logical outspokenness finds its way through the armour of years of custom, thus Dr. Hort loses patience over the *de Præscriptione Hereticorum*, and calls it a “most plausible and mischievous book.”*

But to return to the book of Esther. The distinction of the books of the Old Testament into Protocanonical

* *Ante-Nicene Fathers*, p. 103.

and Deuterocanonical has long been in vogue; the former term indicates those books about which there has never been any dispute, the latter those the canonicity of which has been questioned. These latter, *viz.*, Wisdom, Ecclesiasticus, Tobias, Judith, Baruch, 1 and 2 Maccabees, and certain fragments of Esther and Daniel, the Protestant Church rejected at the Reformation, and, adding insult to injury, dubbed them "apocryphal," a most unjust as well as uncritical use of the term.

It was claimed that this ruthless pruning was a return to the witness of antiquity, and it was roundly asserted that the Early Fathers knew nothing about these books, that the New Testament was ignorant of them, that they never had a place in the Hebrew Canon, that they were a mere spurious product of Alexandria, that the great Doctor of the Western Church, St. Jerome, explicitly rejected them, and so forth. It is just possible, though we have no means of verifying it, that one little passage from the second Book of Maccabees motived this wholesale repudiation:

"And so betaking themselves to prayers, they besought him, that the sin which had been committed might be forgotten. But the most valiant Judas exhorted the people to keep themselves from sin, forasmuch as they saw before their eyes what had happened, because of the sins of those that were slain.

"And making a gathering, he sent twelve thousand drachms of silver to Jerusalem for sacrifice to be offered for the sins of the dead, thinking well and religiously concerning the resurrection.

"(For if he had not hoped that they that were slain should rise again, it would have seemed superfluous and vain to pray for the dead.)

"And because he considered that they who had fallen asleep with godliness, had great grace laid up for them.

"It is therefore a holy and wholesome thought to pray for the dead, that they may be loosed from sins."*

And an illustration of this is afforded by the use made of these so-called "apocrypha" in the Anglican Liturgy. Ecclesiasticus is appointed to be read in November. The lesson taken from the third chapter ends at the thirtieth verse exclusively (the thirty-third in the Douay version);

* 2 Macc. xii. 42-46.

when, however, we turn to our Bibles we see why the two remaining verses are omitted from the lesson; they run thus:

“Water quencheth a flaming fire, and alms resisteth sins:

“And God provideth for him that sheweth favour: he remembereth him afterwards, and in the time of his fall he shall find a sure stay.”*

This was uncomfortable doctrine for men who held that “faith without works” sufficed for salvation! Hence its excision. We are at once reminded of the similar passage in Tobias:

“Prayer is good with fasting and alms more than to lay up treasures of gold:

“For alms delivereth from death, and the same is that which purgeth away sins, and maketh to find mercy and life everlasting.”†

Was this, together with its doctrines about angels, the motive for the rejection of Tobias?

As years have gone by various attempts have been made to justify this crude piece of criticism by appeals to the Early Church, for a dilemma yawned before the Reformers and their descendants. What they upheld was the Jewish Canon, but was it because it was Jewish, or because such was the witness of the Early Church? It would never do to avow that the Synagogue was their guide, the primitive Church must be appealed to in support of their position. So the appeal was made, and, seemingly, resulted most satisfactorily, for great names could be produced in favour of a Christian Canon identical with that of the Jews.

But before discussing the statements adduced in favour of the Protestant Canon, we must realise the consequences of an appeal to the Synagogue. No one will deny that to the Jews alone the sacred deposit was committed, and undoubtedly they nobly fulfilled their trust during the centuries intervening between the Restoration and the coming of Christ. The zeal with which they collected and safeguarded the holy books is clear from the words of the author of the second Book of Maccabees:

“And these same things were set down in the memoirs and

* Eccles. iii. 33-34.

† Tobias xii. 8-9.

commentaries of Nehemias : and how he made a library, and gathered together out of the countries, the books both of the prophets, and of David, and the epistles of the kings, and concerning the holy gifts.

"And in like manner Judas also gathered together all such things as were lost by the war we had, and they are in our possession.

"Wherefore if you want these things, send some that may fetch them to you."*

Still, it by no means follows that the Synagogue was any more than a lifeless chest preserving these treasures "until a faithful Prophet should arise." Neither did it follow because they were the appointed guardians as a nation that that guardianship was limited to those of their nation actually living in the Holy Land. An appeal, then, to the Synagogue to assign the limits of the Canon was a retrograde step which could only involve a denial of any living Church of God which transcended the old dispensation. Appeal then was made, and, as I have said, seemingly not unsuccessfully, to the primitive Church, or rather, the Church of the second to fourth centuries, A.D. What is the result? The Fathers from East and West are marshalled in imposing array, closing with S. Jerome with his famous *Prologus Galeatus*, and they are declared to uphold a Christian Canon identical with the Hebrew Canon. And, indeed, the supporter of the Deuterocanonical books has good reason to be dismayed when he reads the words of these champions of orthodoxy, for they are definite and precise to a degree :

First of all comes S. Athanasius with his Festival Epistle :

"But since we have made mention of heretics as dead, but of ourselves as possessing the Divine Scriptures for salvation ; and since I fear lest, as Paul wrote to the Corinthians, some few of the simple should be beguiled from their simplicity and purity by the subtlety of certain men, and should henceforth read other books—those called apocryphal—led astray by the similarity of their names with the true books. . . . I shall adopt the pattern of Luke the Evangelist, saying on my own account : 'Forasmuch as some have taken in hand' to reduce into order for themselves the books termed apocryphal, and to mix them

* 2 Macc. ii. 13-15.

up with the divinely-inspired Scripture, concerning which we have been fully persuaded, as they who from the beginning were eye-witnesses and ministers of the Word, delivered to the fathers; it seemed good to me also . . . having learned from the beginning, to set before you the books included in the Canon, and handed down and accredited as Divine. . . . There are, then, of the Old Testament, twenty-two books in number, for, as I have heard, it is handed down that this is the number of the letters among the Hebrews. . . ."

The holy Doctor then enumerates the Books of the Pentateuch and the historical books as usually given; after which he proceeds as follows:

"After these there is the Book of Psalms, then the Proverbs, then Ecclesiastes, and the Song of Songs. Job follows, then the Prophets, the twelve being reckoned as one book. Then Isaias, one book, then Jeremias with Baruch, Lamentations and the Epistle, one book; afterwards Ezechiel and Daniel, each one book. Thus far the Old Testament."

After giving the Canon of the New Testament exactly as we have it, he continues:

"But for greater exactness I add this also, writing of necessity, that there are other books besides these not included indeed in the Canon, but appointed by the Fathers to be used by those who newly join us and who wish for instruction in the word of Godliness. The wisdom of Solomon, and the wisdom of Sirach, and Esther and Judith and Tobit, and that which is called the Teaching of the Apostles and the Shepherd. But the former, my brethren, are included in the Canon, the latter being read; nor is there in any place a mention of apocryphal writings."*

This statement is precise, and certainly seems at first sight to favour the Protestant view. Before discussing it, however, we will take a few more passages. S. Cyril, of Jerusalem, delivered his Catechetical Lectures in the years 347-8, partly in the Anastasis, partly in the Basilica of Constantine; they were addressed to candidates for Baptism. In his Fourth Lecture he speaks of the Holy Scriptures as follows:

"Learn, also, diligently, and from the Church, which are the books of the Old Testament and which of the New; and read not, I pray you, any of the uncertain books. For why shouldst

* The 39th Festival Epistle, ed. Schaff and Wace, *Ante-Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, vol. iv.

thou, who knowest not those which are acknowledged by all, take needless trouble about those which are questioned. Read the Holy Scriptures, these two-and-twenty books of the Old Testament, which were interpreted by the seventy-two interpreters."

Then follows an account of the formation of the Septuagint version, after which the Saint continues :

"Read the two-and-twenty books of these Scriptures, and have nothing to do with the uncertain books. Those only study earnestly which we read confidently when in church. Far wiser than thou, and more devout, were the Apostles, and the ancient Bishops, the Rulers of the Church, who have handed down these ; thou, therefore, who art a child of the Church, trench not on their sanctions. And of the Old Testament, as hath been said, study the two-and-twenty books, and these, if thou art diligent, strive to remember by name as I repeat them."

He then gives the ordinary lists till we come to the twelfth book :

"The twelfth is the book of Esther : these are the historical books. The books which are written in verses are five ; Job and the book of Psalms, and Proverbs, and Ecclesiastes, and the Song of Songs, which is the seventeenth book. After these come the five Prophetic books, the one book of the Twelve Prophets, the book of Esaias, the book of Jeremias, which, with Baruch, the Lamentations, and the Epistle makes one book ; then Ezechiel ; and the book of Daniel is the twenty-second book of the Old Testament."*

We can feel the difficulty of this and the foregoing citations for the Catholic side, but it is not hard to see breakers ahead for the Protestant advocates.

A still more important witness for the shorter or Hebrew Canon is to be found in Melito the Bishop of Sardis (c. 180). Eusebius (iv. 26) gives an extract from the Eclogues of Melito, which runs as follows :

"Melito to his brother Onesimus, greeting. Since you have often asked in your zeal for the word that you might have some extracts both from the Law and the Prophets concerning our Saviour and our entire Faith, and since you were anxious to have an accurate list of the ancient books, what their number and order might be, I have earnestly endeavoured to do this, knowing your eagerness about the faith and your desire for

* Lecture iv., 33-35, Oxford Translation.

knowledge about the word, and because, from your desire after God, you prefer these things to all else, striving about eternal salvation. Accordingly when I went to the East and was on the spot where these things were preached and enacted, and had carefully learnt the books of the Old Testament, I made a list of them as below and sent it to you. And these are their names : ”

Then follows the enumeration of the books of the Hebrew Canon. Two things are remarkable in it, viz., the curious statement “ the Proverbs of Solomon, which is wisdom,” and the omission of Esther.

Before examining further the question of the Canonicity of Esther, we must try and find an explanation of the citations already given.

Do they mean that S. Cyril in Jerusalem, S. Athanasius in Alexandria, and Melito in the See of Sardis really held that the only Canonical books of the Old Testament were those of the Hebrew Canon? It is very strange, but perhaps, after all, only human nature, that even those who pride themselves on the possession of the critical faculty are often painfully one-sided in their view. We see what we want to see in a document, and if it is on the surface so much the better for us, it dispenses us from the labour of turning over the sods. The passage from S. Athanasius is but a portion of one of his Festival Epistles, and written under peculiar circumstances ; the same must be said of S. Cyril’s statement, it is part of a popular exposition of doctrine for beginners ; while Melito’s words are simply preserved by Eusebius, and of his voluminous writings only a few equally small fragments remain.*

When, on the strength of such passages as these, it is roundly asserted that these Fathers did not recognise the Deuterocanonical Books, it will hardly be believed that in S. Athanasius’ Tracts against the Arians, as given in the Oxford translation of the Fathers, there occur three quotations from the Book of Wisdom, and two from Ecclesiasticus, and five from Baruch, while in the volume of select works and letters of the Saint published by Schaff and Wace there occur no less than sixteen citations from

* cf., Routh, *Reliquiae Sacrae*, vol. i.

Wisdom, seven from Ecclesiasticus, while Judith is strongly commended, and Tobias is quoted twice. Nor is any distinction made by the Saint between these books which are not on his list as given above, and those in which he declared "alone is proclaimed the doctrine of Godliness." To give but one example out of many: when explaining in what sense the Son of God can be called a "creature" he cites five texts together, viz., Ps. civ. 24; Rom. viii. 22; Apoc. viii. 9; 1 Tim. iv. 4, and Wisd. ix. 2, and all are included under the one head of "Divine Scripture."

Clearly the Saint's practice is opposed to his theory, or, as we should more reverently say, some explanation must exist of the list of the books of the Old Testament given in the Festival Epistle.

So similarly with regard to S. Cyril. He does not include in his list the Book of Wisdom nor that of Ecclesiasticus, yet he quotes each of them three times in his catechetical lectures, and he nowhere draws any distinction regarding their authority as proof.

Had it been question of some passage which involved no unpleasant consequences if thoroughly worked out, Protestant theologians would have contrasted these two facts, this seeming conflict between theory and practice, and would have endeavoured to find some fitting explanation of it. Before searching for such an explanation, however, let us look a little more closely at the passages above quoted, and see if they can tell us anything which may argue for or against the Protestant view.

And the first thing which strikes us is that though the Canon proposed by the above-mentioned Fathers may be the Hebrew Canon "materialiter" it is not so "formaliter" if I may be pardoned these scholastic terms. In other words, it is not given us because the *Jews* have so handed it down—except perhaps in the case of Melito, as we shall see later. Both S. Cyril and S. Athanasius emphatically declare that it is upon the witness of the Early Church that we depend for our knowledge of the number and names of the sacred books. Thus S. Athanasius: "Since some have attempted to draw up for themselves lists of the aforesaid

apocryphal books and intermingle them with the divinely-inspired Scripture, with regard to which we have full conviction according to what they, who were from the beginning eye-witnesses and ministers of the word, handed down to our fathers"; and S. Cyril: "Learn with all earnestness *from the Church* what are the books of the Old and what of the New Testament."

The next noteworthy point is the very precise distinction drawn by S. Athanasius between what he calls the Apocrypha and those books which he says "are not in the Canon"; he attributes the former to "a lying and contemptible science," and of which, he adds, that of them "there is not in any place mention," *scil.*, in the Church's tradition. Of the Deuterocanonical books, so unjustly dubbed "apocryphal," as we see by the foregoing, he speaks very differently: "There are also other books besides these, not indeed canonised, but appointed (? *τετυπωμένα*) by the Fathers to be read by those recently coming to us and wishing to be instructed in the word of holiness." The Saint then knew three classes of sacred books: (a) those upon which sentence had been pronounced, the *κανονιζόμενα*; (b) those on which no sentence had been pronounced beyond the decision of the Fathers that the Catechumens should read them as conducive to piety; and (c) those which were simply spurious, the inventions "of a lying and contemptible science." Now, when he says "*οὐ Κανονιζόμενα μὲν*," are we stretching a point when we say that this is not the same as "*οὐκ ἐν τῷ κανόνι*"?

Before rejecting such a view, let us bear in mind two points. First, the fact already mentioned, namely, that S. Athanasius and S. Cyril both *use* these "uncanonised" books just as they do those already on the Canon. Secondly, that the view suggested certainly appears to be that of Eusebius with regard to certain books of the New Testament. The Canon which he puts forward as known to him (H.E. iii., 25) has provoked much discussion, but it is worth our while to examine it afresh. In the first place, the heading of the section is noteworthy: "Of the recognised Divine Scriptures and of those which are not so." After mentioning the Gospels, Acts, Pauline Epistles, the First

of Peter, and the First of John, he continues: "After these should be placed—if, indeed, it seem fitting—*εἴγε φανείη*, the Apocalypse of John, about which we will give in their proper place the views that are held. So these are among the acknowledged writings. But among the disputed writings (*ἀντιλεγόμενων*), known indeed (recognised? *γνωρίμων*) to many, the Epistle called of James is reckoned (*φέρεται*), and that of Jude and the second of Peter and those named the second and third of John, whether they actually are the Evangelist's or of some other bearing the same name with him. But amongst the spurious (*νόθος*—a bastard) books must be reckoned the Acts of Paul, that which is called 'the Shepherd' . . . and also, as I said, the Apocalypse of John, if it should so seem fit (*εἰ φανείη*), which some, as I have said, reject, but which others judge to be among the acknowledged books."

This statement of Eusebius requires careful analysis. He evidently, like S. Athanasius, conceives of three classes of writings claiming to rank among the Divinely-inspired Scriptures: (a) those acknowledged—*ὁμολογούμενοι*; (b) those disputed—*ἀντιλέγομενοι*; (c) those spurious—*νόθοι*. When mentioning the first series, those acknowledged, he mentions the Apocalypse as holding doubtfully a place among them; we should therefore expect him, if he mentions it again under either of the two following classes, to place it among the *ἀντιλέγομενοι* or "disputed" books. On the contrary, he places it among the *νόθοι* or "rejected" books. It would seem from this that discussions were rife as to the authenticity of the Apocalypse, doubtless owing to the chiliastic tendencies pretended to be discovered in it. Why should it not lapse then into the class of "disputed" books? Because, if its authenticity were once disproved, and the trend of criticism seemed perhaps to Eusebius to be in that direction, it would at once lapse into the class of *νόθοι* or "bastard" books. And this is exactly what S. Athanasius means when he writes to warn his flock not to be deceived by "the books apocryphal, being misled by the similarity between their names and those of the true books."

Books seemed to have been rendered doubtful by the fact

of their anonymity, or by the possibility of their being pseudepigraphic. Thus it is noteworthy that Eusebius seems to insinuate this in his list of ἀντιλέγομενα of the New Testament: "the Epistle called of James . . . and those named the second and third of John, whether they actually are the Apostle's or of some other bearing the same name with him." Once prove that these books were really falsely assigned to the authors named and it seems to follow that the books are νόθοι or "spurious." Thus, as far as we can understand, the Apocalypse had at one time, so Eusebius would seem to imply, an unquestioned place among the ὁμολόγουμενοι, but, in the minds of many, its authenticity was very dubious, and they ranked it among the νόθοι.

This at once throws a new light on the meaning attached to the class of ἀντιλέγομενα or "disputed" books. They were not "spurious" or νόθοι, but they were not declared canonical; rather, they were under discussion. Some Churches accepted them, others did not; but in time they might, many of them, come to be generally accepted. Until, however, this was done, until the Church passed some definite decree about them they could not rank with the universally accepted books. Thus we see how the Deuterocanonical books of the Old Testament and the New stood on much the same footing. The former were not κανονιζόμενα because the Jewish Church had put no sanction upon them, and the early Fathers depended upon the Jews for their knowledge of the Canon of the Old Testament. So similarly among writings claiming to be Apostolic there were many universally accepted as such, and thus κανονιζόμενα by the voice of the universal Church. But there were others which, owing to various causes, their subject matter, perhaps, or their brevity, or the little-known character of the Church to which they were addressed, or perhaps, finally, their anonymous character, could not claim such universal attestation. It was clear that the official exponents of the Church's teaching in individual churches could not declare such books either of the Old or New Testament to be the official guides of the Church's children; certain books were universally recog-

nised, let them be content with those, as S. Cyril said to his Catechumens: "You who are not acquainted with the books acknowledged by all, why take needless trouble about those which are disputed?" But for S. Cyril himself no doubt existed of the divinity of many at least of these "disputed" books, and, as we have already seen, he uses them indiscriminately with the other acknowledged books.

This is fully borne out by the words of Rufinus.* After giving the Church's doctrine touching the Holy Ghost, he says:

"This then is the Holy Ghost, Who in the Old Testament inspired the Law and the Prophets, in the New the Gospels and Epistles. Whence also the Apostle says: 'All scripture given by inspiration of God is profitable for instruction.' And therefore it seems proper in this place to enumerate, as we have learnt from the tradition of the Fathers, the Books of the New and of the Old Testament, which, according to the tradition of our forefathers, are believed to have been inspired by the Holy Ghost, and have been handed down to the Churches of Christ."

He then enumerates the Books of the Old Testament, giving the same books as occur in our Hebrew Bibles; after this follows the list of New Testament writings. He finds it necessary, however, to add: "But it should be known that there are also other books which our fathers call not 'Canonical' but 'Ecclesiastical.'" The list of the seven Deuterocanonical books follows, and Rufinus appends a statement which is, we believe, only found in his writings and in those of S. Jerome†:—"all of which they would have read in the Churches, but not appealed to for the confirmation of doctrine."

No foundation for such a view of the Deuterocanonical writings can be found in any of the Fathers before mentioned who have given the Hebrew Canon. Neither could Rufinus have justly deduced it from them, for, as we have seen, both S. Cyril and S. Athanasius, who give a list similar to Rufinus, use the Deuterocanonical books equally with the Proto-canonical as sources of dogmatic

* *De Symbolo*, 37-38.

† Preface to the Books of Solomon.

proof; indeed, S. Athanasius, *Contra Gentes* II, quotes the whole of Wisdom xxiv. 12-21.

The real difficulty is to find an explanation of the indubitable fact that the Fathers of the fourth century are shy of declaring the inspiration of these books, whereas Fathers before them and after them not merely quoted them but positively defended them—for example, Origen, *Ep. ad Africanum*, and S. Augustine, *de Doctrina Christiana*. Of course, the question of the fourth century was Arianism and its offshoots. Is it possible that this had something to do with the changed attitude of the Fathers of the period towards the Deuterocanonical books? As far as I am aware no one of these Fathers ever gives any reason for the difficulties which he experienced with regard to these books, and hence I can only offer a surmise. In the first place, is there anything contained in these books which could have motivated either party to question the authority of any one of these books? I stated above that it was not impossible that the teaching of 2 Maccabees xii. on prayers for the dead may explain the wholesale rejection of the class of books of which Maccabees formed a part. Did the Arian party refuse to recognise quotations from, for example, the Book of Wisdom, in favour of the consubstantiality of the Son? We have no proof that it was so, but we can well suppose that if hard pressed they might have made use of such a loophole of escape. Or was the converse the case? Did the orthodox Fathers find that the Arians pressed such passages as Wisdom vii., 25, in an unfavourable sense?

“For she is a vapour of the power of God, and a certain pure emanation of the glory of the almighty God: and therefore no defiled thing cometh into her.

“For she is the brightness of eternal light, and the unspotted mirror of God’s majesty, and the image of his goodness.”

The use of the word “emanation” *ἀπορροία* seems to have exercised S. Cyril and S. Athanasius. Yet it is clear from the latter’s abundant citations from the Book of Wisdom, more especially of this very verse, that he did not feel himself precluded from using it. Still the fact that he and other members of the *Ecclesia docens* could

safely cite it would not make it equally safe for the uninitiated to use texts which might be turned against them.

S. Cyril's New Testament Canon is of peculiar interest at this juncture. Remembering the Canon proposed by Eusebius of Cæsarea, who died 340 A.D., a canon which classed amongst the ἀντιλέγομενα of the New Testament, 2 Peter, S. James, S. Jude, and 2 and 3 John, we are surprised to find S. Cyril, who only died in 386 A.D., declaring in the neighbouring Jerusalem that all the seven Catholic Epistles are canonical! This shews us the position which the "disputed" books held in the eyes of the Church's teachers then; they were books which were for the most part verging on universal acceptance, though some, like the "Shepherd" and "the Teaching of the Twelve," would be rejected. And this, too, explains their constant use by those who, in their formal lists of books, omitted them. The truth was that no Canon, as such, existed apart from the Jewish one. In each of the great Episcopal Sees certain books were in circulation and were known as the Sacred Scriptures. As far as any formal list of those of the Old Testament was known, it was derived ultimately from the Jews from whom the earliest Church obtained it, but that the Jewish list thus obtained was exclusive of any other is negatived repeatedly by the use the Fathers make of other books which were in circulation, more or less widely, according to the varying degrees of interchange of information which was possible to each See. There had been no definitive act on the part of the Church which would settle categorically what books were to be read and what not, but in each Church the Pastors used their own discretion as to the use to be made of uncanonised books. Thus it is clear from S. Athanasius that in Alexandria it was customary to allow the Catechumens to read for their devotion such books as Wisdom, Ecclesiasticus, Esther, Judith, Tobias, the Teaching of the Twelve, and the Shepherd. Four of these may be not irreverently styled Biblical romances—they appeal to the imagination; their subject matter forms the staple of elementary Bible-lessons, even now; and for

pagans entering the fold they formed a fitting introduction to the sublimer mysteries of faith. Ecclesiasticus and the Teaching of the Twelve are didactic books; and it is hard to see why, if Ecclesiasticus be adapted to beginners, Proverbs should not be placed in the same category, though it must be confessed that the latter is harder reading than the former, which, at least in its later chapters, contains many passages more approaching the narrative style of the Book of Wisdom. Such was the custom in Alexandria, but it was otherwise in Jerusalem, and the reason was not far to seek. The two "Wisdoms" were the product of Alexandria, and hence well known there. In Jerusalem they might well be viewed with dislike. Converts from Judaism might not unnaturally hold aloof, as the orthodox Jews did, from books which did not emanate from Palestine. Not many years had elapsed since the Council of Jamnia, which restricted the Hebrew Canon so closely; Ecclesiasticus had been, not improbably, ruthlessly stamped out,* and such proceedings could not fail to affect even the Christians. But it may be retorted that these books thus left out of the Canon by S. Cyril and S. Athanasius are just those which are omitted from the Hebrew Canon, and this would indicate that these Fathers insisted on a purely Hebrew Canon of the Old Testament. This brings me to the question indicated in the title of this paper: "Why does the Protestant Church read the Book of Esther?" In the lists quoted above, S. Cyril includes Esther in the Canon, but S. Athanasius carefully excludes it and ranks it among the books to be read by the Catechumens. Melito, too, as we have seen, omitted it. In S. Cyril's list, Esther comes immediately after Esdras; it is, however, hardly possible that it was confused with that book by the scribe who copied Melito's list, though this has been suggested. S. Gregory of Nazianzen (*Carm. i.*, 12) omits it altogether; in *Carm. ad Seleucum* he says, after giving the Hebrew Canon, "to these some add the Book of Esther." Again, Origen puts Esther last of all in his

* Cf., Margoliouth in *Expos.*, *Times*, Oct. 1904.

list; why then does the Protestant Church acknowledge it as canonical? It is easy to see why the Catholic Church accepts it. It is given by Josephus as part of the Canon, the great majority of the Fathers of the Church unhesitatingly assign it a place in the list, *e.g.*, S. Cyril, S. Jerome, S. Augustine, and the Councils of Hippo and Carthage, and thence onwards its place in the Canon has been undisputed. But the Protestant Church, in its efforts to get rid of all the books not in the Hebrew Bible, has tied itself to the authority of S. Athanasius, Melito, and S. Gregory of Nazianzen. Thus in the *Westminster Confession*, 1643-47, we read: "The Books commonly called Apocrypha, not being of Divine inspiration, are no part of the Scripture; and therefore are of no authority in the Church of God, nor to be any otherwise approved, or made use of, than any other human writings."

This is clearly based upon S. Athanasius and S. Cyril as quoted above, yet neither of these Fathers say that these books are not inspired, but, as we have shown, use them as part of the Divine Scriptures.

In Philaret's longer Catechism of the Orthodox, Catholic, Eastern Church, Moscow, 1839, we find a still more precise statement:

"*Question* 31.—How many are the Books of the Old Testament?

"*Answer*.—S. Cyril of Jerusalem, S. Athanasius the Great, and S. John Damascene reckon them at twenty-two, agreeing therein with the Jews, who so reckon them in the original Hebrew tongue (Athan., Ep. xxxix. de Test.; J. Damasc. Theol. Lib. iv., c. 17).

"*Question* 34.—Why is there no notice taken in this enumeration (that of S. Cyril and S. Athanasius) of the Books of the Old Testament, of the book of the Wisdom of the Son of Sirach (Ecclesiasticus), and of certain others?

"*Answer*.—Because they do not exist in Hebrew."

But we cannot discriminate in our authorities, we must take them entire or not at all, and here comes the difficulty. It is quite true that these two Fathers reckon twenty-two books in the Old Testament Canon, but from the above catechetical questions and answers we should naturally conclude that both gave the same twenty-two books. As a

fact, S. Athanasius omits Esther, which S. Cyril receives, and that this is no slip is manifest because the former still preserves the number twenty-two by separating Ruth from Judges; whereas S. Cyril, giving Esther, joins Ruth to Judges to make one book, as was generally done. Consequently, to be consistent, those who stake their all on S. Cyril and S. Athanasius should reckon twenty-three books in the Canon. Further, both S. Cyril and S. Athanasius count in their canon a book which all the so-called Reformed Churches reject, viz., Baruch and the Epistle of Jeremias, which latter forms, in the Vulgate, the closing chapter of Baruch's prophecy. On the authority of one of the two Doctors they should reject Esther, which they agree to keep; on the authority of both they should read Baruch, which they agree to reject.

Again, the 34th question, given above, is supplied with an answer which can only be termed a gross perversion of the truth: "Why are not Ecclesiasticus and other books noticed in these lists?" The answer given is, "Because they do not exist in Hebrew." Needless to say there is not a word of this in either S. Cyril or S. Athanasius. The former never mentions them, but to show how far he is from regarding a Hebrew origin as necessary to inspiration, he is careful to tell his hearers to "read the Holy Scriptures, the two-and-twenty books of the Old Testament, which were interpreted by the seventy-two interpreters." In other words, he puts into their hands the Septuagint version, and no one will deny that the LXX contained several books not in the Hebrew Bible, and had moreover many additions to books actually in that Bible. He tells them to read Daniel, for instance, in the LXX. But the LXX Daniel means the story of the Three Children, of Bel and the Dragon, and of Susanna. And that S. Cyril knew this is perfectly clear, because in these very same catechetical lectures he three times quotes the story of the Children, and on other two occasions quotes the story of Susanna and of Bel and the Dragon. Moreover, it should be noticed that S. Cyril is speaking in Jerusalem, and presumably to converts from Judaism, yet it is the LXX version which he gives them.

The Canon given by Melito certainly presents a difficulty at first sight, but we must remember that in the first place we only possess this fragmentary notice preserved by Eusebius. No context is forthcoming, and an argument drawn from a passage, more especially a letter, torn from its context is necessarily precarious. The important phrases are :

"Since thou hast desired to have an accurate statement of the ancient books as regards their number and their order, I have endeavoured to perform the task, knowing thy zeal for the faith and thy desire to gain information in regard to the word, and knowing that thou, in thy yearning after God, esteemest these things above all else, struggling to attain eternal salvation. Accordingly, when I went to the East and came to the place where these things were preached and done, I learned accurately the Books of the Old Testament. . . ."

It is said that when a certain young divine went to a famous Oxford professor of his day and asked him for a parting word of advice previous to commencing his ministry, he was somewhat startled when he received for answer : "Verify your quotations." Now, when quoting this passage before, I was at the pains to translate it for myself, but here I have given the translation to be found in Schaff and Wace's edition of the Ante- and Post-Nicene Fathers, the *Church History of Eusebius*, iv. 26. A comparison between these two versions will be of interest, not that the latter translation is faulty, but that in the examination of a document of such short extent, and that too without its context, every word is of great importance. Melito writes that he is willing to help his friend because the latter is "struggling to attain eternal salvation." Now does the Greek expression, "*περὶ τῆς αἰωνίου σωτηρίας ἀγωνίζομενος*," mean this? According to Liddell and Scott the full phrase would be "*ἀγωνίσκεισθαι τινί* (or) *πρὸς τινά περὶ τινός*," i.e., "to struggle with someone about something." It is hard to believe in the use of the word *ἀγωνίσκεισθαι* unless some adversaries are presupposed, and I cannot but feel that the word would not have been used unless Melito's friend was engaged in some polemics with Jews which necessitated his knowing exactly what sacred books they actually did acknowledge. This view of

the passage appears to be borne out by the Latin version supplied in Routh's *Reliquiae*: "Ob amorem Dei ista omnibus rebus anteferre, pro comperto habeo, et aeternae salutis obtinendae causa *decertare*." But if this is the case, then it follows that Melito is supplying his friend with the exact Hebrew Canon of that period, and in no sense implies thereby that it is the Christian Canon of the Old Testament. No one can believe that a great Bishop, and one of the most voluminous writers of his time, though all his works have practically perished, should have to go to the East to learn the contents of the Christian Canon. We can at least maintain a case of "not proven" for the view which declares that Melito's Christian Canon of the Old Testament was rigorously the Hebrew Canon of his time. His omission of Esther would still have to be explained by Protestants in view of their reception of it; one writer actually suggests that it is probably included under the name Esdras, which comes last in the list!

Cardinal Newman in "Tract 85," reprinted in *Discussions and Arguments*, writes: "There are books which, sin as it would be in us to reject, I think any candid person would grant are presented to us under circumstances less promising than those which attend upon the Church doctrines. Take, for instance, the Book of Esther. This book is not quoted once in the New Testament. It was not admitted as canonical by two considerable Fathers, Melito and Gregory Nazianzen. It contains no prophecy; it has nothing on the surface to distinguish it from a mere ordinary history; nay, it has no mark on the surface of its being even a religious history. Not once does it mention the name of God or Lord, or any other name by which the God of Israel is designated. Again, when we inspect its contents it cannot be denied that there are things in it which at first sight startle us and make demands on our faith; why then do we receive it? Because we have good reason from tradition to believe it to be one of those which our Lord intended when He spoke of 'the Prophets,' St. Luke xxiv. 44."*

* *Discussions and Arguments*, No. 6.

To reverse the question: "Why then does not the Protestant Church accept the Book of Baruch?" or indeed any of the Deuterocanonical books to which the Fathers of the fourth and fifth centuries, on whose tradition they accept Esther, bear witness?

Dr. Ryle, after quoting the adverse testimonies to the canonicity of Esther, concludes: "But the adverse evidence of the Fathers quoted above, although it indicates the independence of local Jewish opinion upon the Canon, is not sufficient to shake our confidence in the claim of Esther to its place in the Hebrew Scriptures."* But he fails to state on what, precisely, he bases his blissful confidence.

We turn to Hastings' Dictionary of the Bible, and under "Esther" we find with delight a paragraph devoted to the "canonicity" of the Book, but to our disappointment it gives us no help, affords no clue as to the basis on which the canonicity of the book in the "Reformed" Churches rests. In the article on the "Old Testament Canon" we are told about the difficulties raised by the Jews of the first two centuries of the Christian era respecting its canonicity, but that is all, though the writer takes the pains to inform us that the "Apocrypha" owe their claim to canonicity in the Roman Catholic Church to the supposed inspiration of the Vulgate! This is unpardonable.

The truth is, of course, that the "Reformed" Churches have no basis for the canonicity of the Bible. Their appeal to tradition is futile because it is inconsistent throughout. Cardinal Newman points out, in the Tract quoted above, that the rejection of the Canon by the Reformed Churches is inevitable. He is comparing the external difficulties which beset men's acceptance of both Canon and Creed, and he argues that the very same process which leads to the elimination of unwelcome doctrines must, sooner or later, and logically, lead to the elimination of unwelcome books from the Canon. We wonder if he saw at the time that such had precisely been the case when the Reformed Churches inaugurated their career by reducing the dimen-

* *The Old Testament Canon*, p. 218.

sions of the Canon? His words are worth quoting; an objector is speaking: "We are far from denying that there is truth and value in the ancient Catholic system, as reported by the Fathers; but we deny that it is unmixed truth. We consider it is truth and error mixed together; we do not see why the system of doctrine must be taken together as a whole, so that if one part is true, all is true. We consider that we have a right to take it piecemeal, and examine each part by itself; that so far as it is true, it is true, not as belonging to the ancient system, but for other reasons, as being agreeable to our reason, or to our understanding of scripture, not because stated by the Fathers; and, after all, the Church system in question (that is, such doctrines as the mystical power of the Sacraments, the power of the Keys, the grace of Ordination, the gifts of the Church, and the Apostolical Succession) has very little authority really primitive. The Fathers whose works we have, not only ought to be of an earlier date, in order to be of authority, but they contradict each other; they declare what is incredible and absurd, and what can reasonably be ascribed to Platonism, or Judaism, or Paganism." "Be it so," answers the Cardinal; "well, how will the same captious spirit treat the Sacred Canon? In just the same way."*

Professor Sayce's words about the Book of Esther amply justify the Cardinal's prophecy. After pointing out the traces of Babylonian origin in the book, he draws a comparison between it and the Assyrian and Persian histories of Ktesias. Of the latter he says: "The narrative itself resembles the Haggadah of the Jews rather than sober history. Now, it is impossible to read the stories of Ktesias side by side with the Book of Esther without being struck by their startling resemblance; at all events, in general character. . . . Just as the name of the Babylonian goodess Istar becomes the personal name Esther, so the Babylonian Moon-God Nannar appears in the fragments of Ktesias as the satrap Nannaroo." He then enumerates the various exaggerations and improbabilities in Esther,

* *Discussions and Arguments*, No. 6.

and decides that "the historical character of the Book of Esther is invalidated." Finally, he says: "Only one conclusion consequently seems to be possible—the story of Esther is an example of Jewish Haggadah, which has been found upon one of those semi-historical tales of which the Persian Chronicles seem to have been full."*

I am far from saying that such a view is irreconcilable with the inspiration and canonicity of the book, but I wonder what the Professor's own view of its canonicity is?

No reference has been made in the foregoing pages to the teaching of S. Jerome on the Canon. I can only touch very briefly on the main features of this much-disputed question. Three facts stand out pre-eminent. Firstly, that the "Hermit of Bethlehem" explicitly rejected the Deuterocanonical books. Secondly, that, like S. Cyril and S. Athanasius, his practice seems to be opposed to his theory, for he cites them freely with or without a "caveat" as to their canonicity. Thirdly, and it is this point which brings out the contrast between the Catholic and the Protestant mode of viewing questions of canonicity, the Church has on this point always shaken off the authority of this her greatest biblical doctor. It is not a little remarkable that three times during the period of S. Jerome's greatest activity and influence the African Church felt bound to draw up a list of the Canonical Books, among which it included precisely those rejected by S. Jerome. The Catholic Church then reads the Book of Esther and the so-called "Apocrypha" or Deuterocanonical Books because of her Divine authority which establishes their canonicity; the Reformed Churches read or reject various books solely upon their own sweet will.

F. HUGH POPE, O.P.

* *The Higher Criticism and the Marcements*, p. 474-5.

ART. V.—THE “ACTA PILATI” AND THE PASSION DOCUMENT OF ST. LUKE.

IT will be, no doubt, within the recollection of all that both Justin Martyr and Tertullian, in their respective *Apologies* for the Christian religion, refer to a document supposed to be a report sent in by Pontius Pilate to the Emperor and preserved among the State Papers at Rome, in which confirmation could be found for the truth of the facts they alleged about the crucifixion of our Lord. Tertullian is especially clear and definite on the subject. “All this,” he says, after giving a long account full of details of the events of the Passion and the Resurrection: “All this concerning Christ did Pilate, himself also already in his conscience a Christian, report to Tiberius the Cæsar of that day.”* Justin Martyr is less detailed in his account of the Passion, but even more clear in his reference to a definite documentary evidence. “That these things really happened,” he says, “ye can learn from the record of what happened under Pontius Pilate” (ἐκ τῶν ἐπὶ Ποντίου Πιλάτου γενομένων ᾄκτων.)†

In face of such clear and decided words as these it seems very strange that critics generally, and among them such eminent ones as Harnack and Lightfoot, should have held that no such document was really known to exist, that Justin and Tertullian were only “bluffing,” and that they merely assumed that such a report must of necessity have been sent in and would, as a matter of course, contain the details of which they had spoken. If it were not for the eminence of the names of those who have held this view,

* *Apol.* 21; c.f. also *Apol.* 5.

† *Apol.* i. 33, 48.

one would dismiss it at once as childish and absurd. That the document the Fathers referred to was not really Pilate's production is of course by no means impossible, but it is quite clear that they are referring to some written matter which they believed to be authentic, and which contained a considerable amount of detailed information. For the details which they give can not all be drawn from the canonical Gospels, and indeed are, on some points, more or less in conflict with them. It would be impossible and most dangerous to assume that such details would as a matter of course be discovered in a document drawn up by a heathen governor, which document they had never seen, and indeed only surmised to have any actual existence.

This controversy entered upon a new phase with the discovery at Akhmim of a fragment of an apocryphal Gospel which has commonly been identified as being part of the Gospel of Peter. For this fragment also contains details which are not drawn from the canonical Gospels, but which coincide more or less exactly with those which are found in Justin Martyr and in Tertullian; and since it is obviously most improbable, and indeed quite incredible, that the author of this Gospel should have gone either to Justin or Tertullian for the facts on which to build his narrative, and equally impossible that they should have quoted this Gospel as being Pilate's work, we are forced to the only other hypothesis open to us, namely, that all three are alike founded upon a documentary source which was earlier than any of them, and which was so connected with the name of Pilate that Tertullian at least considered it to have been compiled by him, and to be nothing less than his official report to the Emperor at Rome. This conclusion is confirmed when we find upon examination that almost all the details referred to by any of these three, Justin, Tertullian and Pseudo-Peter, are also to be found in the extant apocryphal "Gospel of Nicodemus," which bore in earlier times the title of *Gesta Pilati*. In its present form this Gospel is not earlier than the fifth century, so it cannot itself be the source quoted by these writers in the second century. It does, however, refer back to, and claim to be founded on, an earlier document drawn up by Nicode-

mus in Hebrew—and itself only claims to be a translation of this earlier document made by one Aeneas in the 18th year of the reign of Theodosius, A.D. 425. Moreover, we know from Epiphanius, A.D. 380, that there actually was a document known as the *Acta Pilati* current at a much earlier period than A.D. 425, and appealed to by the Quarto-decimans as affording support for their thesis as to the actual date upon which the Crucifixion took place.

Altogether, putting all the available evidence together, we shall come, I think, to the conclusion that some document was certainly current in the Church at the beginning of the second century which was connected with the name of Pilate, though I think we shall also conclude, alike from the contents of the document, so far as we can reconstruct it, and from the fact that a parallel tradition connects it not with Pilate but with Nicodemus, that it is a Christian document with which we have to do, and that therefore Tertullian was wrong in supposing it to be Pilate's official report; while Justin Martyr, whom there is no ground for supposing to have thought it Pilate's work, has very probably preserved to us its actual title *Τὰ ἐπὶ Ποντίου Πιλάτου γεγόμενα ἄκτα*. A similar title persistently recurs under various forms in the earlier Greek or Coptic MSS. of the Gospel of Nicodemus—such as *Υπομνήματα τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ πραχθέντα ἐπὶ Ποντίου Πιλάτου*—or *Commentarii Salvatoris conscripta sub Pontio Pilato praeside*. The Latin copies, on the other hand, have titles which are much more definitely connected with Pilate as an actor in the story: *Incipit gesta Salvatoris quam invenit Theodosius in praetorio Pontii Pilati in codicibus publicis*. This difference may perhaps point to a similar tendency found in the Latin copies even in Tertullian's time, and may account sufficiently for his mistake. After all it is not a long distance from *Gesta sub Pilato* to *Gesta Pilati*, and the latter title might easily be misunderstood as implying that Pilate had some hand in the authorship.

There are, however, several documents still in existence which make the definite claim to be Pilate's report. Most of these are late in origin, and have arisen, no doubt, out of the idea—for which Tertullian may be originally respon-

sible—that Pilate had actually made such a report. But there is one which takes the form of a letter from Pilate to the Emperor Claudius, not Tiberius, and which is incorporated in the Apocryphal Acts of Peter and Paul, and also is found in conjunction with some Latin copies of the Gospel of Nicodemus. In the Apocryphal Acts Nero sends for it from the archives and has it read at the trial of the Apostles. This letter presents a very close analogy to Tertullian's language on several points, and some have thought that it may have been known to Tertullian, and, indeed, actually be the document on which he is relying. Harnack, on the other hand, thinks that it is later in date and is based upon Tertullian and not *vice versa*. I am myself inclined to a third hypothesis, which is that both it and Tertullian are quoting from this earlier source, and I am led to this conclusion by the fact that I find the same words, only slightly varied, but still involving the essential fact that the miracles of Christ were witnessed to before Pilate, and ascribed by the witnesses to sorcery, in each of the versions of the later *Acta Pilati*. It is not likely that any of these three copied from one another, and the coincidence is most easily accounted for by the supposition of a single common source.

Our next step, then, will naturally be to make a careful examination of Tertullian's words, so as to see what inference we can draw from them as to the nature of this document which he is quoting. He refers to it at considerable length—much more fully than does Justin—and quotes a large number of details as being vouched for by its authority. But as we read through the list we see at once that his authority must have had very close affinities with the canonical Gospels. There are thirty points in all, or thereabouts, for which he quotes the testimony of Pilate, and of these thirty no less than twenty-three could have been proved by the authority of the Gospels or of the Acts. There remain seven points for which no canonical authority can be adduced. But that so large a proportion as more than two thirds of the whole rests on canonical authority suggests, at least, that it is a *Christian* document, and not the report of a heathen Governor with which we have to

do. We go on to examine these twenty-three instances more carefully with a view to discovering with which of the Gospels they have the greatest affinity, and here we are met at once with a very striking and interesting result. The Gospel of St. Mark is scarcely alluded to at all. I do not mean by this that there is nothing peculiar to St. Mark, for after all St. Mark has very little on the Passion which is not also in St. Matthew, but I mean that the whole Marcan narrative is mostly disregarded and that there is but little trace in Tertullian's narrative of the so-called Triple Tradition. On the other hand, there are ten points which are found only in St. Luke, and six which are only in St. Matthew. Four—the jealousy of the rulers, the taking down from the Cross, the burial, and the rolling away of the stone—are common to all the Synoptics; one, the ordination of the Apostles to preach, is common to St. Matthew and St. Luke and also to the last verses of St. Mark; and one only, the definition of *Galilee* as the place of the apparitions after the Resurrection, seems clearly to suggest the Marcan story. Now it seems to me that we have here arrived at a very important and suggestive fact. Tertullian quotes a document as being Pilate's report to Tiberius. This document, as quoted by him, proves to have much in common with the Synoptic Gospels. But it is not with the Synoptic Gospels as a whole, as it would be if he were consciously or unconsciously quoting from his recollections of the Gospel narrative, but only with certain well-marked and distinctive portions of those Gospels. It is with those parts, and in the main with those parts only, of St. Matthew and St. Luke which have been added to the general Marcan tradition from special sources which have not hitherto been identified. It is natural to draw the obvious inference that one, at least, of the special sources on which both these Evangelists drew was, in fact, no other than the very document which was known also to Tertullian and wrongly identified by him with the report of Pilate to Tiberius.

Before we go further we must just pause to note that the use made of this source by these two Evangelists, assuming our reasoning up to this point to have been correct, varies in a notable manner. Matthew depends on Mark for the

main structure of his Passion narrative, and merely inserts stories and paragraphs from his other source or sources into the middle of the Marcan narrative. Bracket out these interpolations and in the main you have Mark remaining in its integrity. Mark is, therefore, the main source, and is merely enriched by later additions. But when we turn to Luke the case is altogether different. For the main portion of his Gospel he, too, follows Mark just as Matthew does, using his narrative as a framework, and interpolating additional matter. But then for a long period he abandons Mark altogether and depends entirely on other sources, with no word from Mark included. Then for a time he comes back to Mark and uses him as at first. And, lastly, when he comes to the Passion story he does, indeed, know and use Mark to some extent; but he does just the opposite from what we have noted as the practice of Matthew throughout and as his own practice in the earlier portions of his Gospel. He depends primarily on his other source, and looks to that for the structure of his narrative, only interpolating, so to speak, certain portions of Mark into this other authority.

It follows from this that, while Matthew has only selected certain stories from this source of which I am speaking, and has added them to the Marcan narrative, St. Luke has done much more; he has adopted this other source throughout as his main authority, and even possibly his only authority, though he has not given it to us intact, but only in an abbreviated and shortened form. It seems further to follow from the fact that in no case do the narratives, drawn apparently by these two Evangelists from a common source, coincide with one another; that one Evangelist must have written much later than the other, probably Matthew later than Luke, and must have been acquainted both with the work of his fellow-Evangelist and also with the source from which he drew. These are very important and far-reaching conclusions, and I am very far indeed from thinking that they are as yet at all fully proved—but it is always well in formulating a theory to look ahead and form some idea of the direction in which its adoption would tend to lead us.

Now, after this digression, I go back to our witnesses.

So far we have only examined one of the four main witnesses to the existence of the Pilate document, namely, Tertullian. There remain three more to be examined, Justin Martyr, Pseudo-Peter, and the Gospel of Nicodemus, and we have to see whether their evidence bears out that of Tertullian—whether, that is to say, they also show special affinities with the portions of the Passion narrative which are peculiar to Matthew and Luke (and especially to the latter), more or less to the exclusion of the general Marcan tradition. If they do we shall have very strong grounds for concluding that they too depend rather upon the Pilate document which I am trying to identify as the source of these portions of the story than upon the canonical Gospels as we know them. The limits of the Gospel story with which we have to do for this purpose I may fix as beginning with the Last Supper, since it is there that St. Luke begins to depend on some other authority than St. Mark, and ending with the Ascension, which is the last event mentioned by Tertullian as having been included in Pilate's report.

As regards Justin Martyr the evidence, though much too scanty to establish any conclusion, on the whole tends to support what we have gathered from Tertullian. He has the phrase, "Let this cup pass from Me," which is peculiar to St. Matthew, and also the feature of the Bloody Sweat (*θρόμβοι* only, not *θρόμβοι αἵματος*) which is peculiar to St. Luke; so, again, he has the Lucan or Pauline words and order at the Last Supper, and records the saying from the Cross, "Father, into Thy hands," etc., which is given only by St. Luke. In the events which come after the Resurrection he seems to follow the Acts almost entirely. The proportion of matter drawn from the narrative peculiar to Matthew and Luke is certainly larger, when compared with that from Marcan sources, than could have been antecedently expected if Justin's only source was our present Gospels—and so far this evidence goes to support the theory I am maintaining—but there is not enough evidence, and it is not sufficiently strong, to justify any very definite conclusion.

Much the same may be said also of Pseudo-Peter. He

mentions the washing of the hands, the setting of a watch, and the bribing of the soldiers, and also has the episode of the penitent thief. But it is impossible to say that he has not derived all of these from the Gospel narratives, and not from any Pilate document, especially since he is clearly well acquainted with our present Gospels, and does not, like Justin and Tertullian, allude expressly to any Pilate authority. Pseudo-Peter's evidence is much more valuable with regard to those details which he adds to the Gospel narrative than to those portions which he has in common with them.

The case is different when we turn to the Gospel of Nicodemus, the last of our four witnesses.* This Gospel, in the form in which we now have it, is, as I have already said, not earlier than the fifth century. It is therefore clearly impossible that any of the other three can be indebted to it, and scarcely less impossible that its author or editor can have gone to them rather than to the canonical Gospels for his matter. And yet the work does on examination present the most extraordinary series of coincidences with these other three. Almost every detail which is mentioned by any of them finds its parallel in this Apocryphal Gospel, and this is true of the non-canonical as well as the canonical points. Of the thirty points of which I have spoken in Tertullian's *Apology*, nearly every one has its counterpart in the Gospel of Nicodemus, and the same is true more or less of Justin and of Peter. The coincidences are too numerous and too remarkable to be explained away; they cannot be due to chance, but seem to point with certainty to some sort of connection between the various documents—a connection which can hardly be due to the direct influence of any one of the four upon the others, but irresistibly suggests a common source. If this is the true explanation, we must further say that this source has been preserved with considerable accuracy of detail, but with, apparently, an almost complete change of form in the Gospel of Nicodemus; a document which, moreover,

* The text to be consulted is that marked A, by Tischendorf and Thilo. Text B is later.

has preserved in its Greek manuscripts the very title Ἀκτα ἐπὶ Ποντίου Πιλάτου which is given us by Justin, and in its Latin ones that of *Gesta Pilati*, which is in such singular accord with the phraseology of Tertullian.

Our next step, then, will naturally be to examine how far the so-called Gospel of Nicodemus embodies those portions of St. Matthew and St. Luke which I have supposed may be drawn from the original *Acta Pilati*. It ought, on my hypothesis, to contain all the peculiar portions of Matthew and most of the narrative of St. Luke, and at the same time to exclude at least those portions of the Marcan narrative which have not been included in that of St. Luke. If it proves, on examination, to answer to this test, we shall feel that in all probability we are more or less on the right track.

The principal features of the Passion story which are given by St. Matthew are as follows :—

1. Pilate's wife's dream.
2. Pilate washes his hands.
3. The rending of the rocks and the open tombs, followed by the resurrection of the saints.
4. The sealing of the stone and setting the watch.
5. The earthquake appearance to the soldiers, and their alarm.
6. The bribing of the watch.

Those which are recorded only by St. Luke are :—

7. Pilate and Herod.
8. The formal sentence of Pilate.
9. The mocking of the soldiers, and offering wine.
10. The prayer of our Lord for His murderers.
11. The story of the penitent thief.
12. The words at death : "Father, into Thy hands."
13. The suggestion of an *eclipse* as the cause of the darkness.
14. The change produced on the spectators, who smite their breasts and return.

Here are fourteen separate and important points, each of them of a distinctive character. Every one, without a single exception, is reproduced more or less exactly in the Gospel of Nicodemus. There are, however, certain

passages peculiar to St. Luke, *e.g.*, the meeting with the women, which are not there reproduced.

We turn next to the Marcan story. The principal points which are peculiar to this form of the Passion narrative are as follows :—

1. Our Lord's refusal to answer Pilate.
2. The release of Barabbas.
3. The scourging.
4. The mocking by the soldiers in the Prætorium.
5. The carrying of the Cross, and Simon of Cyrene.
6. The name, Golgotha.
7. The giving of wine and myrrh before crucifixion.
8. The casting lots for the garments.
9. The mention of the *third* hour as the time of crucifixion.
10. The railing of the spectators, wagging their heads.
11. Eloi, Eloi.
12. The appearance to Mary Magdalene.

Here we have a series scarcely less noteworthy than the other which we have drawn from St. Matthew and St. Luke, but not one of these points seems to have been included in the original fifth century text of the Gospel of Nicodemus, though several make their appearance in the later texts. Here again it is perhaps worthy of notice that it is precisely those four points which are included by St. Luke and not one of the other eight which do thus appear in the later texts. Those points which are only given by Mark and Matthew, and which are not included in St. Luke's narrative, are also absent altogether from all texts of the Gospel of Nicodemus. Speaking generally, to sum up the results of this investigation, we may say that the affinities of the Gospel of Nicodemus seem to be almost exclusively with the Gospel of St. Luke, and with the stories which are peculiar to St. Matthew. Such Marcan details as there are seem to have come to it through St. Luke in almost, if not quite, every case. Insertions from St. John are frequent in the later texts, but seem invariably to be mere interpolations.

But now we come to a piece of evidence which is of far greater interest and importance than any which have

been alleged so far. The Gospel of Nicodemus in its present form (leaving out of account the second part, the *Descensus in Infernum*,) divides itself naturally into three parts. The first part is a re-cast and amplification of the trial before Pilate, using a good deal of canonical material, but in the main deserting the canonical story. Various witnesses are called to establish the legitimacy of our Lord's birth against the accusations of the Jews, and also to prove the truth of His miracles. Similarly in the third part, witnesses come forward and prove the truth of His resurrection, the soldiers tell what happened at the tomb, Joseph of Arimathaea tells his story, and men specially sent for from Galilee tell of His teaching His apostles, and finally His ascent in the cloud to heaven. But between these two apocryphal portions there comes an account of the actual crucifixion which is almost wholly drawn from canonical sources, and follows almost exactly the account given in the Gospel of St. Luke. Von Dobschutz in his article on this Gospel in Hastings' Dictionary indeed goes too far when he says plainly and without reserve that it is Luke xxiii., but undoubtedly it is extremely intimately connected with that Gospel, and in some places is absolutely identical with it for several verses together. There is, so far as I know, no parallel instance in any other apocryphal writing of so lengthy an extract from any single canonical book. The question which we have to solve—and I think that it will be agreed that we could scarcely have any question more interesting and important—is whether this account has really been copied bodily from St. Luke, or whether we may not have here a fragment of the original source both of St. Luke and of this apocryphal Gospel, which has been handed down to us almost intact in the pages of both writers. To the solution of this question we now address ourselves.

The text of this portion of the Gospel of Nicodemus, where the narrative coincides with St. Luke, does not differ from that of St. Luke more widely than the MSS. of St. Luke vary from one another. The type of text is that of the *Textus Receptus*, as against Aleph and B, and it contains most of the words and phrases which have been

extruded in the Revised Version. If the textual evidence stood alone I do not think we could base any strong argument upon it to show that we are dealing with a tradition independent of St. Luke's Gospel. But there are certain very noteworthy variations in the story which seem to me to indicate a separate origin, and it is on them that I would base my argument.

The narrative begins quite differently from that of St. Luke, and yet in a manner which is quite in keeping with the canonical accounts, and very different from that of the apocryphal writings of the fifth century. "Then Jesus went out from the Prætorium and the two thieves went with Him. And when they came on to the place, they stripped Him of His garments, and girded Him with a linen cloth, and put a crown of thorns upon His head. And Jesus said 'Father forgive them,'" &c. Here it seems quite possible that we have to do with ancient tradition, and in that case it is interesting to note that the traditional representation of our Lord upon the Cross, which is doubtless founded upon this passage, rests on good authority.

The next passage to which I would draw attention is the account of the title on the Cross. St. Luke in the R.V. has simply "And there was a superscription over Him, This is the King of the Jews." Nicodemus has a more detailed account. "And after he had given sentence Pilate ordered a title to be written in letters of Greek and Latin and Hebrew, according as the Jews said, This is the King of the Jews." This account does not appear to be taken from St. Luke, and still less from St. John. On the contrary it looks very much as if the words given by Nicodemus were known to St. John, and had suggested the even more detailed account given in his Gospel—including the protest of the Jews, and Pilate's reply *Ὁ γέγραφα, γέγραφα*.

In the episode of the penitent thief where St. Luke has "One of the malefactors who were hanged railed upon him, saying, If thou be he . . ."—our text has simply "said to Jesus." It is much more easy to suppose that St. Luke intensified than that a fifth century writer softened down the word. So again the appeal of the penitent thief,

instead of running as in St. Luke "Remember me when Thou comest into Thy kingdom," is simply "Remember me in Thy kingdom."

The next variation is in some ways the most noteworthy of all. It consists in the insertion of the Hebrew before our Lord's last words, so that it runs, "And Jesus having cried with a great cry said: Father, *Baddach ephked ronel*, which being interpreted is, Into Thy hands I commend my spirit." The explanation given by Thilo, and generally adopted, is that the words are inserted from Origen's *Hexapla* from Ps. xxx. But surely the idea of a fifth century writer of an apocryphal Gospel, thus looking up the reference in his Hebrew Bible, and inserting the words into the text of St. Luke, apparently with the desire of adding "verisimilitude to an otherwise bald and unconvincing narrative," is more than a little far-fetched and improbable. But if we reject this, the only alternative seems to be that we have here the actual words from which St. Luke was writing, and that our Gospel here has preserved a detail which St. Luke had omitted, and has given us the actual words used by our blessed Lord, just as St. Mark has done in the parallel saying: "My God, my God, why hast Thou forsaken Me?"

After the death we have an additional detail, namely, that "the Centurion recorded what had happened to the Governor, and the Governor and his wife grieved exceedingly when they heard, and neither ate nor drank all that day." Lastly, we have the remarkable fact that we have the post-Resurrection appearances, and even, as it seems, the Ascension itself placed in Galilee and not in Jerusalem, in almost direct contradiction of the story of St. Luke, who is clear in placing these events in Jerusalem, and makes hardly any mention of Galilee. There are other small details which seem to me to point in the same direction, but I will not weary my readers with them now, for I have said enough, I think, to show that there is at least a *prima facie* case for the theory that we have here a fragment of a writing of such antiquity that it has been drawn upon by St. Luke in the composition of his Gospel.

The argument has been so long and involved that it

may perhaps be well if I conclude by restating the thesis which I have been endeavouring to set forth and to prove. I suggest then that there was a written account of the Passion drawn up at a very early time, possibly by Nicodemus, whose name seems traditionally to have been connected with it. This account is later than some form of that of St. Mark, and seems to be intended as supplementary to it. It probably began with the Last Supper and ended with the Ascension. It was known to St. Luke and so highly valued by him that he deserts St. Mark and adopts it almost entire as his Passion narrative. It was also known, as I think can be shown, to the author of the Fourth Gospel. It continued to exist as a separate volume, and at a later date than St. Luke's writing. The redactor of St. Matthew's Gospel incorporated into that Gospel most of the stories in it which St. Luke had not used. It was appealed to by the Quarto-decimans, by Justin Martyr and by Tertullian; the last-named supposing it to be the actual work of Pilate; and was used by the author of the Gospel of Peter. Lastly, in the fourth century it was recast and greatly changed and became our present Gospel of Nicodemus, still including most of the original matter, but in a form so much changed that we probably cannot now reconstruct the original text in any part except the actual story of the Crucifixion. This portion, however, remains almost unchanged, and it is possible that from it we may be able to recover some few additional details of the story of the Passion, which are as ancient and as authentic as anything in the canonical Gospels, although they have not, of course, the guarantee of the acceptance of the Church.

A. S. BARNES.

ART. VI.—THE “GRAMMAR OF ASSENT” AND THE “SURE FUTURE.”

WHEN Newman's famous essay first made its appearance in 1870 the critics scarcely knew how to receive it. A great man had spoken, and the smaller men were chary of passing judgement. Like angels, they almost feared to set foot on the country which he had mapped out. Boldest amongst them, perhaps, was the author's friend, the distinguished scholastic philosopher, Fr. Harper, S.J. In a series of very erudite articles in *The Month* he undertook to show that Dr. Newman's theory meant a momentous revolution of scientific thought, affecting logic, conceptual truth, common sense, ethic, and even metaphysic. People wondered what the reply would be, for the objections involved practically the whole of Catholic philosophy. But no reply came, and people wondered for a long time. A couple of years ago, however, thanks to the editor of *The Month*, a characteristic letter was brought to light, written by Dr. Newman to Fr. Coleridge, S.J., from which I may quote the following extracts :—

“ My dear Fr. Coleridge,—I began to read Fr. Harper's papers, but they were (to my ignorance of theology and philosophy) so obscure, and (to my own knowledge of my real meaning) so hopelessly misrepresentations of the book, that I soon gave it over. As to my answering, I think I never answered any critique on any writing of mine in my life. . . . I shall not live another twenty years, but as I waited patiently as regards my former work for ‘Time to be the Father of Truth,’ so now I leave the judgement between Fr. Harper and me to the sure future. . . . Let those who think I ought to be answered—those Catholics, first master the great difficulty, the great problem, and then, if they don't like my way of meeting

it, find another. Syllogising won't meet it. You see then I have not the very shadow of a reason *against* Fr. Harper's future papers, as I think they will all go ultimately, after I am gone, to the credit of my work.

"While I say this, of course I am sensible it may be full of defects, and certainly characterised by incompleteness and crudeness, but it is something to have started a problem, and mapped in part a country, if I have done nothing more."

The twenty years have come and gone, and fourteen years besides, and now the prophecy is beginning to be realised. The subjective side of apologetics is seen to have an importance hitherto sadly unappreciated. The development of the science of education impresses upon us that there are two terms to be taken into account in the imparting and acquisition of knowledge: the subjective as well as the objective. The schoolmaster was at one time thought capable of teaching Latin to John provided he knew the Latin himself, but now it has been discovered that he must not only know the Latin, but he must also know John. The same may be said of the science of apologetics. The objective method must be supplemented, not supplanted, by the subjective method. It is not sufficient to set in array our magnificent show of evidence; but it is necessary to predispose the subject to accept it, to excite the "will to believe," to show that there is a need and exigency in human nature which the acceptance of Christian truth alone can satisfy.

Text-books on the objective side there are in abundance; on the subjective side few. Foremost among the latter we may place the *Grammar of Assent*. Its principles on the one hand have been largely drawn upon by apologists like Mr. Wilfred Ward and Fr. Tyrrell, M. Maurice Blondel and Père Laberthonnière; though on the other hand it is distrusted by apologists of equally recognised position in the Church. Quite recently the learned Bishop of Newport, Dr. Hedley, has seen fit to pass some severe strictures upon it. In these pages, therefore, I shall attempt to sketch the main lines of argument in the work and then discuss some of the objections, particularly those of Bishop Hedley.

The purpose of the book is, as the title implies, to give

an analysis of the phenomena of assent, especially in matters of religion. It does not form a theory based on abstract reasoning *a priori*; but it takes the whole man as he is, examines that state of him known as certitude, and then arranges scientifically the facts which have been noticed. It appeals to the common voice of mankind as a proof that there is such a thing as certitude of knowledge, and then examines the process by which that certitude comes about. This process is found to be, not one of dry formal logic, not one of pure syllogistic reasoning, but one employing the totality of man's faculties and experiences. The whole man encounters a vast number of probabilities, and it is the convergence of a number of different orders and classes of probabilities which produces certitude. When, however, it is said that the instrument used is the totality of man's faculties and experiences, it must be understood that these act according to their respective natures, namely, the intellectual as supreme faculty, the rest in subordination to it.

The practical outcome of the thesis is this: that since in other spheres of thought we do not depend on formal demonstration for certitude, neither ought we to demand it as a *sine qua non* for certitude in religion.

The book, after three introductory chapters on the various attitudes of mind with regard to propositions, introduces its first important distinction, that between notional and real assent. Notional assent is an agreement of the mind with abstract propositions; real assent is that which is given to propositions in the concrete. Thus the assent to the proposition: "It is better to give than to receive," would be a notional one; whilst the assent given to the proposition: "Mr. Carnegie evidently finds more pleasure in scattering his money than in hoarding it," would be a real one. Further, one kind of assent can be transformed into the other. A member of our flock, for instance, is living in open violation of some moral law—say the law of Friday abstinence. We remind him of the command of the Church, and he gives some sort of assent to it, but not sufficient to make him abstain. We remind him of the forty days' fast of our Lord, and he at once feels a force within him in-

clining him to observe the law. His notional assent has been converted into real assent. Indeed, this is the change we are always endeavouring to bring about in our moral sermons. There is none of our congregation who would not admit it to be a grave sin to stay away from Mass on Sundays. Each one gives at least a notional assent to the gravity of the action. We draw out further considerations—the certainty of hell for the wicked and heaven for the good, the evil of bad example, the ingratitude shown to our Lord in breaking His commandments: in a word, we try to make our people *realise* the gravity of the action, to convert their notional into real assent.

The foundation of this distinction is the two-fold way of apprehending propositions, notional apprehension or the apprehension of ideas, and real apprehension or the apprehension of things. And the importance of the distinction is this, that that which is concrete produces an impression on the mind which nothing that is abstract can rival. Real apprehension and real assent are infinitely more stimulating than notional apprehension and notional assent. One saint's life is a more powerful instrument for good than a thousand dissertations on sanctity.

The distinction being clearly drawn, it is applied to and illustrated by the greater truths of religion. Thus we see that, through the instrumentality of conscience, there can be and is a real assent to the truth of One God. ' So also there may be a real assent to all the articles of the Athanasian Creed. "It is not a mere collection of notions, however momentous. It is a psalm or hymn of praise, of confession, and of profound, self-prostrating homage, parallel to the canticles of the elect in the Apocalypse. It appeals to the imagination quite as much as to the intellect. It is the war song of faith, with which we warn first ourselves, then each other, and then all those who are within its hearing, and the hearing of Truth, who our God is, and how we must worship Him, and how vast our responsibility will be if we know what to believe and then believe not. It is a fulfilment of the maxim, *Lex orandi, lex credendi*."

Assent is next shown to be unconditional, that is, it is

distinct from all other mental acts and exists independently of them. We may continue to assent to a proposition long after we have forgotten all the reasons which led us to assent to it. On the other hand, we may refuse to assent to a proposition although there may be the strongest reasons present inducing us to assent to it. Further, we may, after having given our assent to a proposition unconditionally, go back and review the inferences in obedience to which we have given our assent. If this reflex action confirms the first action, then the assent is said to be complex assent or certitude. Certitude, it may be remarked, as here used, is not certitude in the popular sense. Ordinarily speaking, simple assent and certitude are not distinguished. Here, certitude is used to express that assent which has been duly weighed in the balance and found not wanting. As contrasted with simple assent, its chief characteristic is that it is indefectible. The almost startling assertion is made: once certitude, always certitude. Truth is unchangeable; the human mind was made for truth; the normal condition of the mind therefore is certitude. The difficulty at once suggests itself, if certitude is indefectible, why do men sometimes change their very deepest convictions? The solution offered is this: that as a general rule certitude does not fail; that failures of what was taken to be certitude are the exception; and that when such a seeming failure of certitude happens as is implied in a change of one's religion, it is in reality not a failure, but rather a clinging to one or more certainties, a relinquishing of opinions which had never amounted to certainty, and a consistent adding of new certainties to the fundamental one.

The fact of certitude having been examined and established, the phenomena which lead up to it are examined, and the question is considered how a conditional act, such as inference, can lead to an unconditional act, such as assent; how, for instance, we can give our unqualified adhesion to the proposition, "I shall die," which does not admit of being demonstrated, which can only be proved to be truth-like, not true.

First, an important distinction is made between formal

and informal inference. Formal inference is the same as logic, and may be said to be the process of reasoning, in so far as it can be verbally expressed on paper, whether in syllogistic form, or in enthymeme, or in any recognised grammatical form of words where the antecedent and consequent are implied by such expressions as "for," "therefore," "supposing," "so that," etc. Newman assumes that such a syllogism is the syllogism of Aristotle; but on this point, as we shall see later, he has been challenged.

The actual process which goes on in the mind is claimed to be something far more complex than can be expressed by the lips or written on paper. The syllogism is to living thought only what the skeleton is to the living man. It serves a purpose in so far as it enables mind to communicate with mind, and to ascertain where each differs from the other. But it performs only the smallest share of work in the investigation of truth. "Its chain of conclusions hangs loose at both ends"; that is, it starts from first principles concerning which there is interminable controversy, and it ends in an abstract conclusion which is an inadequate representation of concrete reality. "Thought," it is said, "is too keen and manifold, its sources are too remote and hidden, its path too personal, delicate, and circuitous, its subject matter too various and intricate to admit of the trammels of any language of whatever subtlety and whatever compass."

Since, then, formal inference determines neither our first principles nor our ultimate judgements, it is neither a test of truth nor a justification of our assents. What, then, must we put in place of it? It is answered: informal or natural influence. By informal inference is meant the process of reasoning as it takes place in the living man, not the intellect acting isolated and alone, but the intellect acting in conjunction with all those experiences and inferior faculties which minister to it. "It is the cumulation of probabilities, independent of each other, arising out of the nature and circumstances of the particular case which is under review; probabilities too fine to avail separately, too subtle and circuitous to be convertible into syllogisms, too numerous and various for such conversion, even were they

convertible." Really it does not take the place of formal logic, but rather it carries formal logic from the realm of abstraction to the realm of reality. Once, however, translated into the realm of reality, it becomes modified according to the nature and condition of each individual who uses it. Hence the reason why the same evidence produces different effects on different people. A given truth is presented to the mind, but it finds that other truths have got there before it, and if it is to remain there it must be dovetailed with them. In order that the objective element of knowledge may be of use, the subjective element must not be ignored.

This process of informal inference is called "natural" because it is the one ordinarily used. It argues from things to things, not from notions to notions. It does not use an artificial calculus. It may be said to be a method of passing from one concrete proposition to another without the use of any tangible middle term. The phenomenon is quite familiar to us. A farmer is sure it will rain to-morrow, but cannot give his reasons. A physician can diagnose a patient and prescribe the correct treatment, and yet be unable to defend his judgement before another physician. A saint may be able to detect truth from heresy, although unable to state the grounds of his choice. Its action is especially noticeable in those who either do not know or who do not care about mental discipline, in geniuses and the uneducated, in women more than in men. It may be called instinct, not in the sense of brute instinct which acts necessarily, but in the sense that it perceives facts without any *assignable* reason *how* those facts have been perceived. For the most part its conclusions are but probabilities, but their cumulative weight produces certainty and justifies action.

Now what is that power within us which enables us to adjudicate on the cumulation of probabilities and to pass to certainty? In other words, is there any criterion by which we can test the validity of our inferences? Newman claims it to be what he calls the Illative Sense. Let us be quite clear as to what is meant by the Illative Sense. First, it is not a sense in the scholastic meaning of the term—that is, it is not some organic faculty essentially distinct

from the intellect. It is expressly said to be the perfection of the ratiocinative faculty, and to be used in a way parallel with the terms "good sense," "common sense," "sense of beauty," etc.

It is shown to have a perfect sanction, that is, we are bound to follow its dictates. The prerogative of man is to develop his own perfection out of the rudimentary nature with which he was born. The means of that development is the acquisition of knowledge. The immediate instruments which he uses are inference and assent. Now it is a man's duty to develop and perfect himself, his duty therefore to use his instruments, inference and assent, rightly, and therefore also his duty to follow the dictates of the illative sense.

The action of the faculty is illustrated by the action of parallel faculties. The moral sense, for instance, is the faculty by which the mind exercises its supreme control and direction in matters of conduct. Text-books of ethics may be written, rules may be laid down, laws may be enacted, but they are all hopelessly inadequate unless there be a living intellect to apply them. Or take the artistic sense. A student may learn off whole treatises on perspective, geometry, anatomy, architecture, colouring, etc., but they alone will not make him an artist. He must first possess and then develop the living mental faculty which we call the artistic sense. The same also is true with regard to poetry. A professor may explain and illustrate at great length the rules of rhyme, rhythm and metre, but he cannot confer the intellectual faculty which makes a poet.

Similarly, it is asked, "Why should ratiocination be an exception to a general law which attaches to the intellectual exercises of the mind; why it is held to be commensurate with logical science; and why logic is made an instrumental art sufficient for determining every sort of truth, while no one would dream of making any one formula, however generalized, a working rule at once for poetry, the art of medicine, and political warfare?"

The illative sense then is the living intellect acting in the concrete living man; acting in conjunction with all

his other faculties, utilising them, controlling them, or relinquishing them according to its perfection of judgement; and acting in a way too subtle and too elastic to have its processes reduced to the forms of paper logic. Just as the moral sense is the mental faculty which is the ultimate test of conduct; just as the artistic sense is the mental faculty which is the ultimate test of beauty; so also the illative sense is the ultimate test of right reasoning. On the one hand it is not cramped or hindered by poverty of language, for its range far exceeds that of language. It is able to turn in on the mind itself and examine all those personal elements of thought, principles, tastes, opinions, prejudices, mental complexion, all of which have their influence on the conclusions to which reasoning leads. "The mind contemplates them without the use of words by a process which cannot be analysed." On the other hand, it falls short of language in that it supplies no common measure between mind and mind; it is purely a personal gift or acquisition. In this function logic goes one better than it.

We are now brought to the final chapter of the book, one of surpassing beauty, and the one for which all the others exist. Each of the others was written out ten times by the author, the last perhaps twenty times. It illustrates the connection between inference and assent, between converging probabilities and certitude in the leading truths of religion. The author marshals the usual evidences of religion, first of natural, then of revealed, as they have appealed to him. In this he furnishes the most brilliant example of what he has been all along insisting upon, namely, that in the acquirement of certitude the subject is a factor to be reckoned with no less than the object, that not only must external evidences be offered but the internal dispositions must be capable of assimilating them. "In these provinces of enquiry," he says "egotism is true modesty. In religious inquiry each of us can speak only for himself, and for himself he has a right to speak. He knows what has satisfied and satisfies himself; if it satisfies him, it is likely to satisfy others. There will be very many exceptions, but these will admit of explanation."

First, the sources of natural theology are reviewed,

conscience, the voice of mankind, the history of human affairs. Foremost, of course, is conscience, and no author ever sketched more deftly its office as a teacher of God and His attributes and of a moral code for mankind. Then the criteria of revelation are considered. The preparation for revelation in natural religion, its foreshadowing in the Mosaic system, miracles, prophecy, miraculous propagation, all these are wonderfully portrayed and adduced, not as proofs in themselves, but as a collection of weighty probabilities which, taken cumulatively, destroy doubt and establish certainty. They are offered only to those minds who are prepared for them, namely, those who are imbued with the opinions and sentiments identified with natural religion. Such minds Christianity "addresses both through the intellect and through the imagination; creating a certitude of its truth by arguments too various for direct enumeration, too personal and deep for words, too powerful and concurrent for refutation." "I am the Good Shepherd, and I know mine, and mine know me. My sheep hear my voice and I know them, and they follow me."

The chief objections brought against the work regard the distinction between formal and informal inference, and consequently the nature, or rather the existence, of the illative sense. Does natural reasoning really go so far beyond syllogistic reasoning as the illustrious author maintains it does? And if it does not, what need is there of an illative sense?

Bishop Hedley, writing in the *Ampleforth Journal*, states the difficulty thus:

"I have never been able to accept Newman's main thesis in the *Grammar of Assent*. This I take to be, that the real reasoning process by which men arrive at all their important convictions is not purely intellectual, but made up of imagination, association, probability, memory, instinct, feeling, popular persuasion and every kind of impression that the complexity of man's being is susceptible of. Doubtless, many minds do depend for their conviction on very mixed motives. But I should have thought it evident that no really intelligent mind would ever allow the validity of a conviction until it had reviewed, by the great controlling faculty of reason, the multitudinous

impressions with which it had to deal. The only power by which the mind can really 'infer,' is the purely intellectual faculty. Feeling, associations, and personal character may incline a man to an inference. To say that there is an 'illitative' sense, other than the intellect proper, is only to say that truth is subjective—which is intolerable. 'Feeling and imagination are seen to be modes of knowledge.' This is how Dr. Barry describes Newman's view. If that is so, then knowledge is a mere dissolving view. 'Action can demonstrate better than many syllogisms.' This seems to be merely playing with words. The part which the imagination, a faculty that registers and modifies sensible impressions, plays in the intellectual processes of the mind is obscure, and must always be difficult to formulate in words. It may suggest possibilities, indicate misty heights or dark abysses, stimulate the mind to travel and explore. But, of itself, it can surely never get beyond conjecture or guess. If 'inference' means no more than this it may 'infer'; but if inference means intellectual judgement, or the conviction of man using the sum total of his faculties, imagination, like sense, is a mere handmaid. Something of the same kind may be said of that modern 'philosophy of the unconscious,' which Dr. Barry seems to think Newman anticipated. Modern speculation makes a great deal of it. But can a man be said to arrive at knowledge unconsciously? Is it knowledge at all before it is consciously turned over in the mind? Can any amount of impression, accumulation of material, preparation, impulse or feeling be really called knowledge? Is the philosophy of the unconscious, rightly understood, anything more than the living intellectual power ready to turn its eye upon all the material of knowledge, whether within us or without?"

Preliminary to touching upon these objections, let me clear up a little obscurity as to formal inference. Newman tells us expressly that that which he calls formal inference is identical with the syllogism of Aristotle. Now Aristotle tells us expressly that the syllogism regards the internal action of the mind, and not merely the external form as existing on the lips or on paper. He says: "For demonstration does not belong to language, since neither does syllogism generally, but it appertains to the internal word"—*οὐ γὰρ πρὸς τὸν ἔξω λόγον ἢ ἀπόδειξις, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ συλλογισμός.*

But then we may press a further question: did Aristotle, by the internal word, mean the living idea backed up by all its experiences, working under all the manifold in-

fluences which act upon it; or did he mean the bare idea shorn of all these associations, the action of the intellect regarded precisely in itself? I think no one would maintain the former. The latter therefore, I claim, is commensurate with paper logic or the "formal inference" as described in the *Grammar*. There is no mistaking it: "Let then our symbols be words: let all thought be arrested and embodied in words. Let language have a monopoly of thought; and thought go for only so much as it can show itself to be worth in language. Let every prompting of the intellect be ignored, every *momentum* of argument be disowned, which is unprovided with an equivalent wording, as its ticket for sharing in the common search after truth. Let the authority of nature, common-sense, experience, genius go for nothing. Ratiocination, thus restricted and put into grooves, is what I have called inference, and the science, which is its regulating principle, is logic."

This description of formal inference, by contrast, throws light on the meaning of natural inference. If on the one hand formal inference is reason acting in grooves, stripped of all its associations with sensation, then natural inference is the reason acting in conjunction with all the various sensitive faculties. Nowhere in the *Grammar* is it claimed that the imagination, or any other organic faculty, makes inferences. When it is said that "feeling and imagination are seen to be modes of knowledge," the meaning is, not that they act quite independently of reason, but that the reason's controlling action as it takes place in the living concrete man is too rapid and too subtle to have its process written down on paper in terms of Barbara, Celarent, Darii and Ferio. If proof be needed that Newman insists on the paramount supremacy of the reason, we have it in the following words taken from the *Grammar*: "It seems a truism to say, yet it is all that I have been saying, that in religion the imagination and affections should always be under the control of reason. . . . Sentiment, whether imaginative or emotional, falls back upon the intellect for its stay, when sense cannot be called into exercise; and it is in this way that devotion falls back on dogma."

So also when it is said that the statement: "Action can demonstrate better than many syllogisms," is a mere playing with words, a like answer may be given. Let it be granted that every human act has a syllogism lying somewhere beneath it. Surely there is a difference between that syllogism and the syllogism spoken of in the statement. The one is hidden and implicit, the other evident and explicit. It would be nearer the truth to say that a human act, generally speaking, has, not one, but thousands of syllogisms underlying it, aye, millions: for some human acts depend on the experience of a life-time. How many syllogisms, for instance, would it take to produce a demonstration equal to that act by which the great author of the *Grammar of Assent* submitted to the Catholic Church?

The most serious objection, however, is that where Dr. Hedley suggests that the "illative" sense is something other than the intellect proper. If it is not the intellect it is an organic sense, and consequently all the supposed inferences which it makes are mere guesses, and the general result is that we are shut up in pure subjectivism. Now, this is exactly what Newman does not say. Hear some of his descriptions: "The illative sense is right judgement in ratiocination." Again: "Certitude is not a passive impression made upon the mind from without by augmentative compulsion, but in all concrete questions (nay, even in abstract, for though the reasoning is abstract, the mind which judges of it is concrete) it is an active recognition of propositions as true, such as it is the duty of each individual himself to exercise at the bidding of reason, and when reason forbids, to withhold."* Once more: "The sole and final judgement on the validity of an inference in concrete matter is committed to the personal action of the ratiocinative faculty, the perfection or virtue of which I have called the illative sense."† Lastly: "It is the mind that reasons and controls its own reasoning, not any technical apparatus of words and propositions."

"I should have thought it evident," writes Dr. Hedley,

* P. 344.

† P. 345.

"that no really intelligent mind would ever allow the validity of a conviction until it had reviewed, by the great controlling faculty of reason, the multitudinous impressions with which it had to deal." But this reviewing process is exactly the same as the conversion of simple into reflex assent, and is, as we have seen, fully recognised by the *Grammar* as part of the journey towards certitude. The point in question is, can that review be made at any time, say on the eve of one's change of religion? Is it either necessary or even possible, *hic et nunc*, to institute a criticism on all the impressions of one's past life? It is neither possible nor necessary. The impressions have been registered, and in so far as they have been reviewed by the reason they have passed into reflex assents and contributed each its share towards general certitude. The same mind which then passed particular judgement on them now sits in general judgement, and in this office it is known as the illative sense.

In view of these remarks then, I must distinguish Dr. Hedley's statement as to the meaning of the main thesis of the *Grammar*. The real reasoning process by which men arrive at all their important convictions is not purely intellectual in the sense that intellect acts independently of all other faculties; but it is purely intellectual in the sense that it acts in conjunction with, yet holding command over, imagination, association, probability, memory, instinct, feeling, popular persuasion, and every kind of impression that the complexity of man's being is susceptible of; Newman, in a word, recognises that quality of the human soul, called in scholastic language *simplicitas*; that it is the same soul which thinks, feels, vegetates, and fulfils the often overlooked office of actuating that portion of primary matter committed to its keeping; that it is the whole man who acts, and not a faculty isolated from him.

A word on the philosophy of the unconscious and I may bring my paper to a close. Newman, in his teaching on implicit reason, is said to have anticipated this phase of modern philosophy. In what sense has he anticipated it? First, let me distinguish between reflex and direct con-

sciousness. Dr. Hedley will doubtless allow that the mind can work spontaneously and so acquire a good deal of knowledge, though such knowledge would not justify important actions until it had been first submitted to a reflex process. But then this modern philosophy will also claim that there are judgements formed *in* us—by the spontaneous working of our various faculties of sense, imagination, etc.—but not *by* us. In the former sense Newman may be said to have anticipated the philosophy of the unconscious. The later sense is quite alien to his whole system. An example shall illustrate the distinction. An eminent Jesuit was lately giving a retreat conference to a body of secular clergy. Speaking on preaching, he offered advice something to this effect: "Choose the subject of your Sunday's sermon and prepare it in outline on the previous Monday morning. Then leave it to 'unconscious cerebration' to simmer or incubate. It will go on working itself out, even when you are asleep, and then on Sunday morning it will be ready."

If such a method of sermon preparation be followed, there will probably be some intellectual illuminations during the week, flashes of knowledge striking on consciousness, which will receive their due attention from the reflex judgement at the time, and pass into the category of reflex assents. Then there will be all the knowledge which has unconsciously accumulated whilst the mind has been pondering over church debts or locked in sound slumber. It may not strike upon consciousness until the preacher is in the pulpit, not even perhaps until the moment it is required. Then, quick as lighting, it is reviewed, judged, and enunciated. Whatever has been acquired unconsciously, whether by "unconscious cerebration," or "the subliminal process," or anything else we like to call it, it must be subjected to the reflex reason before it can be considered reliable knowledge. If modern philosophy goes further than this, it goes further than the philosophy of Newman's *Grammar of Assent*.

Other objections there are against the work, but they mostly involve the unending scholastic controversies on first principles. These Newman carefully avoided, even

as he avoided the language in which they had been carried on. Over and over again he asserts that he is not forming a theory *a priori* as to how the intellect ought to act, but that he is merely ascertaining the facts *a posteriori*, and grouping the phenomena as witnessed to by the voice of mankind. The modern philosophy of his time had appealed to experience, and Newman took it on its own ground and showed that experience, if only consulted fairly, would tell for the great truths of religion. He did not therefore deny the value of *a priori* reasoning: he prescinded from it. He preferred to start from the great facts of his own existence and the voice of conscience speaking within him. Pre-arranged formulas might satisfy some folk; they were not for him, nor, in his opinion, for the people he wished to convert. And so he chose as title-page motto the saying of St. Ambrose: "Non in dialecticâ complacuit Deo salvum facere populum suum."

THOMAS J. GERRARD.

ART. VII.—THE ANTI-CHRISTIAN POLICY OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT.

NO Catholic can view without grave misgivings the triumphant progress of anti-Christian legislation in France. For it must be confessed that the Bill of Separation of Church and State, now rapidly passing into the law of the land, the logical outcome of a steady policy of repressing religion pursued for many years, is the greatest victory ever achieved by Latin Freemasonry against the Church since the time of the French Revolution. The effects of this successful campaign against religion will not be confined to France: they are certain to be felt in other countries which look up to her for guidance and example; for it must be borne in mind that although no longer, as at one time, the centre of power and arbiter of nations, she still preserves a world-wide influence among anti-clericals and haters of religion, as the home and focus of Latin Freemasonry and the aggressive exponent of the most advanced anti-religious ideas. Her policy will reverberate and echo through the Latin countries of both hemispheres, putting courage into the hearts of the enemies of religion, bracing them up for further attempts against the Church, and strengthening the bonds which unite the various centres of Freemasonry, all of which bow in unison to the leading spirits in France. What Rome is to the Catholic, Paris is to the Latin Freemason—the centre of unity, the bond of brotherhood, the guardian of tradition, the city of light whence radiate to all parts teaching, guidance and example. It cannot be too strongly impressed on Catholics that Freemasonry takes world-wide views and has world-wide aims; that consciously or unconsciously general moral

support is given to irreligious propaganda, or at least that no opposition is made. A standing proof of this is that the secular press of the world—newspapers, reviews and magazines—is always open to the exposition of principles more or less at variance with Catholic doctrine and practice, while only in rare instances does it give the Catholic apologist a chance to reply. Moreover, in case of a conflict between the Church and the secular party in any country, it is sure to take the side of the latter and give a version of events favourable to it, while it is next to impossible to get the other side of the question brought forward or even to give contradiction to mendacious statements that have received world-wide circulation through the press agencies. The free press, so glorified in modern society, is anything but a courageous champion of the truth; it is one-sided, partial, mean, averse to the truth and ready to sympathize with the anti-clerical party in any country, because it has an aversion to religion even when not actively hostile to it.

It is unfortunate that many well-meaning Catholics have been led astray by the secular press in the present crisis about which we should naturally expect a practically unanimous opinion prevalent amongst them. Whatever sophistry may be used by the promoters of the present Bill to explain its purpose, not much penetration is required to see that it is a plain issue between Atheism and Christianity, as was the case during the French Revolution. It is persecution of the worst kind, an invasion of elementary human rights, an unjust discrimination against men and women simply because they believe in God, put in force with the scarcely-veiled intention of driving religion out of the country. It is more than a faint echo of the Revolution heard after a century. The present legislation is a replica of the successive measures against religion passed by the Constituent Assembly in 1789. The pompous phrases about liberty of conscience, so often in the mouths of the present rulers of France, should not blind us to plain facts. At the very time when the Catholic clergy of France, driven out of their parishes for refusing to take the Civil oath, were being massacred in hundreds and imprisoned in

thousands, proclamations about liberty of conscience were being made repeatedly by the Girondist legislators, the very authors of this atrocious persecution.

Fortunately in the present instance it is not hard for us to lift off the veil and analyse motives and purposes. M. Combes, the ex-Premier of France, the man to whom fell the lot of executing the laws against the Religious Orders, has supplied us with the necessary material to work upon. In an article written for an English review* in defence of the policy of himself and his colleagues, he professes to explain the necessity that obliged them to pass the measures against the Religious Orders, measures, he admits, which were but a preparation for the complete separation of Church and State. Certainly no one better than he can voice the sentiments of anti-clerical France; his article may therefore be regarded as an authoritative exposition of the policy of the Government of the Third Republic. He makes but a feeble attempt to place false issues before the reader, and his true self breaks out continually, showing the real underlying motives. From time to time he works himself up to Jacobin fury with *the Nation in danger*. We know the cry well. During the orgies of the Revolution the same cry was heard repeatedly and was generally followed by *A la lanterne*. He waxes indignant over the "contemptible insults and calumnies" of the English Catholic papers, which charge him with being arbitrary, violent and brutal, representing him as a "violent sectarian inspired by a hatred of all religion and devoured by a desire to destroy it," and he appeals for a fair hearing from the general body of English opinion, which should take into account the different social conditions and political necessities of the two countries. However, there are some elemental ideas of justice held in common by all mankind; and if the defence of his anti-religious campaign now laid before us were well calculated to refute the charges enumerated above, calm and judicial reasoning would have been more to the point than the intemperate language used towards the victims of his policy, the thousands of weak

* See *National Review*, March, 1905.

and defenceless men and women over whom he is enjoying a brutal triumph, having driven them from their homes and deprived them of their means of livelihood. To those who cannot follow the argumentation to their own satisfaction, the general tone of the article will nevertheless convey the suspicion that M. Combes is just what he is represented to be.

It ought to be now as plain to all outsiders as it is to the French Catholics that the steady, unrelenting policy of the anti-clerical party, not only in France, but in Italy, Spain, and the other Latin countries, is the destruction of Christianity as a moral force in the world. This is the meaning of the shibboleth, "the emancipation of the human race from dogma," so often in the mouths of the leaders of Latin Freemasonry, who are at the bottom of every political movement directed against the Catholic Church. It is not clericalism which is the enemy, but Christianity itself. That is the true meaning and motive of the persecution of the Religious Orders in France, and the separation of Church and State. The real issue, undisguised at times by the more outspoken and violent of the party, is between Atheism and Christianity, between a Christian and atheistic, or, as M. Combes terms it, a *neutral* Government. It is a return to the atheistic principles and violently persecuting character of the First Revolution. When M. Combes declares, as the keynote of his policy, "the absolute independence of the State of all dogma and its recognised supremacy over every religious communion" to be the "doctrine of the French Revolution, of which the French Republic glories in being the heir," the most sceptical should be convinced that the uprooting of the religious idea has been the sole motive of the present legislation in France. It is startling, indeed, to find that the ex-Premier of France has drawn his inspiration on the religious question from that lurid Assembly which abolished Catholicism, closed the churches, forbade all outward signs of religion, decreed death to the priests, and saw that decree carried out in the fiendish September massacres. Some disavowal of sympathy with the inhuman excesses perpetrated by the Revolution in

assuming her lay and *neutral* character might be expected at this juncture from a man, admittedly attached to its principles, who has carried out such penal legislation to compass the same end. What happened before in France may happen again, as witness the massacre of priests at the time of the Commune. If the present measures are not sufficient and the work of de-Christianising France is impeded, then a repetition of past horrors may be expected at any time. Putting this aspect of the question aside, however, this bold avowal given due consideration is a sufficient explanation of all the measures taken against the Catholic Church. It is easy to say, "The Republic is in danger—the Republic must rouse herself up for her defence." The Committee of Public Safety justified its most inhuman excesses with the same cry. If the French Republic were really in danger, if the Catholic Church were really waging war on it, we should know more about it than to require to be assured of the fact by M. Combes. Let proofs be forthcoming and we can believe him. The Catholic Church is no more making war against the French Republic than she is against England. The absurd argument is brought forward as it is not politic at present to avow that the real purpose of the legislation is to make the teaching and preaching of Christianity illegal in France, as it was during the Revolution.

No other argument should be needed to convince outsiders of the real meaning of the anti-clerical movement in France than this wretched attempt to hide it under a mass of frothy declamation. Surely while so many thousands of innocent men and women, against whom no crime is alleged, who devoted their lives to the noble and self-sacrificing duties of teaching, caring for the sick, and looking after the poor, have been hunted from their homes, their property confiscated, all avenues to their specialized employments closed to them, and see no prospect before them but abject want and poverty, the author of their misfortunes should be able to give to the world some really convincing arguments in justification of measures that have caused such enormous suffering. *A fortiori* does the outside public seek for conviction, while hundreds of

thousands of parents who had voluntarily placed their children in Catholic schools and convents, in preference to the lay schools, find these schools closed by force, and their children obliged to attend others that they do not approve of. Such far-reaching interference of the State with the rights of the parents has never before been attempted in any country. M. Combes ought to be aware that it is a poor argument to fling at the English public that the clerical party had captured every sphere of public activity, including the liberal professions; had founded schools in competition with the State schools in all country towns and chief rural communes, and that clerical teachers had taught even in State schools under the law-giving rural communes the liberty to employ either clerical or lay masters, for competition with the State in teaching is allowed to religious bodies in England and all other countries where the liberty of the subject with regard to parental rights is more respected than it is in France.

What does this successful competition show but that a large portion of French people are Catholics who desire to give their children a Christian education; that many of the rural communes were actuated by Christian motives in employing clerical teachers; that the Catholic element in France was able by its worth and merit to capture every sphere of public activity in legitimate competition with its enemies, though the latter were backed up by the influence of the Government. If it can be made a subject of complaint that practical Catholics have captured the liberal professions, then we have arrived at the stage when the vindictive hostility of the Government will be directed not only against priests, monks, and nuns, but against all Frenchmen who profess the Catholic religion. The same determination to blot Christianity out of France shown by the leaders of the French Revolution, in their orgy of blood and murder, appears now in the less violent but no less effective legislation of the Third Republic.

That the Catholic Church in France has waged an unceasing war against the French Republic, that it has been at the bottom of every Royalist and other factious movement for the past thirty-five years, and has been

guilty of constant and deliberate breaches of the Concordat, are charges which have been often made before but never proved, and it might be reasonably expected that M. Combes at this juncture should not repeat them without bringing a formidable array of facts in support of his assertions. A fair acquaintance with the history of contemporary France since the fall of the Second Empire leaves the general impression that the French clergy have kept aloof too much as a body from politics and have allowed their rights and liberties as citizens to be filched from them without sufficient resistance. Attacked in unmeasured terms and held up by their enemies as objects of hatred, they have continued performing their ministerial duties with fidelity, bearing insult and provocation all along with unvarying meekness, and a remarkable absence of retaliation which has been often regarded on this side of the Channel as an exhibition of cowardice.

As to breaches of the Concordat, they have been all made from the other side. The first great breach which has vitiated ever since all French diplomacy dealing with the Holy See, was the adding of seventy-seven articles, unknown to the Pope and his advisers, to the original fifteen which had been agreed upon and solemnly signed by both the contracting parties, after a series of numerous proposals and stormy discussions filling up the greater part of two years. These additions, known as the Organic Articles, which were supposed to explain the former but in reality were in contradiction to some of their essential provisions, passed into law with the Concordat without discussion either in the Council of State or in the Corps Législatif. Their existence was not even suspected by the Pope's advisers till they became law, and thus an ecclesiastical code was established in France without the concurrence of the Holy See. In full consistory Pius VII. protested against them as a grave violation of promises given by the French Government and a serious violation of his rights, and wrote to Bonaparte urging their repeal. Naturally enough they have been a bone of contention ever since between the Holy See and the successive French Governments, especially within recent years, for the former never

admitted that it was bound by agreements to which it was not a contracting party. As M. Combes is well aware of this it is more than disingenuous, it is outrageous for him to attempt to fix the stigma on the Holy See and the French clergy of systematically violating a solemn contract entered into with the State.

To cite one particular instance in which his high-pitched complaints seem sadly out of tune, viz., the right of nomination of bishops by the French Government, the Holy See could go much further if it wished than merely to reject some of the nominations made to episcopal sees by Freemason and infidel presidents. Foreseeing that at one time or other the head of the French nation might not be a believing Catholic, it was arranged that the nomination of bishops under those circumstances should be arranged by a *new convention* (Art. xvii.). The incongruity of a man without religious belief appointing to episcopal sees was the reason for the insertion of this special clause, as well as the wholly divergent views on the desirable qualities that would fit a candidate for the office which a president of this kind would entertain.

Coming now to the expulsion of the Religious Orders, it will be remembered that the Law of Associations, passed under M. Combes' predecessor in office, decreed that the Orders which were not authorized by the State were to apply for authorization within a specified time, sending also a detailed statement regarding their object, number of members and amount of movable and immovable property. Numbers of the Orders complied with the law on the understanding that each case would be considered on its own merits and authorization granted or refused accordingly. They did not suspect that the arrangement was a pitfall prepared for them: a clever device by which the Government might obtain an exact inventory of their property in order to lay hands on it. What was their indignant surprise when the Government, instead of considering the cases of the Orders individually, as the law clearly implied, divided them into three categories, that of the Teaching, the Preaching, and what they were pleased to call the Trading Orders, and

proposed that the authorizations should be rejected *en bloc*. In the meantime, hoping for the support of the public opinion of the country, the Government sent round circulars to the municipalities asking whether they were in favour of or against the authorization of the Orders. The replies received must have been momentarily disconcerting. Out of 1,871 municipal councils whose opinion was asked 1,147 replied in favour of authorization, 545 were against it, while from 179 no answer was received. As the neutrality of the latter section was evidently due to want of moral courage, we may confidently lay down that two-thirds of the municipalities of France were opposed in principle to the dissolution of the Religious Orders. The majority of the prefects of the departments replied to circulars sent to them in a sense unfavourable to the Orders, but as these men are thoroughly under the thumb of the Government they do not represent the voice of the country. Thus we see the large body of public opinion that had to be set at naught if the authorizations were to be refused.

The vested interests which would be violently interfered with were enormous. It involved the ejection from their homes of 75,000 religious of both sexes who had chosen a certain way of life in which they wished to remain. It affected the comfort and happiness of 250,000 aged persons and orphans supported by them in their asylums. It would bring about the closing of 14,000 schools and the temporary dispersal at least of hundreds of thousands of young scholars. The successful competition of the Free Schools, almost entirely in the hands of religious, with the State Schools, makes us wonder what those Catholics have been doing at the elections who are so anxious to give their children a religious education. Can it be that it was the mothers who sent their children to the Free Schools while the fathers were throwing the weight of their votes against them at the polls? In 1879 the schools taught by the religious counted 2,301,943 pupils. After Paul Bert's law in 1882 secularizing primary education it became necessary to begin the work all over again by building Free Schools. In spite of the enormous cost and many other difficulties the attendance at these had risen in 1886 to 907,246, and

eleven years later to 1,477,310. In secondary education the triumphant progress of the ecclesiastical colleges, in fair and open competition with the State lycées, was equally surprising. In 1900 the latter could boast of only 81,321 students, while the former had 91,140 on their rolls. It is clear from these figures what an enormous number of French parents must have been opposed on principle to the closing of the schools.

The situation would be considered embarrassing in countries like England and the United States where public opinion counts for something and vested interests are regarded as sacred, and no Government could act however much they might desire to do so; but in France a bold, well-organized minority can ride roughshod over the feelings of a tame, cowardly and apathetic majority and pass whatever penal measures they wish. So the authorizations were triumphantly rejected *en bloc*, and France took another step towards materialism.

Coming now to M. Combes' exposition of the reasons that moved the Government to dissolve the Religious Orders, it is surprising how airily he dismisses the whole subject with empty phrases. The Teaching Orders, which had built up a magnificent system of primary and secondary education for both sexes that will take the State many years and at the cost of great pecuniary sacrifice to replace, were expelled, "as they were regarded as unfit trainers for free citizens." It was not denied that the pupils issuing from the clerical schools were thoroughly well educated, able to take their places in after life with the pupils of the State schools; it was not alleged that they were disloyal citizens of the French Republic. They had, however, the fatal defect of being believing Christians; they might be considered free citizens in a *political*, but not in a *religious* sense. The freedom that M. Combes postulates for the youth of France is freedom from belief in dogma or religious doctrine of any kind. It is not difficult to understand the underlying meaning of the phrase. As the same principle applied in England would drive all clerical professors of any Christian form of belief out of the schools or universities, it shows great

assurance on M. Combes' part to appeal on this score to the sympathies of the English public. He acknowledges that it was not till 1886 that there was a majority in the Chambers in favour of secularization of teaching. That majority immediately proceeded to invade the rights of the party, then for the first time in the minority, which, when it was in power, had allowed freedom in education to all classes of the community. Since then it has continued its brutal work with the cry of freedom and liberty—but this means liberty for its own followers and freedom to oppress all others of a different way of thinking. Suppose the tables were turned and the clericals, once more in power, were determined to put down Atheism in France by legislative measures; suppose they passed laws restoring entirely to the Church the education of the young, which she had enjoyed in the Middle Ages and up to comparatively modern times; suppose it dispersed all lay professors trained in the State schools, forbidding them to open schools of their own and confiscating their property. Here is a perfect parallel to what has just taken place: the measures adopted would not be more drastic than those applied to the Religious Orders. Would the cry, I ask, of "Clerical Tyrants" that would ring through the civilized world be silenced by the phrase of M. Combes, modified to suit the new juncture of affairs, that the party in power regarded the lay teachers, trained in the State schools, as unfit trainers for *Christian* citizens?

Woefully inadequate, too, is his defence of the equally cruel expulsion of the Preaching Orders. It is well-known that the vocation of these Orders is to supplement the preaching of the ordinary parochial clergy by going about from church to church, preaching missions and retreats to bring sinners back to repentance. If they ever went outside these duties it was only on rare occasions, such as, for instance, to give the conferences preached every year in Notre-Dame. It is amusing to see M. Combes pose for a moment as the champion of the rights of the secular clergy by affirming that the religious were interfering with the work of the former, as if that were any concern of his. The Catholic Church is able to define the duties of

both orders of clergy and regulate their relations with one another without the uncalled-for assistance of outsiders.

After this preliminary fencing, his real charge is that they conducted a crusade against liberalism. Since the doctrines of liberalism, as understood by M. Combes and his colleagues, involve the negation of the moral teaching of Christ, the Preaching Orders would not have been worth their salt if in the course of their ministry they had not tried to stem the progress of infidelity. M. Combes would have them keep their mouths closed, for instance, on the sanctity of the marriage tie while divorce was making such awful progress in France and loosening the bonds of society. They preached no doctrine in France that is not preached here and wherever the Church exists, and therefore no greater reason existed for their expulsion from France than from any other country, except that the rulers of France are setting up as infidel doctrinaires and are determined to crush out all rival teaching.

Whatever danger French politicians might pretend to fear from the Teaching and Preaching Orders, which exercised an undoubted influence on the youth and manhood of the French people, it would seem impossible to give a satisfactory reason for the cruelty exercised towards the Contemplative, or, as M. Combes defines them, the *Trading* Orders. They were few in number, in fact outside the Grande Chartreuse they were comparatively insignificant. In the course of centuries the monks of the Grande Chartreuse, by their incessant industry, had changed a desert into a garden. Their lowly lives were divided between prayer, study, and manual labour. They lived retired from the world and its conflicts, seeking only their own salvation and not attempting, except by good example, to exercise any influence over their fellow-men.

But the peaceful and retired character of the hermit monks of France was no more destined to shield them from spoliation and dispersal than it saved those in Italy, driven in 1860 from their mountain homes perched on the summits of the Apennines by the agents of the Sardinian Government. The spirited protest of Leo XIII., then Cardinal Archbishop of Perugia, to King Victor Emmanuel

regarding the dispersed Camaldolese monks of Monte Corona is just as applicable to the present case: "Men of stainless life," he says, "of unbounded popularity among our country-folk, whom solitude, silence and prayer perpetually separated from all worldly pursuits, they were accused of mixing themselves up with politics! Men whom the world never saw coming down from the lonely peak of their inaccessible mountain except when the duties of brotherly charity compelled them, and whose convent was the refuge of the pilgrim, the infirm and the needy—these were held up as persons who imperilled the interests of the nation!"

The monks of the Grande Chartreuse having discovered the secret of making the famous liqueur which bears their name, their lay-brethren manufactured it on a large scale, owing to the great demand for it from all parts of the world, and the Government derived such a large revenue from the duty imposed on it that it was debated whether it would be worth while to expel them, in view of the loss of revenue entailed. But no considerations, monetary or otherwise, are allowed to stand in the way when it is a question of striking a blow at Christianity, and so they were comprehended in the general law of expulsion. It would seem, therefore, that any reason short of hatred of Christianity, which is the impelling motive of all these legislative enactments, could not be assigned for the cruelty exercised towards these innocent men and the confiscation of their lawful property, even by so astute a reasoner as M. Combes. But he is equal to the occasion, and coolly informs us that they degraded the religious idea by their "ignoble and huckstering spirit." Just as he posed for a moment as the champion of the secular clergy against the Preaching Orders, he now exhibits himself as the guardian of that religious idea which he is doing his best to destroy in France. He preaches the *neutrality* of the State one moment, and interferes the next to keep the religious idea pure and unsullied by commerce. What is it to him or his colleagues whether the religious idea be degraded or kept elevated to the proper level by its professors when he regards it as a chimera? If the monks had sought to

acquire wealth by the manufacture of the liqueur to spend in luxurious living there might be some truth in the allegation, but it is well known that they lived poor and simple lives themselves and used all the proceeds of the sale of the liqueur in works of charity and beneficence. The result of their overflowing charity may be seen for many miles around the monastery. In view of recent scandals it would be well for M. Combes to set his own house in order before taking in hand those of others. Until he can clear himself of the charge of looking for a personal bribe of a million francs from the monks for the privilege of exemption from the very law which he was executing, the "ignoble and huckstering spirit" which he tries to foist on the monks will be attached to his own dishonoured name by posterity.

The division into Teaching, Preaching, and Contemplative Orders does not comprehend all who suffered by the decree of expulsion. We are anxious to hear some reason for the disbanding of those whose vocation was to care the sick and of those who conducted orphanages and asylums for the aged poor. We would care to be further informed why the Benedictines of Douai, an English foundation and English property, who conducted a purely English College, were not exempt; similarly how the Passionist Fathers of the Avenue Hoche in Paris, who simply acted as chaplains to the English-speaking residents and visitors, and knew nothing of French interests or politics, merited confiscation and dispersal. The real reason is, of course, that no representatives of religion, foreign or otherwise, are wanted in France by the present ruling powers, and will be all banished or reduced to impotence according as the Government can effect its purpose. M. Combes boasts of having carried through his measures against the Religious Orders by strictly legal means, Concordat in hands. Premising that legality is no guarantee against cruelty, oppression, and gross injustice, it may be stated further that as the Concordat does not mention the Religious Orders, we are thrown back to general principles when it is question of their legal existence in France. Leo XIII. in 1880 protested against

the expulsion carried on that year by Jules Ferry, and laid down the axiom that the Catholic Church, in the full integrity of her vital organism and the full liberty of her action, had a right to exist in France. She was there before the arrival of Clovis and his Franks, and her influence and action were the civilizing and organizing forces which built up the nation. "Wherever the Catholic Church exists," the Pope added, "there Religious Orders spontaneously grow up; they spring from the Church as branches from the trunk of the tree. They are the auxiliaries whose help the bishops find to be especially necessary in our days, helping by their skill and industry the secular clergy in their ministrations and relieving by Christian charity the needs of the poor."

So much for the use made of the Concordat as a legal instrument against the Religious Orders. Constant and deliberate breaches of this contract between Church and State are invoked by M. Combes as the great argument for abolishing it altogether and repudiating the pecuniary and other obligations entered into by the French Government as a kind of indemnity for the Church property confiscated at the period of the French Revolution. To show which of the two parties to the contract was guilty of constant and deliberate breaches of it, it will serve my purpose to quote from the letter of Cardinal Guibert, Archbishop of Paris, addressed in 1886 to the then President of the Republic, M. Grévy :

"Read over the records of the last five years. In 1880 the Religious Orders are dispersed on the authority of contested laws and without having obtained judgement from the Courts. At the same time Treasury laws, which impose a heavier burden every year, fall oppressively on communities of religious women, regardless of the immense services they render to the poor, the sick, and the youth of the country. In 1882 a school-law blots out religion from the programme of public instruction and inflicts on Christian France, under the name of *neutrality*—a name hitherto unknown—the stigma of official Atheism. Year after year the budget of public worship is cut down. In the space of five years there is a reduction of seven millions of francs. The salaries of the bishops are diminished, those of the cathedral canons are threatened; the burses in the seminaries are stricken out of the estimates; the cathedral churches are refused the subsidies

necessary for the dignity of public worship and the repair of their buildings ; the assistant pastorships are suppressed by the hundred. In every locality where the municipal officers become the tools of anti-religious passions, the Government follow in their wake, tolerating or sanctioning the most unlawful usurpations."

M. Combes boasts of having by his measures against the Religious Orders prepared the way for the separation of Church and State, leaving the conducting of this latter part of the anti-religious campaign to his successor in office. From a religious point of view the situation has become so trying within the past few years that with an infidel Government throttling the free action of the Church at every turn and utilising the Concordat to carry on a petty persecution and unwarrantable interference in Church affairs, many English Catholics, with their experience of almost entire liberty under a Protestant Government, have been of opinion that the Church in France will gain rather than lose by her separation from the State. But this is a delusion which arises from an entire misconception of the situation. Having already seen that the Government will not allow the fundamental liberty of teaching accorded to Catholics under Protestant Governments elsewhere, it is unlikely that it will rest content with the brutal triumphs it has gained up to the present. We may dismiss as a piece of brazen effrontery the declaration of M. Combes that "separation will serve the interests of the religious community, whose liberty will be fully safeguarded." Having already taken away so much there is very little liberty left to be safeguarded. It is more to the point that he follows it up with the ambiguous remark that it will "restore liberty to the State and will place the final seal on her lay and neutral character," which in other words means that there will be now no obstacle to the progressive career of an infidel and anti-Christian Government, determined to capture all minds to its own ideas regarding the fundamental problems of human life.

The hollow mockery of the ex-Premier's statement that separation will ensure greater liberty to the Church is evident from some of the provisions of the Bill. English

Catholics are fond of arguing that it will be a great benefit to the French Church to be free from the State. The clergy, no longer crouching under the insolent orders of a Masonic and infidel Minister of Worship, no longer hated by the people as Government employees, no longer shackled by State interference, will be able to look after their flocks free from outside interference. But those who reason thus do not understand the real meaning of the Bill of Separation. There is no intention of allowing the Free Church to exist in the Free State. The Bill belies its name, for it does not propose a real separation. It is simply a repudiation by the French Government of its pecuniary obligations to the Church, an unwarrantable confiscation of Church property, and the dragging down of the Church from the honourable position of an ally in the furtherance of the welfare of the nation to that of a dangerous society to be kept under the constant surveillance of the police. There will be no more separation than that existing between the police authorities and an ex-convict, or ticket-of-leave man, liable to re-imprisonment if he does not report himself from time to time. The purpose of the Bill is to degrade, impoverish and manacle the Church more securely than before. The ultimate intention, of course, in the mind of the atheistical Government is to reduce the Church to such a state of slavery that she may not prove any serious hindrance to the utter de-Christianization of the country.

Taking up some of the provisions of the Bill in detail, it is remarkable how drastic they are in character, reminding one at every turn of the legislation passed by the Constituent Assembly. The second Article, which is neither more nor less than an unjustifiable act of wholesale confiscation, recites that: "The Republic neither recognises, pays salaries to nor subsidizes any form of worship." That would be all very well if the State were under no pecuniary obligations. But by this act it repudiates just debts even admitted in theory by the Constituent Assembly in 1789, when it confiscated the property of the Church. The decree on this point recited that: "The National Assembly declares that all ecclesiastical property is at the disposal of the nation, subject to the charge of providing in a suitable manner for the

expenses of worship, the maintenance of its ministers and the relief of the poor." In the Concordat the arrangement was confirmed, Pius VII. agreeing to the Budget of Public Worship standing as compensation for the confiscated Church property, then beyond all possibility of recovery. Article 14 recites, "The Government shall assure a suitable stipend to the bishops and priests of the dioceses and parishes comprised in the new circumscriptions." It should ever therefore be borne in mind that the Budget of Public Worship is nothing more or less than the discharge of a debt due by the State to the Church, and its suppression at this juncture a cynical repudiation of a clear pecuniary obligation, due as a kind of interest on the many millions stolen from the Church in past times.

The only honourable course open to the French Government, in lieu of the continuance of the Budget, would be the restoration to their rightful owner of the cathedrals and churches and the capitalization of the Budget for some years in advance, the lump sum being handed over to the bishops. Yet what a pitiable contrast does the actual method proposed in the Bill contrast with the generous and lavish provision made by Mr. Gladstone for the Irish Protestant clergy on the disestablishment of the Protestant Church in Ireland. In the latter instance more than £12,000,000 was spent on life annuities, commutation money, building and repairing charges, and church requisites in behalf of a small body representing about only a fourth of the population of Ireland. A generous provision would also be forthcoming in France if there was question of the dissolution of any other society possessing funds; but the anti-clerical party when it comes to dealing with the clergy, whom they regard with profound feelings of aversion and contempt, are lost to all sense of honour and justice. The following woefully inadequate pension is provided for the bishops, parochial clergy and chaplains:

"To ecclesiastics who count at least thirty years' of remunerated functions, of which twenty at least have been passed in the service of the State, it is proposed to grant an annuity equal to half their present stipend, with the proviso, however, that this cannot be less than 400 (£16) nor exceed 1,200 francs (£48)."

The Bill proposes that all others who have not been in receipt of a salary from the State for this long period will be paid their full salary for the first year, two-thirds the second year, one-half the third year, and one-third the fourth year, after which the State will clear its hands of them and cease all payment. Departments and Communes may make a provision on the same scale as the State for the clergy at present paid by them for ministerial services. The strength of the supporters of this iniquitous piece of legislation is shown by the shameless parsimony which decrees that no ecclesiastic, even of the highest standing, such as an archbishop, even after twenty years of service remunerated by the State, shall receive as an old-age pension more than what is hardly equal to the wages of an unskilled workman in this country. It can easily be imagined, moreover, what hardship will be entailed on numbers of ecclesiastics belonging to the second category, many past their sixtieth year, who will be gradually reduced to penury after four years. Again, as the pensions of all will depend on the good behaviour of the recipients, as interpreted by their sworn enemies, it is not unlikely that ordinary pastoral zeal for souls, though conducted by the rules of prudence, will be utilised in many instances as a pretext for stoppage of payment.

With this proposed miserable expenditure, the State considers herself free to seize on all churches, cathedrals, parochial houses and other religious institutions and appropriate them to her own use. It matters not that they have been built by the voluntary gifts of the faithful for the purpose of Divine worship; the State has other purposes in view for them. It is proposed that for ten years the State, Department or Commune will be bound to let these edifices to the religious bodies to whom they belonged at a rent not to exceed ten per cent. of the annual income of the local religious association. When this period has elapsed, it is free to let them to any other society or persons or appropriate them for its own uses. The parochial houses will be allowed to remain in possession of their present occupants for two years, after which they may have them for another five years at a moderate rent. When seven years have

expired from the present date they will fall entirely into the possession of the State, Department or Commune, and may be disposed of as these bodies think fit. Episcopal residences and seminaries are to be left in the possession of the present occupants for two years, but at the end of that short period they are to pass completely into the possession of the State.

What freedom, then, we may ask, does the State guarantee to the Church as compensation for this wholesale spoliation? Having been deprived of her corporate character in the eyes of the State, her bishops and priests being no longer recognised as such, her members will be allowed to form themselves into local groups or societies for religious worship—*associations cultuelles*. These societies, which are not allowed to have any other object except that of religious worship exclusively, must comprise at least seven members, all residents of the locality where the society is formed. Though they will be authorized to receive subscriptions and donations, they will not be allowed to possess any funds over and above what is necessary for current needs, and are absolutely debarred from possessing any immovable property except the church and the residence of the priest. To ensure the keeping of these stringent regulations, they will be obliged to present a yearly balance-sheet to the civil authorities, showing income and expenditure. The meetings for Divine worship are to be kept under the surveillance of the police, and every year a declaration must be made beforehand what number of meetings are to be held and upon what dates. It is provided that infringements of these regulations shall be punished by fines and imprisonment to be inflicted on the directors of the societies. No religious functions, such as processions, will be allowed to take place in public, nor will it be lawful to place a cross or any other religious emblem on any new churches that may be built. The ringing of church bells is to be regulated by the municipalities, as also the attendance of the clergy at funerals. The priest will be liable to fine and imprisonment if his sermon, preached as it will be in presence of the police, "has a tendency to excite one section of his fellow-citizens

against another," or if "it contains a direct provocation to resist the laws or other legal acts of the authorities." The members of the societies will also be held responsible for their presence on such occasions, and, as a result, the lease of the church may be cancelled by the local authorities and the society itself dissolved.

It does not require much reflection to see that, under the new conditions, the Church will be bound hand and foot, and that there will be less religious liberty allowed in France than in Russia, Turkey or any other country. Religious France, once the "eldest daughter of the Church," is now to be the Cinderella, deprived even of those vestiges of liberty that even persecuted Catholics of other nations enjoy. The aim of the Bill of Separation is, after the robbing of the property of the Church, to keep her impoverished for all future time and exclude her from every legitimate sphere of influence. No longer will she be allowed to practise works of beneficence, no longer may she educate the young or tend the sick, or relieve the wants of the poor or open asylums for the afflicted. The societies being allowed to exist for the sole purpose of religious worship, the careful scrutiny of their accounts by the civil authorities will detect any outlay for what these will decide are objects not legitimately belonging to the purpose for which they exist. Every utterance of a priest against the vices of the age, every warning to his flock to avoid the company of the wicked may be construed by the police-officer present as an incitement of one body of citizens against another, and be made a pretext for closing the church and dissolving the local society. As sure as the years roll on, the present laws will be followed by others still more oppressive. Who knows if legislation may not be attempted against infant baptism? If the rights of parents are interfered with so far at present that they are deprived of the power of giving their children a Christian education, because M. Combes and his colleagues are determined on "the emancipation of the youth of the country from clerical guidance," would it not be logical to forbid them to make their offspring children of the Church by baptism till the latter are old enough to choose for them-

selves? In all probability after ten years have passed most of the churches of France, dedicated for centuries to the worship of God, will be rented out under anti-clerical influences to other bodies for secular purposes and converted into dancing-saloons and theatres to ring with the sound of the *Carmagnole* and the *Ca ira*, and be the witness of the immoral plays and dances so characteristic of modern irreligious France. Putting aside legislation altogether, what chance will there be of a successful career to a Christian man under a Government that employs spies in the army to notify if officers go to Mass on Sundays or are active in works of Christian charity? In all likelihood the fact of a man belonging to one of the proposed *associations cultuelles* will be a bar to all promotion in civil or military life. Latin Freemasonry, which is at the bottom of all this outrageous persecution, will never cease its efforts till it succeeds in destroying every vestige of Christianity in France, unless, indeed, the hand of God intervenes in some miraculous manner.

It is hard for us to understand how easily the French Catholics are allowing their liberties to be filched away from them, how submissively they permit themselves to be trampled upon. Yet it must be confessed that the mass of the population is treating the passing of the Bill with such apathy that it may be doubted if France, even now, in spite of her devoted clergy at home and her thousands of heroic missionaries in heathen lands, is really a Catholic country. Indifferentism to religion, it must be confessed, has made enormous strides since the secularization of the primary schools a quarter of a century ago. The pupils, brought up during the first years of these godless schools, are now grown men, and the process of unchristian education has never ceased in the meanwhile. The non-attendance at Mass on Sundays, which is a fair test of practical Catholicism, is simply appalling. A census taken lately in 416 communes to the south-east of Paris, containing altogether 215,883 persons, showed that, excluding children and salaried officials of the churches, only 5,200 attended Mass, that is 2.40 per cent. In villages containing on an average 500 of a population, not more than ten

would be found at Mass on the Sunday. More remarkable still, in eighty of the communes the churches were found to be shut up for want of worshippers. It has been calculated that in Paris only five per cent. attend the Sunday Mass. The same indifference is shown regarding the Easter duty. In a town of ten or fifteen thousand inhabitants hardly a hundred men will be found to approach the Holy Table at Easter. The Frenchman usually reserves the sacraments for his dying hour. More startling than everything else is the number of unbaptised Pagans in France. By careful inquiries it has been ascertained that about half the children in Paris and other large cities are growing up without baptism. At Limoges it was discovered on inquiry that ten thousand of the inhabitants had never been baptised. In that city some ladies who belonged to a society for baptising children in danger of death were cruelly beaten through the streets by an enraged mob for carrying out this holy work. Christian marriage and Christian burial are largely on the decrease among the French working classes, who have steadily deteriorated in morals with the progress of irreligion, fully one-fourth of them living in open concubinage. It may not be generally known that alcohol is producing the same evil effects amongst them as at home. £60,000,000 goes annually from the French working classes in drink, besides £40,000,000 in debauchery. The French mob, which is the great power in times of public disturbance, may be looked on as Pagan in actual fact, utterly regardless of religion and inspired with fanatical hatred against its ministers. Side by side with these criminal and degraded classes, and not willing to make headway against them, is the vast multitude of indifferent and non-practising Catholics.

It is not likely that this mass of religious inertia will ever be moved to resist any enactments against religion, nor that people who habitually neglect their religious duties and hold the clergy in contempt though calling themselves Catholics will even take the trouble to form *associations cultuelles*. They are living in practical materialism without thought of another world, and to all intents and purposes are already de-Christianized. Nevertheless, we must not

leave out of account the believing section of the population, which is still considerable, especially in some of the provinces, and it may be feared that the growing intolerance of the dominant party may lead in the near future to serious disturbances almost amounting to civil war, to be followed as at the time of the Revolution by an exodus from France. of Catholic families despairing of a better condition of things, driven forth by a persecution as relentless as those of the seventeenth century in England and Ireland, which peopled the colonies of North America with many thousands of settlers. The dividing line is still sharply enough defined between believing and unbelieving France, and if the unscrupulous designs of the latter section on the inalienable rights of the former continue to develop, Nemesis may come to the French nation in the shape of civil conflict, lowered prestige and diminished population.

AMBROSE COLEMAN, O.P.

ART. VIII.—“FACIENS PACEM ET CREANS MALUM.”

EVIL must be one of two things. Either it is an unforeseen accident which has befallen creation; or else it is a part of the constitution of things as it is known to us, accidental, indeed, in its metaphysical character, but a practically inseparable feature of the design upon which this world is made. In the former case, how can the existence of the world be ascribed to an omnipotent and omniscient Creator; in the latter, how can the Creator be perfectly good, according to that notion of goodness which guides our estimate of human actions, and which is the only one we can apply to those which we ascribe to God?

Some reasons have been shown (DUBLIN REVIEW, January, 1905) for rejecting the former hypothesis, and for preferring the latter, in any account to be given of the matter. That such an account must, in the absence of fuller knowledge, be of a speculative and tentative character must be fully admitted; but that it is urgently called for can hardly be doubted by anyone who is at all conversant with the tendencies of contemporary thought.

I propose now to suggest some considerations which may be provisionally accepted as throwing some light on the place which evil holds in the scheme of the Almighty and All-wise Creator.

I would first observe that there appears to be no ground whatever for the theory that this world is the best possible. We have absolutely no data upon which to base such an assumption, since our notion of possibility is conditioned by our knowledge—very imperfect as it is and seems likely to remain—of the order to which we ourselves belong. We can

have no reason for believing this world either to be the best possible or not to be so, being, as we are, entirely precluded from forming the most elementary positive conception of any other. We must consequently reject any explanation of the existence of evil which depends on a supposed inability to avoid it on the part of the Creator, whether such inability may be reconciled with His omnipotence or not.

But whether this world is the best possible or not, it has unquestionably a certain peculiar goodness of its own to which our own experience infallibly witnesses, no less than Revelation; there is in all human beings an ineradicable love of life as it is, which shows it, with all its shortcomings, to be on the whole desirable; and we have the full authority of revealed religion for our instinctive conclusion that this goodness of creation is not merely relative to ourselves, but is, so far as it goes, something objective and real.*

Now, all goodness comes from one source, namely, God.† Whatever created thing is good is so by virtue of its participation in the Divine goodness. *Unumquodque dicitur bonum bonitate divina.*

We have, therefore, to enquire how creation, as a whole, partakes of the Divine goodness—in what respects the created world resembles its Divine Author, and in what respects it necessarily differs from Him. We shall then perceive how far, and in what sense, evil can enter into the constitution of the world without impairing its essential goodness by destroying that likeness to its Creator in which that goodness consists.‡

It is evident that there are certain Divine attributes of which creatures cannot in any sense or degree partake. Such are the Divine independence, simplicity and infinity. All created being within our knowledge is, and, so far as we know, must be, contingent, complex and finite; and whatever likeness of the Divine nature it reflects must be limited by these conditions. But within these limits there is still room for a definite communication of resemblance to the nature of God. This is seen first in the bare fact of

* Gen. I.

† *Summa*, I b., 4 c.

‡ Cf. *Contra Gentiles*, iii. 19: "Res omnes creatae sunt quidam imagines primi agentis, scilicet Dei."

existence, which itself is a kind of goodness, and imparts a resemblance to the Divine nature, *Ens a se*. But, secondly, there is in the complexity and finiteness of creation, not merely a necessary difference from, but an actual similitude of the Creator. For the whole is complex because it is finite; that is to say, it is made up of parts which mutually limit one another. But if creation were essentially infinite, the mutual limitation of its parts would disappear and there would be an infinite whole, made up of infinite parts; which is, of course, a contradiction in terms. But in the Divine nature there is no such contradiction; there are not parts, indeed, but relations co-extensive with an infinite whole. It can, therefore, hardly be considered fanciful to find in the unity and diversity of creation some reflection of the Divine unity and of its immanent relations. It is, at any rate, certain that the unity of created existence is constituted by a diversity of parts, and that this unity in diversity is good because it participates in the Divine goodness *per modum cujusdam assimilationis*.*

But evil is essentially and formally neither more nor less than limitation; not, of course, in the sense in which all creatures must be limited by their own nature, but by reason of a "privatio" or arrest of some part of their natural development. We are not yet considering the moral aspect of evil, or its penal consequences; and apart from these it is nothing more, as I have said, than a limit put to the full action or development of any being, or factor in the totality of creation. In this aspect, therefore, it is plain that natural evil—*malum naturæ*—is one of the actual conditions of that likeness of Himself in which it has pleased God to place the goodness of His creatures.† For there is probably nothing in the world that is not ideally capable of fuller development than that which its actual environment permits it to attain.

As to moral evil, there seems at first sight to be a

* Cf. *Summa*, I., xv, 2: "Illud quod est optimum in rebus existens est bonum ordinis universi."

† Cf. c. q. iii. 20: "Quum manifestum sit quod motus non potest esse ubi non est potentia ad aliud, quia motus est actus existentis in potentia, itemque manifestum sit quod malum est ipsa privatio boni, planum est quod, in hoc ultimo substantiarum ordine, est bonum mutabile cum permixtione mali oppositi se habens;" and *Summa* I., 49, 2.

difference. For moral evil involves not merely an arrested development, but a conscious and wilful rejection of and hostility to God, an impious setting aside of the Creator by the creature, and the deliberate forfeiture by the latter of its own final good. How, it may be asked, can evil of this kind consist with the fulfilment of the Divine purpose in creation?

But though all this is unquestionably true, it has nothing to do with the question we are now considering, which is concerned, not with the character of the agent, but with the effect of his action. We are not now asking whether God is offended by the doer of moral evil, but whether the evil he does disturbs the order and harmony of creation so as to impair the goodness of the whole. There can be no doubt that it does not. For the moral law which represents in creation the moral perfection of God is no less finite than the creatures upon which it is imposed. As created being is limited by not-being, and as the parts of creation are mutually limited by one another, so the moral law is limited by the possibilities of moral transgression.* Outside the "narrow way" of moral rectitude lies a vast field of possible wrong-doing, and it is only in terms of this mutual limitation that we are able to form any conception of morals whatever. Now, in regard to the order of the whole, it makes no difference whether possible wrong-doing becomes actual or not—just as a landscape is not altered by waste land at the roadside passing into private ownership: the two ideas are incommensurable. So also are the ideas of a moral sphere in creation and individual responsibility and choice. Thus, in St. Augustine's phrase,† God is not the author of our sins, but keeps them in their due place; they please Him not by being what they are, but by being where they are, and so the harmony of the whole is maintained—as the beauty of a picture depends on the arrangement of its lights and shades, or that of a piece of music upon the harmony

* Cf. Rom. vii. : "Peccatum non cognovi, nisi per legem."

† S. Aug. lib. de Gen. ad lit. imperf. 5, 3; Civ. Dei, 2, 18. Cf. De Gen. ad lit., 3: "Deus enim naturarum optimus conditor, peccantium vero justissimus ordinator est; ut etiam si qua singillatim fiunt delinquendo deformia, semper tamen cum eis universitas pulchra sit." And cf. Eccli., 33, 15: ἀπέναντι τοῦ κακοῦ τὸ ἀγαθόν.

of the notes: *ordo sæculorum tanquam pulcherrimum carmen.*

It may be noted here that what we commonly speak of as the Divine justice appears in this view as that immanent law of the Divine nature by which God perpetually maintains the due order and harmony in which the goodness of creation lies; so that the whole may be likened to a piece of concerted music in which the harmonies continually vary, but the "motive" is preserved throughout. Thus the human will, however free, cannot be a disturbing force in the order of nature, but ranges itself continually with one or other of the constituents of that order, just as new matter introduced into an animal or vegetable organism may be assimilated or rejected by it, but cannot change the organic relations of its parts. To the individual, indeed, there may come injury or destruction by his transgression of the established order; but by that very fact the unity and harmony of the whole is preserved.*

We are now in a position to form some clear idea of the place of physical evil in the created world. We have seen that it is implied in that harmonious diversity of finite existence by which, under the actual conditions of the finite, the perfection of God is mirrored in creation: since it is formally nothing more than that mutual relation of parts which in our experience is involved in a heterogeneous whole; and heterogeneity is, as a fact (though not, so far as we know, by any *a priori* necessity) a partial manifestation of the Divine likeness in created being.

It may, perhaps, be remembered that in a former number of this REVIEW I endeavoured to approach this question from the other side. Starting from sensible experience, which is the foundation of all our knowledge, and inferring from it, by a necessary process of reasoning, the existence of God, we found that *malum naturae*, the mutual opposition of creatures, appeared to be a real element in the Cosmos, or harmonious totality of creation, and must therefore represent or correspond to something eternally immanent

* *Summa*. II., ii. 19, 1 c.: "Malum poenae est quidem malum, in quantum privat aliquod particulare bonum; est tamen bonum simpliciter, in quantum dependet ab ordine finis ultimi."

in the Divine nature. What this might be we did not then enquire; but now, approaching the subject from the side of revelation, and starting with the existence of God in that three-fold unity which revelation makes known to us, we have found that in order to impart that goodness which consists in a certain similitude of Himself to created being, God has produced in it that very opposition which was the ground of my former argument, and into which the formal nature of evil necessarily enters. We have thus reached the same conclusion by two separate arguments: by an induction from experience we have arrived at some conception, however vague, of the immanent relations in the Divine nature;* and from the revealed truth of the three-fold Divine Personality we have been able to deduce the existence of formal evil in creation. We have seen, further, that this use of evil is not confined to the sphere of material being, but is equally apparent in the moral law, which is itself a partial manifestation of the immanent law of the Divine Being,† and cannot be defined as applied to created being, otherwise than as the limitation of a certain course of action by its possible contrary. The very idea of law implies a limit, and that which limits is necessarily in some sense the contrary of that which is limited.

There is, however, a further point to be considered. No matter how truly evil, in its merely formal aspect, may enter into the unity and harmony of creation; no matter how perfect the picture of which it provides the shadows, or how exquisite the music which it accentuates, there still remains the problem of sin, with its far-reaching consequences. Though God may take pleasure in the material and moral order in which evil exists as a condition of goodness, can He be pleased with the sin which He is said to

* The necessity of such an inference perhaps may find some support in the conception common to all heathen religions of a hierarchy of deities, often acting in mutual opposition, but under the supreme authority of an All-Father—*divūm pater atque hominum rex*; and still more in the Zoroastrian dualism, and the various mythological representations of the degenerative and regenerative processes of nature, e.g., the Hindu deities, Brahma, Vishnu, and Shiva, subordinate to the supreme Prajapati. Cf. Newman, *Arians*, ch. i., § 3, 5, 6. Cf. also Eurip.: "οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο χωρὶς ἐσθλὰ καὶ κάκα ἀλλ' ἔστι τις σύγκρασις, ὥστ' ἔχειν κάλως."

† Cf. Rickaby, *Moral Philosophy*, pp. 113-114.

detest, or with the suffering which is its penal consequence? And if He is not pleased with it, why should He permit it to exist?

Now there are two different aspects in which sin may be viewed. In one aspect, it is merely the setting in motion of one set of causes rather than another, or the bringing into operation of one kind of limitation rather than another. The stability of a building is the result of the mutual pressure of roof, walls, arches, and buttresses; if it falls, its fall is the result of the operation of other forces, such as the atmosphere or gravity. But whether it stands or falls, there is no suspension or contradiction of the laws of nature, no disturbance of the order to which it belongs. In like manner, sin and its consequences cannot, as we have already seen, disturb the harmony of creation; to do right and to be rewarded, and to do wrong and be punished, are both equally in harmony with the universal law, so long as we consider only the sinful action and the consequences which it entails.

But when we come to consider the agent, the matter assumes another aspect. Here we have a rational being acting in opposition to his reason; and what is more, a being who is in supernatural relations with his Creator wilfully renouncing those relations and rejecting the Divine friendship that is offered him. He cannot, indeed, disturb the harmony of creation; nor can he inflict any injury upon the Power which gave him being and placed him in the supernatural order, since the finite cannot limit the infinite. But in the exercise of his freedom he chooses another place than that for which he was created; he chooses the shadows of the picture instead of the light; though he was made to sing a part in the music of the world, he chooses instead to be lost in its intervals of silence. What may be called the personal animosity of sin—the "*malitia*" which makes it sin and not merely error—is what is detestable to God; but the sinful act brings its appropriate consequences to the doer, in accordance with the universal law, and therefore does not disturb the harmony which the unfailing operation of law maintains, or mar the essential beauty of creation. As I have

before remarked, sin without suffering as its consequence would, from the point of view of the whole, be an intolerable monstrosity ; but sin and suffering, as cause and effect, fall into place as part of the universal order, and thus *non specie sed ordine placent*.

It is thus evident that sin, which is "deordination" as between the will of the Creator and that of the creature, cannot affect the goodness of the order of creation in which it exists, and so, as part of that order, must even form part of its goodness.*

But the personal element in sin—the opposition of the created will to the will of the Creator, though in itself necessarily hateful, must be permitted by Him, since, if it were not, either the created will would not be free, or else God would abstain from creating the person whose rebellion was from eternity certain to the Divine foreknowledge—(though it must be remembered that God's foreknowledge has no relation to time, and is really the actual presence in the Divine ideas of all that will or can exist). But if God were forced by the foreseen action of a free will to abstain from endowing it with freedom, or from creating it at all, then it is evident that He would by such abstinence have submitted His own will to that of His creature, even when that creature's existence was potential only, and not actual.† But this is not merely impossible, but utterly inconceivable ; the finite cannot limit the infinite, and to imagine it possible that it should do so is something like imagining a son who should have begotten his own father. Therefore, though what is called the antecedent will of God for the conformity of the created will to the Divine, and the consequent happiness of the creature, is in one sense frustrated by sin, it is nevertheless in a sense fulfilled by the perfect operation of the freedom with which rational creatures are endowed, and

* *Summa*. I., xlix. 2 : "Malum quod in defectu actionis consistit, vel quod ex defectu agentis causatur non reducitur in Deum, sicut in causam. Sed malum quod in corruptione rerum aliquam consistit, reducitur in Deum, sicut in causam."

† Cf. *The Existence of God*, by R. F. Clarke, S.J. (1887), pp. 87-88. Here, of course, lies the answer to the curious sense of injustice which is felt by some minds at having been created without their own consent. *Deus creavit te sine te*. God could not, without contradicting His own nature, make His acts conditional on the will of His creatures.

which it is a part of the antecedent will that they should exercise. But the consequent will of God which requires the due fulfilment of the conditions proper to created being is absolutely fulfilled, as we have seen, in the inseparable connection of sin with its due consequences;* there is therefore no difficulty in conceiving that God takes pleasure in this double fulfilment of His will by reason of the similitude of himself which it embodies.

Thus God is truly, by something more than a mere figure of speech, "*faciens pacem et creans malum.*"† He creates natural evil in the sense that natural evil is involved in the order of the actual creation; and moral good equally implies possibility of moral evil. Yet it is equally true that God's "eyes are too pure to behold evil, and He cannot look upon iniquity;"‡ that is to say, He cannot tolerate the choice of evil by His rational creatures, whom He has created for good; and could not, without doing inconceivable violence to His own nature, hinder the consequences of their choice.

It will now be apparent that the key to the whole question is to be found in the motive upon which the Divine will acts in creating. All God's actions have Himself for their primary object; and this by an absolute necessity, for if God could act in obedience to any other will than His own, He would have thereby vacated His place in the universe: He would have ceased to be God. But this is as impossible as to move the centre of a circle; as the centre must be the point to which all the radii converge, so God must be the end and final cause of all being.§ It would seem to be neglect of this essential consideration that causes the widespread perplexity on this subject with which we are only too familiar. It seems to be assumed that the Christian conception of the relations of mankind with its Divine Creator is one of mutual accommodation: man, it is supposed, ought to be unselfish enough to desire to please God rather than to please himself: but this unselfishness must be reciprocated by God, who, not to be outdone by His creatures, must in turn prefer their pleasure to His own.

* *Summa*, I., xix. 6 ad i.

† Isai. xlv.

‡ Habac. i.

§ Cf. Billot, *De Deo Uno et Trino*, tom i., par 2, ch. 2. i.; and S.T.A. *Contra Gen.*, ii. 12.

It would be easy, if it were worth while, to quote examples from various contemporary religionists and philosophers which would show this statement of their theory, grotesque as it is, to be substantially correct. We may be content with one. Mr. Mallock has recently* called attention to what he considers to be the crux of Theism—the necessity of reconciling the existence of evil with the goodness of God: and he asks how evil of certain kinds "can be reconciled with the goodness of a God, for whom the sanctity of each soul is the main purpose of evolution?" Certainly if that were the main purpose of creation—whether by way of evolution or by any other way, it could not be said to have achieved any great success: and on the other hand, if there be a Divine Creator, He can hardly be supposed to have failed to accomplish His main purpose. So that one of two conclusions must be true—either there is no Divine Creator, or His main purpose in creating must be something different from what Mr. Mallock conceives it to be. But we have seen that the latter alternative is, for very much more substantial reasons than the one suggested, the belief of the Catholic Church. "Universa propter seipsum operatus est Dominus."

God, then, has created all things for His pleasure: for to please God is the one perfect and absolutely sufficient motive which can exist, for God Himself no less than His creatures. He is pleased with created things for the only reason for which He can be pleased with anything—because they in some degree reflect and manifest His infinite perfection. Creation so manifests His perfection because there is in it a likeness to Himself, by reason of its unity and diversity: and in the presentation of this aspect of unity and diversity, which is the likeness of the Triune God mirrored in finite being, evil has a definite part. Moreover, since the manifestation of the Divine likeness by creation includes the freedom of rational beings, it is necessary that the possibility of moral as well as the presence of natural evil should enter into the scheme; and finally, since God's intention to create cannot be frustrated by the foreseen defection of the creature, and since

* *Hibbert Journal*, March, 1905.

free will once given, either in fact or intention (these two being but one thing in God) cannot be abrogated, it follows that the actual moral evil which free will has originated must also enter into the universal harmony, together with the penal consequences which are necessarily attached to it by the established law of creation.

It may here be repeated that by the necessity which belongs to the order of created existence which we know, we are not to understand an absolute necessity, as if there could be no order to which such necessity might not be attached. Doubtless it would not be impossible for omnipotence to create a universe which should accord with God's will and pleasure, and in which no evil could exist; as some have supposed that He may have created worlds of two or of four dimensions. All we can say is that evil is as inseparable *de facto* from the creation which we know as a third dimension is; we have no data that will enable us so much as to guess at the answers to the questions whether God could have made a universe on different principles from those which He has followed in this one, or why He should have chosen to create at all. When we reach the confines of human experience we reach the ultimate limits of thought, and can even in imagination go no farther. We have reached this impassable boundary when we conclude, as we have seen that we must, that evil is not an unforeseen accident but a duly regulated circumstance of that order of creation of which we have experience.

One further question, however, remains to be answered. Granting all that has been said of the goodness of the whole of creation, and the powerlessness of any individual creature to destroy or disturb that goodness by the exercise of his free will, there still remains the suffering of the individual, which, whatever may be its relation to the universe, is to him an unmitigated evil. Has God, it may be asked, no care or sympathy for each one of the separate personalities which He has created? Can He ruthlessly sacrifice their eternal welfare in order to maintain the order of the whole—can He even delight in their temporal and eternal suffering, because it subserves the harmony of creation which pleases Him? Is not such a conception of God's relations with

His creatures as we have been considering at variance with our natural ideas of goodness and justice? Would not a good man submit to any privation rather than be the cause of needless pain to a single one of his fellows? And can a God whose justice and goodness are perfect be less benevolent than His finite creatures? Such questions as these, if not legitimate, are at least natural; and they occur almost inevitably to anyone whose attention has been fairly directed either to the vast tragedy of human life in general or to the intensity of individual suffering.

Before replying directly, I would make the following observations. In the first place, neither the aggregate amount nor the individual intensity of human suffering is really in question. For what we are considering is the perfect goodness of a God who permits suffering; and this is brought into question by the slight suffering of one person no less than by the most intense misery of countless millions. If the permission of suffering is consistent with God's goodness at all, the latter may be justified as easily as the former; and on the other hand, if it is not consistent, the smallest possible amount of suffering is as fatal to God's goodness as the greatest. If God had caused needless suffering to one person for the smallest space of time, He could not be perfectly good; but if suffering is the unavoidable consequence of man's free actions, His goodness is no more infringed by the wretchedness of millions than by one throb of pain endured by a single person. It is only by a quite obvious anthropomorphism that we bring the consideration of amount or degree into the question. We, with our limited powers, are excusable if we do as little harm as we can. But even then we cannot entirely avoid doing some. But since God's power is unlimited, He could do harm only by defect of goodness.

Secondly, suffering is not the worst thing there is; we have seen, on the contrary, that there is a sense in which it may be good. What is essentially the worst thing there can be is that supernatural sense of loss—*poena damni*—which is not ordinarily thought of as suffering, though it is doubtless a form of suffering more intense than any merely

natural pain of mind or body. God Himself could and did endure the latter: the former alone was not possible for Him, since it is the direct consequence of the realised loss of the true object of human existence, which is God. Thirdly, since the magnitude of that loss is but dimly conceived by us in our present state, we see its natural consequences out of proportion. We realise what sensible suffering is, but not the sin which causes it—we see the consequences of transgressing the order of creation, but not the full proportions of the transgression itself. It is as if we saw a shadow, but not the light which cast it; and it is thus that such aberrations of fancy as "Eternal Hope" or "Happiness in Hell" have been made possible.

But perhaps the aspect of human suffering which causes most perplexity is its apparently indiscriminate distribution. The guilty suffer occasionally, but seldom, as it appears, in due proportion to their guilt; and the innocent frequently suffer more than the guilty: the world is not ruled by poetical justice. Now there are several considerations which extenuate in a very great degree this apparent inequality of distribution. But taking it at its worst, an explanation is to be found in the fact we have already noticed that suffering is the consequence of sin—that is, it is the compensation which prevents the disturbance of the harmonious order of creation which sin would otherwise subvert. For when such a compensation takes place in nature it implies some degree of readjustment of parts, extending beyond those in which a defect has occurred—the loss of one eye, for instance, involves an increased strain upon the remaining one; a defect in the respiratory organs imposes additional labour upon the heart; the settlement of a building causes a slight change in the relative position of every part of it. In like manner, the solidarity of the human race requires that the readjustment of a single member of it should necessarily involve some change in the condition of others besides himself—impossible, as it must be, to trace such causal connection with any degree of certainty in the vast complexity of human relations. But there is no difficulty in understanding that the suffering of the innocent, when it occurs, is due to

what we may perhaps call a modification of their environment caused, whether proximately or remotely, by the sins of others.

These considerations do not provide an answer to the particular question we are considering. They give precision to it, but no more. What we want to know is whether it is consistent with the Divine goodness that God should, for the sake of the universal order, permit human suffering to any degree or extent; and whether such permission does or does not argue a lack of Divine sympathy for the individual, as compared with God's satisfaction in the contemplation of the whole.

First it must be noted that suffering is only inconsistent with God's goodness if it is unnecessary. For if it is necessary, it cannot be prevented by even infinite goodness. But we have seen that it is necessary, in the sense that its absence would entail the complete destruction of that order in which the goodness of the world consists. Therefore its existence is no sign of any defect in the Divine goodness.

Next we have the curious fact that those who, like J. S. Mill, most emphatically refuse to ascribe goodness to God in any other sense than that in which it may be predicated of human beings, nevertheless require in Him a kind of goodness which is entirely different from any that we have experience of. For the Divine goodness, in respect of the permission of suffering, can only be questioned on principles which we should refuse to apply to the actions of any human being. If a Prime Minister declares war, it is certain that he causes, indirectly, a vast amount of physical and mental suffering, which falls for the most part, if not entirely, upon persons who are quite innocent of its cause. It is equally certain that the minister could, if he chose, refrain from declaring war; but, supposing the cause to be just, would anyone say that he ought to refrain, or that his failing to do so argued a lack of benevolence in him? Again, a judge in pronouncing sentence upon a criminal not only causes a great deal of discomfort to the culprit himself, but thereby also inflicts a possibly greater amount of mental suffering, and

often of physical suffering as well, upon his entirely innocent family. But no one would maintain that a good judge ought for this reason to refrain from sentencing the criminal to a degree of punishment adequate to his crime. In the one case, the minister is bound to prefer the general good of his country, for which he is responsible, to the escape from suffering of the soldiers and their relatives on each side, and the population of the seat of war. In the other case, the judge must prefer the welfare of society, which he is appointed to protect, to the interests of the criminal and his family. That is, a good action is still a good action, even though it may have incidental consequences of a harmful nature, as even the most superficial student of moral theology is well aware. Hence it follows that the action of the Creator is still perfectly good—being due, as we have seen, to the best possible motive—even though it incidentally gives occasion to the free will of rational creatures to bring about bad results. Therefore God's permission of suffering is justified on the principles of human morals, which are the only ones we know; as indeed we might have expected, seeing that human morality can be nothing else but the counterpart of a Divine original.

But there is a further moral principle which needs illustration here, if we are to have a complete answer to the question before us. There are certain human relationships which oblige one of the parties to take the utmost pains for the protection of the other from harm that may befall him from his own incapacity or ignorance. Thus, the relationship of mere humanity imposes upon us the obligation of helping one another in cases of extreme necessity; parents are bound to protect their children from the dangers which beset the weakness of their immaturity; rulers are bound to devise means for the general welfare of the community over which they preside; and so on in varying kinds and degrees of relationship. Now, it may be said that God is in relations of this kind with humanity; since He is the Father and Ruler of the world, and all who exist are His mere dependents. It may, therefore, be supposed that He is under a moral obligation (which can only be an obligation imposed by His own goodness) of protecting

His creatures by some special means against the consequences of their own weakness. Otherwise there might possibly be some ground for imputing to Him some want of sympathy with individual interests, as compared with the order of the whole—though we are really not in a position to form any opinion as to what the consequences would be of God's omitting to do what he actually has done. At any rate, as a fact, God has provided His creatures with abundant protection against sin and its consequences by Himself becoming man, and so crowning the manifestation of the Divine likeness, which is the essential good of creation, with His own actual presence in it. In the human nature of Christ is exhibited the perfection of created existence to which all lower forms of being in a sense lead up:* the infinite Divine being is, so to speak, expressed in terms of the finite and created. No account of the relations of the Creator with evil can be complete which stops short of the Incarnation, for it is chiefly through it that we are enabled to perceive the perfect sympathy of God with His suffering creatures. Grace, which is a new force brought by the Incarnation into the order of creation, counteracts the weakness of the human will, and protects it against those influences which would bend it in the wrong direction; but the will remains free, and the harmony of the universe is not disturbed but readjusted, according to the law under which it has existed from the first.

We have now reached a conclusion on the whole subject. I have not attempted to solve any of the numerous detailed problems which properly belong to it, and I do not claim for the general view which I have endeavoured to present, that it leaves no obscurity undisputed. We cannot even imagine, for instance, how creation from nothing can ever have taken place, or why it should have pleased the Almighty Creator to call the universe into being, seeing that it could add nothing to His already perfect beatitude. But "*omnia exeunt in mysterium*," and we have no right

* *Summa*, III. i. 1. "Illud videtur esse convenientissimum, ut per visibilia monstrentur invisibilia Dei, ad hoc enim totus mundus est factus. . . . ad rationem summi boni pertinet, quod summo modo se creaturæ communicet, quod quidem maxime fit per hoc, quod 'naturam creaturæ sic sibi coniungit, ut una persona fiat ex tribus, verbo, anima, et carne.'"

to expect that the origin and nature of evil should be more clear to us than those of the other factors of our environment in this world. It is, however, not less clear than any one of them; and we have seen, as I venture to think, some of the lines upon which a Theodicy, or justification of the ways of God to men, may reasonably proceed.

It is worthy of note that such a justification cannot apparently be discovered without the aid of the Christian revelation; at least, if one may judge from the uniform failure of all attempts to solve the problem without it. No system of philosophy alone has ever lightened the burden of life for the masses of mankind, or brought to them any effective realisation of the beneficent Personality that rules it. To do so has been and is the unique prerogative of the Catholic Church, and herein is undoubtedly to be found one of its many minor credentials.

The solution does not, indeed, lie exactly upon the surface of things; some patience in acquiring information and some small amount of clear thinking are necessary in order to perceive it. The easier way, and that which mostly finds favour with Agnosticism, as it admittedly did with the eminent inventor of the title, is to ask questions, and like jesting Pilate, stay not for an answer. But the ways of God are made known to those above all whose desire is "non supervolitare judicando, sed inhærere amando"—not to criticise, but to love.

A. B. SHARPE.

* S Aug., *de Trin.*, viii. 3.

Roman Decrees.

Congregation of the Holy and Universal Inquisition.

Ex approbatione Scapularis vel Confraternitatis non sequitur approbatio apparitionum, revelationum, gratiarum curationum, etc.

Romae ex aedibus S.O., die 3 Sept. 1904.

Illme. ac Revme. Domine,

In Congregatione Generali S.O. habita feria IV., die 31 Aug. p.p., expensis omnibus quae ad supremum hoc Tribunal delata sunt circa cultum B.M.V. vulgo de *Pellevoisin*, Emi. Dni. Cardinales una mecum Inquisitores Generales decreverunt :

Quamvis devotio Scapularis SSmi. Cordis Jesu et adscriptio inter sodales piae Confraternitatis in loco vulgo *Pellevoisin* a B. Virgine Matre Misericordiae nuncupatae, *probatae sint* ; nullam tamen ex dicta adprobatione sive directam sive indirectam adprobationem sequi quarumcumque apparitionum, revelationum, gratiarum curationum aliorumque id genus, quae praedicto Scapulari vel piae Confraternitati quovis modo referri vellent ; eos vero omnes, sive sacerdotes sint sive non, qui libros vel diarios in vulgus edunt, sedulo curare debere ut adamussim, prout conscientia dictat, sequantur normas in Constitutione Apostolica *Officiorum* praefixas ; et qui verbo Dei praedicando incumbunt, ut servant omnino praescriptiones Concilii Lateranensis V. et Tridentini, Sess. XXV., circa praedicationem apparitionum et miraculorum ; et ecclesiarum demum rectores qui ejusmodi Confraternitatem in propriis ecclesiis institui, statuasque vel picturas B. Virginis sub praedicto titulo Matris *Misericordiae* dicari satagunt, ut regulis pro Scapulari SSmi. Cordis a Sacra Rituum Congregatione statutis sine ulla restrictione in posterum se conforment.

Quae dum cum Amplitudine Tua communico ut eorum plenam executionem cures, faustaue ac felicia Tibi precor a Domino. Addictissimus in Domino.

L ✠ S.

S. CARD. VANNUTELLI.

Illmo. ac Rmo. Domino

Dno. Archiepiscopo Bituricensi.

The Sacred Congregation of Rites.

Indulgentiae conceduntur recitantibus infrascriptam orationem pro pia morte obtinenda.

URBIS ET ORBIS.

Christifideles iam prope morituros pia Mater Ecclesia nunquam praetermisit opportunis pro rei necessitate solari subsidiis. Saluberrimis autem hisce adiumentis recens aliud iam nunc accenseri potest. Nam plerique e clero, iique potissimum, qui curae animarum incumbunt, ut in dies spirituali hominum bono in supremo vitae discrimine provideatur, Sanctissimo Domino Nostro Pio PP. X. preces admoverunt, quo Christifidelibus sequentem actum adhuc in vita emittentibus: "Domine Deus meus, iam nunc quodcumque mortis genus prout Tibi placuerit, cum omnibus suis angoribus, poenis ac doloribus de manu tua aequo ac libenti animo suscipio," Plenariam Indulgentiam in articulo mortis consequendam elargiri dignaretur. Has vero preces, relatas in Audientia habita die 9 Martii 1904 ab infrascripto Cardinali praefecto S. Congregationis Indulgentiis Sacrisque Reliquiis praepositae, Eadem Sanctitas Sua peramanter excipiens, benigne concessit, ut omnes Christifideles, qui, die ab eisdem eligendo, sacramentali confessione rite expiati sacraque Synaxi refecti, cum vero charitatis in Deum affectu, praedictum actum ediderint, Plenariam Indulgentiam in ipso mortis articulo lucrari valeant. Praesenti in perpetuum valituro. Contrariis quibuscumque non obstantibus.

Datum Romae ex Secretaria eiusdem S. Congregationis die 9 Martii 1904.

L ✠ S.

A. CARD. TRIPEPI, *Praefectus.*

JOS. M. CAN. COSELLI, *Substitutus.*

Regulares debent sese conformare calendario Cleri Saecularis, quando aliquod festum maius transfertur ad Dominicam infra octavam pro tota regione.

ORDINIS CARMELITARUM EXCALCEATORUM.

Hodiernus Rmus. Procurator Generalis Carmelitarum Dis-calceatorum, Sacrorum Rituum Congregationi humillime

exposuit, quod per Litteras apostolicas in forma Brevis Pii PP. VI. ad Episcopum Paphensem Vicarium Apostolicum Wratislaviensem datas die 19 Aprilis 1788, concessa fuit toti regioni Borussiae facultas, "ut solemnia Assumptionis et Nativitatis Beatae Mariae Virginis festa (quae omnino retinenda sunt) transferantur in Dominicam diem infra Octavam, ita ut ea ipsa die officia et missae, tamquam illa festa suo loco mota non fuerint, celebrentur, facta in officio et missa commemoratione Dominicae, ipsoque etiam translato in antecedentem sabbati diem ieiunio." Quum vero a quibusdam dubitetur, num huic legi subdantur Regulares qui proprii respective Ordinis sequuntur Calendarium, et iuxta illud officia Sanctorum ordinata habent, ideo idem Orator, duplicis sequentis dubii solutionem enixe exposulavit, nimirum :

I. *Num Regulares qui proprio gaudent Calendario teneantur legi translationis festorum Assumptionis et Nativitatis B. Mariae Virginis in Regno Borussiae ?*

II. *Et quatenus negative ; Num possint tamen praedictae legi se conformare ?*

Et Sacra eadem Congregatio, ad relationem subscripti Secretarii, exquisito voto Commissionis Liturgicae, reque mature perpensa, rescribendum censuit :

Ad I. *Affirmative uti mos est.*

Ad II. *Provisum in primo.*

Atque ita rescripsit die 5 Augusti 1904.

L † S.

S. CARD. CRETONI, *Praefectus.*

D. PANICI, Archiep. Laodicen, *Secret.*

The Sacred Congregation of Indulgences.

In the following decree the division of London into the two dioceses of Westminster and Southwark is given as an illustration of the circumstances which render a decree of this kind necessary :—

In locis quae duobus spectant Dioecibus facultas Ordinibus Regularibus propria cum clausula "dummodo in dicto loco nullus eorumdem Ordinum conventus reperiatur" exerceri potest in ea parte dioecesis in qua nullus dictorum Ordinum habetur Conventus.

PLURIUM DIOECESIUM.

Etsi anteactis temporibus vix umquam evenit, ut una eademque civitas ad duas diversas dioeceses vel Vicariatus vel Apos-

tolicas Praefecturas pertinuerit, hodie dum nihilominus id locum obtinet; exemplo sit civitas Londinensis, quae in duas dioeceses dividitur, Westmonasteriensem scilicet et Southwarcensem. Id vero causae est cur a nonnullis dubitetur utrum facultates, quae sunt Regularium propriae et quarum exercitium aliis minime conceditur, nisi pro iis locis in quibus eorundem conventus non existit, exerceri valeant ab iis, quibus ex speciali indulto fuerunt tributae, si ipsi commorentur in ea parte civitatis, id est in ea dioecesi, in qua nullus extat Regularium conventus, quamvis extet in altera parte civitatis, id est in alia dioecesi. Quae causa dubitandi potissimum est aucta ex Decreto hujus S. C. Indulgentiis Sacrisque Reliquiis praepositae die 14 Decembris 1857 in una Tornacensi, in qua dubium erat propositum: "*An per loca in quibus Ordo Minorum Observantium S. Francisci Assisensis non existit, intelligendum sit in casu civitas, oppidum, pagus, cum respectivis suburbiis, sive in locis eis adiacentibus?*" Cui responsum fuit: *Affirmative*. Porro haec S. Congregatio, attenta casus novitate, ut omnis ambigendi ratio de medio tollatur, certaue agendi norma in posterum statuatur, sequens dubium dirimendum proposuit:

"*An in civitatibus et generatim locis, in quibus sunt constitutae duae dioeceses, vel Vicariatus Apostolici, etc., . . . eae facultates, quae sunt aliquorum Ordinum propriae, quaeque fuerunt concessae per speciale indultum, cum clausula: DUMMODO IN DICTO LOCO NULLUS EORUNDUM ORDINUM CONVENTUS REPERIATUR, exerceri valeant in ea parte civitatis vel loci, in qua nullus adsit conventus dictorum Ordinum, adsit vero in alia?*"

Et Emi. Patres in generali Congregatione habita in Palatio Vaticano die 18 Augusti 1903 proposito dubio respondendum mandarunt: *Affirmative*.

De quibus relatione peracta SSmo. Dno. Nostro Pio PP. X. in audientia habita die 28 eiusdem mensis et anni ab infrascripto Cardinali Praefecto, Sanctitas Sua Emorum. Patrum resolutionem ratam habuit et confirmavit.

Datum Romae, ex Secretaria eiusdem S. Congregationis, die 28 Augusti 1903.

A. CARD. TRIPEPI, *Praefectus*.

Pro R. P. D. FRANCISCO, Archiep. Amiden., *Secret.*

J. M. CAN. COSELLI, *Substitutus*.

Indulgences are granted to the prayer, "Our Lady of the Sacred Heart, pray for us."

Conceduntur Indulgentiae recitantibus invocationem : "Nostra Domina a SS. Corde, ora pro nobis."

PIUS PP. X.

Ad perpetuam rei memoriam.

Benigne annuentes oblatis nobis piis precibus a dilecto filio Praeposito Generali Missionariorum Sacri Cordis, omnibus et singulis fidelibus ex utroque sexu, ubi terrarum nunc et in posterum existentibus, quocumque idiomate, dummodo versio sit fidelis, invocationem hanc contrito saltem corde ac devote recitantibus : "*Nostra Domina a Sacro Corde, ora pro nobis,*" quoties id agant, toties de poenaliū dierum numero in forma Ecclesiae solita centum expungimus. Largimur insuper Fidelibus iisdem, si malint, liceat partiali ipsa Indulgentia functorum vita labes poenasque expiare. Contrariis non obstantibus quibuscumque. Praesentibus perpetuis futuris temporibus valituris. Sed praecipimus ut praesentium authenticum exemplar transmittatur ad Secretariam Indulgentiis Sacrisque Reliquiis praepositam; alioquin nullae sint; simulque ut praesentium litterarum transumptis seu exemplis etiam impressis manu alicuius Notarii publici subscriptis et sigillo personae in ecclesiastica dignitate constitutae munitis, eadem prorsus fides adhibeatur, quae adhiberetur ipsis praesentibus, si forent exhibitae vel ostensae.

Datum Romae apud S. Petrum sub annulo Piscatoris die XXVIII Junii MDCCCIV, Pontificatus Nostro anno primo.

L ✠ S.

Pro Dno. CARD. MACCHI.

NICOLAUS MARINI, *Substitutus.*

Praesentium Litterarum authenticum exemplar transmissum fuit ad hanc Secretariam S. Congregationis Indulgentiis Sacrisque Reliquiis praepositae. In quorum fidem, etc.

Datum Romae ex eadem Secretaria, die 9 Julii 1904.

L ✠ S.

JOS. M. CANON COSELLI, *Substitutus.*

Science Notices.

The Meteorological Observations in the recent British Antarctic Expedition.—Lieutenant Charles W. R. Royds' recent address to the members of the Royal Meteorological Society on meteorological observing in the Antarctic regions certainly showed very conclusively that the mass of meteorological observations taken during the expedition of the *Discovery* and brought home to be sifted and arranged, was not secured without difficulties so great as to border very close upon the impossible.

Lieutenant Royds stated that he was not a meteorologist, and that before starting on the expedition he was unacquainted with the working of many of the instruments. This being so it is all the more to his credit that he made himself so quickly master the situation; and if he did not go out a meteorologist, he has certainly come back a distinguished one.

The meteorological observations may be said to have commenced when the ship arrived at its winter quarters on February 8, 1902, for it was only the usual observations which were taken at sea.

As soon as the water in the bay was frozen the meteorological screen was set up on the ice, and on April 17, 1902, the observations were started in latitude $77^{\circ} 50'$ S., and continued until February 15, 1904, when the ice broke up and allowed the ship to go free. The locality of the observations is thus described: "The ship was in a small bay of about a quarter of a mile in depth; all around, from N.N.W. through East to S.E., there was land rising quickly to some height. In the N.N.W. the hills were 400 feet high, and these extended to N.E., and then a hill of 1,000 feet in the East and one of 700 feet in the S.E. Between the East and S.E. was a deep gully, or gap as we call it, which opened on to the great ice barrier. From S.E.

through South and West to N.W. we were entirely open, except for land twenty to fifty miles away. From N.W. back to S.W. was the Albert Range, rising to peaks of 15,000 feet; and to the South were some islands 3,000 feet, and land rising to 8,000 feet."

The observations were taken every two hours, the day observations from 8 a.m. to 10 p.m. being taken by Lieutenant Royds, and the night observations being divided between the eleven officers, each officer taking a night. The two-hourly observations taken were the barometer and attached thermometer, the dry and wet bulb thermometers and the spirit minimum, the outside thermometer, the Assmann aspirator, force and direction of wind by Beaufort's scale and the velocity by the Robinson and Dines anemometers, the weather, direction and movements of upper and lower clouds, and general remarks. In addition to these, at 8 a.m. and 8 p.m., the maximum thermometer was read. At 10 a.m. the Dines recording sheet was shifted; at noon two other barometers were read for comparison, and a sunshine recorder card was shifted, and the evaporation was taken by weighing two dishes of ice; at 8 p.m. the black and bright bulb thermometers were read. On Monday mornings, at 10 a.m., the records of two or three barographs, thermographs, and hydrographs were changed. In addition, sea, earth, and snow temperatures at various depths were recorded, as was also the increased thickness of ice and snow fall. Observations of the movement of the smoke of Mount Erebus were recorded whenever seen. Another feature in the scheme was the placing of a thermometer off Cape Armitage, one and a half miles from the ship, so that observations could be daily taken by it simultaneously with the screen observations. Attempts were also made to take observations with a thermometer placed on the summit of Crater Hill 1,000 feet high, but it was found necessary to discontinue these observations. During the latter part of the sojourn in the ice some interesting observations for ozone were taken. It is also mentioned that in the constitutional walks of the officers a thermometer was carried and temperatures of various places in the locality taken.

The sledge parties also made liberal use of the thermometer, aneroid, and hypsometer; as many as six different sledge parties have been observing at the same time as the observations taken at the screen.

An instructive portion of Lieutenant Royds' address was that which dealt with the difficulties of observing with the individual instruments in the Antarctic regions. The Kew pattern barometer was hung in the magnetic house on board the ship, that being the only position where it would remain untouched. The position, however, had the disadvantages of exceedingly low temperatures, the attached thermometer often going down to -14° . The variation in the temperature of the room was occasioned by the door being left open or being unable to be shut on account of drift. As an instrument of warning it became useless, the gales coming on without an apparent quick fall or rise of any great extent.

The dry bulb thermometer was an ordinary mercurial thermometer graduated down to -45° , and was placed in the screen which faced about N.E. and S.W. During the winter of 1902 the observations of the wet bulb thermometer were not found satisfactory, as the dry and wet bulb thermometers seldom differed in their readings, and if they did the wet bulb generally showed a higher reading. Lieutenant Royds accounts for this for two reasons; 1st, the coating of ice constantly kept on the bulb was too thick, and so prevented the effect of the evaporation from affecting the mercury; 2nd, the fact of having muslin and ice over the bulb did not allow a quick change of temperature to be felt by the mercury, and so if the temperature fell quickly the dry bulb would show slower than the wet, but should the temperature rise quickly the wet bulb would show lower than the proper difference reading. During the second year, however, very much more satisfactory results were obtained. Only a small amount of ice was kept on the thinnest piece of muslin, and the muslin was shifted weekly to prevent accumulation of ice.

The minimum thermometer was placed in the screen and read every two hours and re-set. Much trouble was experienced with this instrument. The column often broke, and several thermometers were broken in the vain attempts to make them work again. It is interesting to note that in comparing the spirit minimum with the mercurial thermometer at the present time reading the former showed a difference of $1\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$ below.

Referring to the minimum thermometer placed for a while on the summit of Crater Hill, and the one placed about a mile and a half from the ship to the South, it must be mentioned that the difference between those and the simultaneous observation at

the screen was very marked. As an example, on August 15, 1902, the noon observation at the screen was -20° , and the wind was light easterly air. At the high-level station the temperature was -26° , and out at Cape Armitage it was -37.5° .

The highest temperature registered for the first year was $+39^{\circ}$, on December 26, 1902 (and by a coincidence it happened that in the second year 1903) the highest temperature was $+42^{\circ}$ on the same day, December 26.

One thermometer was placed on a stand outside the screen and in the open air. From April to August, when the sun is below the horizon, this thermometer always registered less than the one inside the screen. Later in the year this nearly always registered higher and fell below again during the night. When the sun was above the horizon all day the outside thermometer almost invariably showed a higher temperature than the one inside the screen.

High praise is bestowed on the behaviour of Assmann's aspirator, notwithstanding the bodily sufferings its use caused the investigators. "It is true we used to call it the 'exaspirator' as it was placed in the open air, and one had to read it facing the wind on account of the heat from the body affecting the reading. The graduations were minute, and one's eyes being either filled with drift or tears from the melting snow or cutting wind, it was most difficult to read. Then again the instrument had to be made to work by means of a key, and this necessitated removal of one's mits, and consequently frost-bitten fingers; anyhow, for all the disadvantages, many of which could be entirely got over, the observations taken from this instrument are, in my opinion, truer readings of the actual air temperature than those given by the thermometers in the screen."

Speaking of the thermometers used for solar indication, which were the black and bright bulbs in vacuo, regret is expressed that these instruments were not graduated down to -40° or below instead of only to $+10^{\circ}$, as it is thought that observations taken throughout the winter with these instruments would have been most interesting, and might have thrown some light on the difference of temperature between Cape Armitage and the screen thermometers. The highest black bulb reading in 1902 was 154° on December 21, and during 1903 it went up to 151° on December 8.

Concerning the mechanical instruments used for recording

the force of the wind, the Robinson anemometer worked during the whole time with hardly a stop. It is pointed out, however, that the fact of its continued working was entirely due to the mechanical skill of Mr. Skelton, as there were no spare arms or caps supplied with this instrument, in spite of the experience of the *Southern Cross* expedition, in which the gales were so heavy that the Robinson anemometer was damaged and its work discontinued. A difficulty experienced with this instrument was the fact that the case was not drift-tight, and in the blizzards the inside got choked with drift, hiding the dial and stopping the easy working of the instrument. But here the ready ingenuity of Lieutenant Royds counteracted the deficiency in the construction of the instrument, for by placing gummed paper all round the glass case it was made drift-tight.

The difficulties of Antarctic meteorological observations were perhaps still more apparent in the case of the Dines instruments. The smaller type was in the screen, but the large recording one was on board. Each was liable to the same tedious operation of clearing the open hole in the head of the instrument after every observation during blizzards. This was no pleasing work in the case of the larger instrument, whose head was in the mizen cross-trees. Another difficulty was the separation of the mixture of spirit and glycerine, for whenever there was a temperature below -40° the spirit rose to the surface and the bottom of the float was in a thick liquid resembling condensed milk. The separation of the liquid stopped the correct working of the instrument. Another difficulty was the collection of frozen breath on the piston-rod, forming a coating of ice which hindered the working of the float. Again, in the low temperatures, the clock stopped. Lieutenant Royds sums up the tale of woe by stating that it is nearly impossible to keep any of the self-recording instruments at work during blizzards: "all the self-recording instruments suffer badly as the drift gets inside the boxes and entirely chokes them, drying up the ink in the pen, smudging the paper, and forming round and over the working parts, completely stopping their working."

The heaviest gale was on July 19, 1902, and between 4 p.m. and 8 p.m. of the next day. From 10 p.m. to 10 a.m. the Robinson anemometer gave an hour velocity of 85 miles.

Regarding the work of the sunshine recorders, it is mentioned that before going South it was gathered from Ross's account that there would be little use for these instruments. But this

was a wrong conclusion. Day after day there were glorious clear skies and continual sunshine. At the meeting, photographs of three cards of twenty-four hours' sunshine were shown—a unique exhibition, as until the expedition of the *Discovery* the instrument was not made to record the whole twenty-four hours.

Besides the accounts of methodical meteorological work with the various instruments, Lieutenant Royds contributed some interesting notes of more casual observations. The beauty of the clouds observed were a subject of comment; the mother-of-pearl clouds, apparently at great altitudes and of the most "exquisite colouring," are said to defy description. Mention was also made of the mirages, halos, coronæ, and auroras.

At the close of the paper was a note as to the height of icebergs. "Much has been reported with regard to the enormous height of icebergs, instances being quoted of 500, 600, and 1,000 feet. Now the great ice barrier is to a large extent the birthplace of the greater number of these bergs. On passing along its face we sounded continually, and obtained a more or less even depth of 400 fathoms. Now ice of this nature floats with about eight times as much of its area below the water as there is above; consequently a berg of 500 feet would be drawing 4,000 feet, or nearly 700 fathoms; so you can see that no berg of more than 300 feet could float away from the barrier. I would not go so far as to say that there are no bergs of those dimensions—more or less—as our region of exploration was so minute in comparison to the large area still unknown. With regard to the length of the berg I give no limit, the barrier being over 400 miles long."

The Photography of the Corona of the Uneclipsed Sun.

—Monsieur A. Hansky's achievement of photographing the corona of the uneclipsed sun formed the subject of a recent communication to the French Academy of Sciences. The photographs were secured with a 12-inch telescope at the Mont Blanc Observatory in atmospheric conditions which from their transparencies were peculiarly favourable for the attempt.

M. Hansky made a number of preliminary experiments on the selective absorption of screens dyed with various aniline colours, with the result that a combination was obtained which absorbed all radiations of more refrangible than 660 μ . As the red radiations of the corona are very intense and do not

suffer absorption or dispersion in passing through the terrestrial atmosphere, he used this screen in obtaining twelve negatives.

The way in which the individual screens were prepared was as follows: a fixed undeveloped Lumière film was soaked in each of the suitable dyes, and between each exposure they were re-arranged amongst themselves so that no false effect due to any particular disposition of the "grain" would affect the picture. The interposition of a blackened brass disc, a little larger than the solar disc, prevented the direct photospheric and chromospheric rays from reaching the plate.

The negatives obtained showed halos around the disc, and bear favourable comparison with those photographs obtained during total eclipses.

Notes on Travel and Exploration.

Western Uganda.—The Western Province of the Uganda Protectorate comprises the three distinct kingdoms of Bunyoro, Toro, and Ankole. Its features are described in an article in the *Journal of the Manchester Geographical Society* by the Rev. Mr. Fisher, who points out the comparative accuracy of ancient knowledge of this region. Herodotus mentions the pygmies, and Hipparchus, who lived a hundred years before the Christian era, the three inland lakes. That these lands were at one time permeated to a certain extent by external, probably Egyptian, civilization, the writer finds evidenced by many traditions and beliefs. The prevailing creed is, however, devil-worship, which has a numbing effect on energy and initiative owing to the power of the priests. These latter are in Bunyoro alone allowed to consult with the great devil, and that through his ten angels, who will not respond unless the priest wears the species of crown especially acceptable to them. Their creed demands human sacrifice, branding, cutting with sharp knives, and the extraction of the lower teeth. In another part of the country, among the Batoro, the ritual demands cupping, practised all through life to such an extent as to sap the vitality of the nation. Among the tribes to the west of Ruwenzori cannibalism exists, but only the bodies of foes slain in fight are eaten. These people have the Batwa or forest pygmies for their neighbours. The writer thinks that the semi-obscurity of the forest has stunted the growth of this race, who are in intelligence far in advance of their neighbours. Their bodies are covered with an imperceptible down, growing, like the monkey's hair, in reverse directions on the arms, meeting at the elbow. Their habitual attitude is sitting with their arms clasped round their necks. They have suffered much from famine and small-pox in recent years, and are probably reduced in numbers. They practise no form of cultivation, but live by

hunting, in which they are adepts. The okapi is thought to be nearing extinction at their hands, and they can slay the elephant, whose tusks are exchanged for bananas or other products of the adjacent tribes. Mr. Fisher's concluding remark is that deterioration is stamped everywhere on the people of Western Uganda, and that if there be evolution, it must be that of evil. But great possibilities are open to British action in the future, and the expenditure of seven millions on the railway is justified by the extinction of the slave trade, of human portorage, and of inter-tribal wars.

Western Uganda and the Nile Railway.—In a paper on Western Uganda read before the Royal Geographical Society on May 8th, Colonel Delmé-Radcliffe narrated his experiences as a member of the Commission for the delimitation of the Anglo-German and Anglo-Belgian boundaries. The important part likely to be played by the valley of the Kagera river in the development of the lake region and construction of the great trunk line from the Cape to Cairo was specially emphasised by him, and he described it as admirably adapted for forming its route by its practically uniform level from the mouth of the river to the 30th meridian. Southward it appears to offer an opening through open plains for the extension of the railway towards Lake Kivu to join on with the trunk line coming from the south. Supposing the line to follow the Kagera Valley through its entire length, it could be continued and carried across Buddu by various alternative routes to Entebbe, where the line from Mombassa must eventually end, instead of stopping as at present at Port Florence on the eastern shore of Lake Victoria. By one of these routes a railway could be carried from the western boundary to Entebbe with scarcely a yard of cutting, and there are but two considerable rivers which would require to be bridged.

The Commercial Future of Central Africa.—Lord Mountmorres, who has been travelling in the Congo Free State, delivered a lecture on the commercial possibilities of Central Africa to the African trade section of the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce. The potential resources of the region traversed by him are, in his view, scarcely realized by the people of this country, and he dwelt specially on the practically illimitable supply of cheap labour outside the equatorial forest, only await-

ing direction to render it available. The natural waterways are navigable for 8,000 miles, and the trans-continental railway intended to run diagonally across Africa will tap a country rich both in mineral wealth and in a soil capable of producing all crops raised in tropical or sub-tropical climates, such as rice and wheat, spices, drugs, coffee, cotton and tobacco. Rubber plants are being planted at the rate of two millions a year, and in ten years some sixty million will be ready for cutting, giving 60,000 tons of rubber per annum, enough to supply the consumption of the entire world.

Problems of West Africa.—General Kemball has made an interesting tour of West Africa in his capacity of Inspector-General of the Frontier Force, travelling over 1,700 miles, from Egga on the Niger across French Dahomey and German Togoland to Kumassi. All the country traversed he describes as settling down under European influence, and as a result of the extinction of slave-raiding the population must necessarily increase. But an unfavourable change of climate is reported in the growing scarcity of water in the dry season, attributed to the deforestation of some of the bush and forest regions. The French believe that the Niger is diminishing in volume, and that the Sahara Desert is extending northward, which they ascribe to the destruction of trees and bushes in the tracts bordering on it by the nomad Tuaregs with their flocks and herds. In Ashanti and the northern territories of the Gold Coast there was the same complaint of the deficiency of water and shrinkage of the streams, so much so that a detour had to be made, as the direct road from Gambaga to Salaga could for this reason no longer be followed. In Kumassi a great change was visible in the conditions of trade, as European merchants from the coast had now established stores there, and the natives came in to trade at the inland posts served by the railway. In Northern Nigeria Zungeru, now the headquarters of the district, was made the starting-point for a prolonged tour which for nearly a month's march followed a new route to Ilo. A great forest was traversed abounding with game, including giraffe and lion, hitherto not generally known to be found in Nigeria. On crossing the Anglo-French frontier near Ilo, the General was courteously received by the French authorities, and he reports that as a result of French rule the people of Borgu are settling down peaceably, and

caravans of traders, whom the officials do all in their power to help, pass daily without molestation. He saw no symptom of disturbance anywhere in the course of his tour.

Exploration of Nigeria.—The expedition of Lieutenant Boyd Alexander and Captain Gosling from the Upper Benue to Lake Chad traversed an unknown country for a great part of its way, and has thrown considerable light on the relations of the different sections of the population. Among the Fulani aristocracy, deprived of its supremacy by British conquest, there is naturally little love of the white man, and the hope that he will soon abandon the country and return whence he came is fondly cherished. Prophecy is enlisted on its side, and the ancient prediction that Fulani rule should last a hundred years and be overthrown by a white race, sets a limit of four years to the sway of the invaders. Such prophecies create an atmosphere which facilitates their accomplishment, and the time is not far distant when this vaticination will be put to the test. Another symptom of restlessness is the activity of the Senussite sect among the Mohammedans, especially in the country contiguous to Lake Chad. The wealth of the Fulani consists in flocks and slaves, and the prohibition of the slave trade has deprived them of a considerable source of income in the annual contingent of from 5,000 to 6,000, sent to Sokoto for sale to Tripoli merchants. The Fulani, however, having settled down to a life of ease in the plains, have lost much of their primitive energy, and are moreover of mixed blood, having intermarried with the native Haussas. The purest representatives of the race are the bush Fulanis, who lead a semi-nomad life in the wilds, and whose tall, pale-skinned women, with massive braids of silky hair, preserve the original type of the shepherd conquerors. While the ruling caste occupies the lowlands and the towns, the pagan tribes survive in the hills, and some are described as fierce and savage head-hunters like the Dyaks of Borneo. One of their border villages was visited, and found to consist of mud hovels clinging to the rocks, and reached only by devious tracks through a wild country. The doorways of the squalid huts were so low that they could be only entered on hands and knees, and the interior was divided by a narrow passage, on each side of which were cubicles for the inmates. They use poisoned arrows and ride small hill ponies as their means of locomotion. At Bauchi an important centre was reached, where the Emir lived with some display of

state. Here an exhibition of Hausa wrestling was witnessed, which surprised the travellers by its resemblance to similar performances in Europe. Umpires were appointed, and the combatants shook hands before beginning, just as they do at a contest in England. The country adjacent to Lake Chad, where the French and English frontiers meet, is described as being in a very unsettled condition.

Irrigation in the Punjab.—To the five great rivers from which it derives its name, the Punjab owes its fertility almost as absolutely as Egypt to the Nile. Its hydrography differs entirely from that of other provinces of India in the fact that its river system is fed by the melting of the Himalayan snows at a season when streams having their source in Central India, like the Nerbada and the Mahanadi, are at their lowest ebb. The flood waters of the five rivers, little needed at that season for irrigation, roar down unchecked to the sea. It is later in the year, when the wheat crop, covering nearly half the irrigated area, has been sown, that the water delivered by the canals becomes a network of fertilising veins. The irrigated area has grown from the tentative half-million acres of 1860 to the six millions reached in 1900-1. But the limit will only be attained when the rivers have yielded up the last drop of the vivifying fluid, and a new and grandiose scheme is in contemplation for adding another million-and-three-quarters of acres to the lands already reclaimed from sterility. Much of this land is almost entirely unproductive, some is watered at great cost of labour from deep wells, and some, dependent on the rainfall for productiveness, is stricken with hunger in dry seasons. The magnitude of the work may be estimated from the length of water channels to be created, giving an aggregate of 3,000 miles, exclusive of the minor conduits leading from the main sections to individual fields. The scheme is a complicated one, involving the transfer of the waters of one stream to reinforce those of another to be utilised elsewhere. Thus the Upper Jhelum will be dammed in Kashmerian territory, and its waters, irrigating a large district on their way, diverted into the bed of the Chenab to fill the canal whose existing supply will be intercepted higher up by a weir across the Upper Chenab, where a large portion of the discharge of the stream will be carried off to irrigate a district of 648,000 acres lying between the Chenab and the Ravi. The Upper Chenab Canal will then be carried under the Ravi in a mighty siphon deliver-

ing 6,500 cubic feet a second, about six times the ordinary summer volume of the Thames at Windsor. In its subsequent course it will irrigate 883,000 acres more, and thus exhaust itself in its beneficent activity. Residents in the Punjab believe that its climate has been altered by irrigation, and ascribe to it the eccentricities of recent seasons, when storms and rains occurred at unwonted periods.

Notices of Books.

Theologische Bibliothek. Joseph Kardinal Hergenröther's "Handbuch der allgemeinen Kirchengeschichte." Vierte Auflage, neu bearbeitet. Von Dr. J. P. KIRSCH, Päpstl. Geheimkämmerer, Professor an der Universität zu Freiburg i.d. Schw. Zweiter Band: "Die Kirche als Leiterin der Abenländischen Gesellschaft." Mit einer Karte: Provinciae Ecclesiasticae Europae; Medio Saeculo XIV. Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder. 1904.

IT is now some two years since the appearance of the first volume of Dr. Kirsch's revised edition of the late Cardinal Hergenröther's Church History. And the second volume which now lies before us has naturally been awaited with interest, and possibly with some impatience, by historical students. But when we consider the size of the work, the abundance of fresh materials that have accumulated, and the extensive changes made in this new edition, the time occupied by the task of revision cannot be thought excessive. One of the best features in the work was the copious account of the sources and authorities and the bibliography of recent historical literature. And as further research has been made since the author's death, and a large number of new books have seen the light since the last edition, a long array of fresh references had to be added to bring the book up to date. It will be enough to mention Dr. Pastor's valuable volumes on the history of the Popes as an instance of the important work that has been done in this field in the last few years.

But, as our readers are already aware, the editor's task has by no means been confined to the addition of fresh matter and the correction of incidental errors. As we pointed out on the appearance of the first volume, some important changes have been made in Hergenröther's arrangement of his materials.

The plan originally adopted was a division of each volume into three long periods, in each of which the various subjects were treated in separate chapters ; and this necessarily involved some sacrifice of the natural chronological order of the narrative. In the new edition Dr. Kirsch has subdivided the long periods into shorter sections, in each of which the whole varied life of the age is allowed to pass before the readers. Among the minor changes, we may mention a new arrangement of the lists of authorities and books to be consulted, which are generally brought together at the head of each division so as to lessen the number of foot-notes.

One result of the new arrangement of the work is a considerable increase in the size of the second volume, which now covers the whole field of mediæval history as well as the age of the Renaissance. This gives us a bulky book of upwards of a thousand large pages. The main part of the narrative is printed in good large type, but some of the lesser details are given in a smaller size, for the editor naturally finds that there is little space to spare. To many readers of these degenerate days the present volume may seem to be alarmingly large ; but when we remember the wide field it covers, and see the amazing mass of materials contained in its well-ordered pages, we may well wonder that it is not very much larger.

Naturally enough, many pages are devoted to the story of Scholastic Theology, and the reader will find an interesting and fairly full account of the work done by the leading Schoolmen, and a brief summary of the chief points of controversy debated by the disciples of St. Thomas and Scotus. Where so much is given it may seem ungracious to ask for more, but we should have liked to see some mention of the *Schola Ægidiana*, and the early "Baconian School" founded by John Bacon, the English Carmelite ; and if space is wanted for these matters, we could very well spare the quotations from Scotus on p. 668, which are, to say the least, somewhat misleading.

It is generally dangerous to cite an isolated sentence from one of these mediæval masters unless one is familiar with the context and accustomed to the author's methods. We have all heard of controversialists who sought the teaching of St. Thomas in his preliminary objections, and it may be safely said that there are more perilous pitfalls in the pages on Scotus, who often argues on both sides and seems to leave the verdict

open. In the present case the German historian has certainly been unfortunate; and if he had read all the context of the places to which he refers, he would hardly have thought that the words he cites could be fairly given by themselves as evidence of the Franciscan master's teaching.

In the same way his language on the original opinion of Scotus regarding the Immaculate Conception is calculated to give the reader a false impression; and the passages to which he refers us cannot be said to bear out the statement that the subtle doctor at first followed Alexander of Hales on this matter; for although the other opinion is fairly set forth in those pages, Scotus has already given his own famous argument in favour of the doctrine since defined. We trust that this part may be amended in the next edition, for there are probably few who read Scotus for themselves, and a very large number of readers will be likely to form their estimate of his teaching from what they are told in this deservedly popular manual of Church history.

To turn to a minor question of ethnology, we may point out that it is hardly accurate to treat of Finns and Esthonians under the heading "*Die völlige Bekehrung der slavischen Völker im Nordosten Europas.*" Lithuanians and Prussians may be grouped under that title; for though not properly Slavs, they merely belong to the other branch of the Slavo-Lettic family. But it is otherwise with the Finns, who belong rather to the Altaic group and are in no sense Slavonic.

A word of praise must be given to the typographical accuracy of the volume, which, in spite of the multitudinous mass of proper names and words in foreign languages, is singularly free from misprints. To prove the rule by some exceptions, the only errors we have noticed we may point out that the name of Machiavelli has been printed with a superfluous *c*; and in the Swedish title of St. Bridget's Revelations "*Uppenbarchoen*" should surely be "*Uppenbarelsen.*" The reader may well be glad to be spared any German misprints, for the "*Zetacism*" of the new official spelling of such words as "*Okzident*" and "*Zölibat*" is sufficiently trying.

We congratulate Dr. Kirsch on the manner in which he has accomplished so large a portion of his task, and we trust that he may soon have the satisfaction of carrying it on to completion. The labour still before him is sufficiently arduous, but he may well find encouragement in the Brief which Pope

Pius X. has addressed to the publishers of the recent Italian translation of the first volume. After speaking in high terms of the late Cardinal Hergenröther, the Holy Father adds: "Quoniam autem hoc intervallo ex quo is excessit e vita, progressionem in hisce studiis factae sunt tam magnae ut ipsius opus partim reconcinnandum videretur, non parva dilecto filio Joanni Petro Kirsch habenda est gratia, qui ejusmodi sibi provinciam sumpserit in eaque exequenda exploratam suam sollertiam peritiamque demonstret." With this Papal approval, we can safely commend the work to our readers.

W. H. K.

Les Martyrs : Recueil de pièces authentiques sur les Martyrs depuis les origines du Christianisme jusqu'au XXe siècle. Par le R. P. DOM H. LECLERCQ. Tom. III. Julien l'Apostat ; Sapor ; Genséric. Paris : Oudin. 1904.

TO Dom Leclercq's untiring energy and unquestionable scholarship we are indebted for the third volume of the new series *Les Martyrs*, containing the acts of the Christian Martyrs from the earliest ages to our own. Having dealt in the first two volumes with the persecutions of the first three centuries, particularly under Nero and Diocletian, Dom Leclercq now puts before us the "Authentic Acts" of the martyrs of the fourth and fifth centuries, that exceedingly interesting period when Christianity had virtually conquered the Paganism of the Empire, and was endeavouring to convert the barbarian races outside the sway of the Roman power. The acts speak for themselves and provide most interesting and edifying reading. Some of the martyrs suffered within the Empire owing to the revival of the pagan spirit by Julian and his associates, but the nature of their trials is generally less barbarous than that of the earlier martyrs, though their conduct is no less heroic. Whatever the humanity of Julian himself, or however little he deserves the title of a cruel tyrant, yet his extraordinary hatred of Christianity served as only too good a pretext for provincial governors and others to torture and slay without mercy those who refused to renounce their faith and offer sacrifice to pagan gods. The Persian and Vandal persecutions remind us more of those of Nero, but many of the martyrs themselves are not well known to the ordinary reader.

Dom Leclercq opens his book with a short account of the materials he uses in his composition and an explanation of the methods he has adopted, together with three interesting notices of Dom Ruinart, Jean Baptiste de Rossi and Edmond de Blant, to each of whom he owns himself greatly indebted. There then follows a long preface of some 180 pages containing an account of martyrs "whose names are known to God," with details of "punishments and their representations in ancient times." About fifty pages are then devoted to the well known treatise of Lactantius, "De mortibus persecutorum," showing the characters of the various persecutors, and how God, in his justice, had dealt with them. The authorship of this treatise has been questioned, as the only known existing MS. describes the book as "liber ad Donatum confessorem de mortibus persecutorum," written by Lucius Caecilius, but it is quite probable that Lucius Coelius Lactantius is here referred to, and St. Jerome affirms that he actually did write "de persecutione."

The rest of the book consists of an appendix of acts, the degree of whose historical worth, the author remarks, has merely to be established. Dom Leclercq, very wisely we think, prefers to use a different type for these acts, as they were compiled at later periods and are often written with a partiality and vividness which, perhaps, may violate the rigid and unbiassed rules of a genuine history. These documents, some forty in number, contain eighteen accounts of Persian martyrs, together with a poetic description of the martyrdom of Mar Bassus, which has lately been translated from the Syriac text into French for the first time by Monsieur J. B. Chabot (Paris, 1903).

Little need be said concerning these forty acts, except to commend them heartily to all, and especially to those who love to hear of the manifest workings of Divine Grace in God's heroic servants. Nothing, perhaps, is more inspiring than to read of what our fellow-creatures have been ready to suffer for the glory of God in all ages and every circumstance of life; and in these volumes, which Dom Leclercq is now engaged in publishing, there are many chapters which cannot fail to touch the most callous and indifferent reader. Dom Leclercq's labours have already laid upon us a deep debt of gratitude, and we have every hope and wish that this debt may soon be increased by further editions of *Les Martyrs*.

G. B. H.

Some Thoughts on Inspiration. By J. ARMITAGE ROBINSON, D.D. London: Longmans, Green and Co. Cr. 8vo, pp. 64. 6d.

"IT is difficult to define inspiration." So says Dean Robinson. "It is always to be remembered that the Church has never attempted a formal definition. It would be as unwise now as at any time in the past to make such an attempt." It depends on what one conceives to be the Church, what one may think of this statement. The Church has over and over again declared, and has formally defined at Trent and in the Vatican, that "God is the author of Sacred Scripture"; that is to say, if we regard the Catholic Church throughout the world as the Church. But, after all, the definition of these councils does not take us far. The theologians have given a very exact definition, the Church has been, to a large extent, silent.

Dean Robinson's three lectures are for the most part a plea for taking a broad view of scripture. He does not believe in the historical accuracy of much in the Old Testament, It is the spiritual teaching that lies behind that history that he looks to. Both Old and New Testaments in their entirety he would fearlessly submit to the most searching criticism of reverent scholars. He even hints that the human knowledge of our Lord may have been limited, not only in regard to the future, but even in regard to the past. "For," says he, "He grew in wisdom."

What will probably prove of service to many readers, Dean Robinson adds at the end of the little volume a list of recent books which he thinks may prove instructive to the thoughtful English reader.

We do not agree with much that the Dean has said in this volume; but on the whole it is well worthy to be both read and carefully considered, and will probably be found to be nearer to the mark than many publications which have been in vogue of recent years.

J. A. H.

Studies in Religion and Literature. By W. S. LILLY.
 London : Chapman and Hall. Pp. xvi.-320. Price 12s. 6d.
 net.

THIS volume is composed of a reprint of nine essays which had already appeared elsewhere. As is usual with Mr. Lilly, they are very full of thought and the evidence of wide reading. The two essays on Cardinal Wiseman and the Tractarian movement, as well as that on the unfortunate, if brilliant Abbé de Lamennais are sure to prove interesting, especially to Catholics. Perhaps the lecture on the "Theory of the Ludicrous" with which the volume closes will have proved a little recondite to an audience; we found it rather hard work at times to follow. Nor are we surprised that a friend of Mr. Lilly was inclined to question the fact that Thackeray, Dickens, Carlyle and George Eliot were typical representatives of English humorists of the last century.

Balzac is a writer who, one is inclined to think, is not very much read in these days. Mr. Lilly calls him the French Shakespeare, and devotes a long essay to a criticism of his work. He looks upon him as having left behind him a life-like picture of the manners and customs of French life in his own day, just as Shakespeare has done for English life in his time. Of the religion of Shakespeare, Mr. Lilly says in his introductory essay on that subject, "Mr. Simpson's contention that Shakespeare's opinions were Catholic, and 'that with such opinions he probably would, if he had the opportunity, die a Papist,' does not seem excessive. More than that we cannot say" (p. 30).

Speaking of Tennyson, Mr. Lilly says: "He is distinguished in the highest degree by what I regard as the dominant English characteristic—reverence for duty as the supreme law of life: the subordination of all ideals to the moral ideal" (p. 48). It might be questioned, perhaps, whether this is a characteristic distinctively English; it will readily be granted that in theory it holds a very prominent place in this country.

In the same essay (p. 50) Mr. Lilly tells us that: "Tennyson discerned, clearly enough, that this doctrine of the absolute and indefeasible authority of what is called 'the people,' that is, of the numerical majority of the adult males of a country, is really a doctrine of anarchy; that it means the triumph of the passions over the rational will; whereas the true theory of the state,

whatever its form, means the triumph of the rational will over the passions."

This seems to me a very doubtful doctrine. There can be no doubt that the days of privileged classes were days of the ignorance of the people, a most unjustly draconian system of punishments, wars and selfishness. We have instances of its fruits in the French Revolution, and to-day in Russian autocracy. No system is perfect, but there is certainly a great advance in the government by "the people" in England, America and France over the governments of Louis XIV., Russia and England in the olden days. Why government by "the people" should be "the triumph of the passions over the rational will" is not at all obvious. Why not say the same of government by grand dukes? Why should one class of the people govern more than another? Why should grand dukes, or plutocrats, or others, have more "reason" than anyone else? The only answer seems to be that the ruling caste, if it feels its inherent weakness, has a tendency to keep the body of the people in ignorance so as to maintain its own privileges.

Mr. Lilly's book is a most readable one. We commend it as likely to prove instructive, and likely to interest the reader in subjects he has not come across before.

J. A. H.

B. Alberti Magni, O.P., Ratisbonensis Episcopi Commentarii in Job: Additamentum ad opera omnia B. Alberti. Primum ex quinque codicibus manuscriptis edidit MELCHIOR WEISS. Cum effigie B. Alberti Magni et octo tabulis phototypicis. Freiburg: Herder. Pp. x-568. 1904. Mark 12s.

IT is well known how greatly attached were the Christian Middle Ages to the *Libri Moraliū* on Job of St. Gregory the Great. They were considered to be an arsenal for the defence of Christian truth, as well as a treasury of the guiding principles in the moral ascetic life of the time. Proofs of this are the number of epitomes made from the *Libri Moraliū*, with the intention of bringing the teaching of the great Pope more easily within reach of the people. No wonder, therefore, if men well versed in the Scriptures when reading the *Expositio in Job* by St. Gregory felt themselves drawn to comment anew upon the book of Job according to their own feelings and according to the spirit and characteristic way of thinking of

their time. A commentary, especially when it comes from the pen of the great scholastic Bl. Albertus Magnus, must therefore be of profound interest to us, who on account of the universality of his conception and his knowledge ("magnus in magia, major in philosophia, maximus in theologia"), is called *doctor universalis*. Our gratitude is therefore undoubtedly due to Melchior Weiss for editing the *Commentarii in Job*, increasing thereby our knowledge of the literary works of Bl. Albertus as well as restoring to us one of the pearls of mediæval literature. But while St. Gregory the Great, distinguishing clearly between the *sensus historicus*, *typicus* and *moralis*, created a doctrinal masterpiece, the *Commentarii* of Bl. Albert. wear a different aspect. They are rather an example of the way in which the Middle Ages, and especially the pious inhabitants of its monasteries, meditated upon holy Scripture, a way of child-like simplicity and penetrated with sweet unction and that spirit of prayer which was a fruit of the divine office chanted with love and understanding, and in the spirit of contemplation. *Ad litteram*, that is, taking word by word, like the honey-bee from flower to flower to collect honey, Albert writes down etymological definitions, reminiscences from profane history and classical literature, quotations from Aristotle *de plantis*, or from Palladius *de agricultura*. Sometimes he gives typical or moral explanations, dogmatical investigations like the holy fathers, especially like St. Gregory before him. The personal originality of Bl. Albert lies in his skilful accommodation of Scripture texts. Although this way of meditating upon holy Scripture may have gone out of use in our times, generally speaking, yet those who esteem and love this simplicity and the spirit of prayer of our forefathers will with pleasure read his commentary. The preacher, too, who wishes to put before his hearers not so much his own human words as the inspired words of Divine truth, will find in Bl. Albert's work many new ideas and many useful hints as to texts of holy Scripture. With great care and diligence the editor has endeavoured to put before us the best possible text. The arrangement and critical apparatus are good. The book is well got up; paper, print, index locorum S. Scripturae, index nominum et rerum, and eight phototype facsimiles of the codices. The price, twelve shillings, is moderate, and he who possesses the Paris edition, omnia opera Beati Alberti, Vivès 1890-1899, 38 vols., will do well to procure also this *Additamentum*.

A. H.

A Complete and Practical Method of the Solesmes Plain-Chant. Adapted from the German of DOM BIRKLE, O.S.B., by A. Lemaistre. New York : Joseph Wagner.

FOR experts and others who understand several languages there are valuable books already available which deal more or less fully with the Liturgical Music. But hitherto the average English-speaking organist and choir-master, seeking for information upon the rudiments of plain-song, has found it difficult to get his want supplied.

The *Complete and Practical Method* has appeared at an opportune moment. It is written in English. It is inexpensive. It deals with the subject in a simple and practical way. There is a chapter on Notation ; another on the Intervals, with suggestions and exercises to enable one to read them easily. There is a chapter on the Modes which anyone can understand. Then, in the second part of the book, there is a careful treatment of the different forms of the melodies and of the principles which underlie their composition, and finally, a very useful analysis of them into their component parts, with a view to their intelligent execution and a just appreciation of their musicianly form.

We notice a few places where the author's views are not quite in accord with the Solesmes authorities, and for that reason we do not think the title of the book has been wisely chosen. And we wish that more care had been taken with the form and style of the English language.

With these reservations we can recommend Mr. Lemaistre's work to all those who wish for a simple, practical and inexpensive book of instruction on the subject of plain-chant.

E. R. G.

Elementa Philosophiae Scholasticae. Auctore Dr. SEB. REINSTADLER. Editio Altera. Friburgi : Herder. 8vo, Vol. I., pp. 452 ; Vol. II., pp. 448. 6 mark. MCMIV.

IN these two volumes of Dr. Reinstadler's *Elements of Scholastic Philosophy* we are presented with a compendium embracing Logic, Criteriology, Ontology, Cosmology, Anthropology, Natural Theology, and Ethics. Thoroughly up-to-date in his method, Dr. Reinstadler shows a wide acquaintance with modern exponents of St. Thomas, as well as with the more recent phases of German, French, and English thought upon philosophical topics.

He has some very good plates illustrative of the section upon Anthropology, and treats carefully of the physical operations that take place in the human body—a subject the lack of which often mars an otherwise excellent text book. The matter is very clearly and logically arranged throughout, and there is a completeness in the treatment that satisfies the reader. Several emendations have been made in the second edition, still further completing the original work, and it is to be hoped that it will speedily find its way—as it deserves—into the hands of many students of Scholastic Philosophy.

C. S. B.

Thomæ Hemerken a Kempis : Sermones ad Novitios ; Vita Lidewigis Virginis. Ex Autographo edidit M. J. POHL. Freiburg : Herder. P. 540. 1905.

THE publication of a critical text of the works of Thomas a Kempis proceeds apace, the sixth volume being now issued, containing the *Sermones ad Novitios* (xxx.), and the *Vita Lidewigis Virginis*. The editor follows the same method of treatment as in the volumes already published. No note whatever is added to the text, all critical remarks being reserved for the minute and detailed studies which form the appendix. The volume closes with ten photographic reproductions of the original MS. The text, both of the discourses and the biography, is from the autograph of the venerable author of the *Imitation*. The editor has preserved for the most part the punctuation of the original, which, though quaint at first, offers no difficulty to the reader. He has, on the other hand, taken the liberty of correcting obvious solecisms in the text, of which, however, he has not failed to render a minute and laborious account in the *Epilegomena*. On this point he remarks :

“Quid enim jucunditatis aut utilitatis adferrent legentibus nihil nisi pietatis adfectus sectantibus *cimiterium, elemosina, habundancia, leticie, michi, nichil, penitencie, proch* similesque insolentiae sescentiens repetitae ?” (p. 492).

But with regard to the more responsible work of the editor he adds :

“Sed quod his minutiis gravius est, dubitatione sollicitor, num artem criticam factitans locos dubios omnes recte vel legerim vel emendaverim. Probe equidem scio distinguendum esse inter meros calami errores et lapsus scriptoris indocti,

quorum ut illos corrigi, ita hos non tolli consentaneum est ; in qua distinctione si non ubique aliis satisfecerim, non mirabor, cum ne mihi quidem ipse satisfecerim " (*ib.*)

Few, probably, of the readers of the *Imitation* will have seen the works contained in this volume ; hence it will not be presumptuous on our part if we urge them to procure it.

H. P.

De Actibus Humanis. Auctore VICTORE FRINS, S.J. Pars II.
 "De Actibus humanis moraliter consideratis." Freiburg :
 Herder. Pp. xi.-563.

IT is some seven years since the first instalment of this grandiose study appeared, in which human acts were treated in their ontological and psychological aspects. In the volume before us the author deals with human actions in their ethical aspect. In the forthcoming and concluding volume he will treat the subjects of conscience and sin. So vast a treatise on what occupies but a comparatively limited space, even in a full course of ecclesiastical training, is intended for the professor and the reference library, rather than for the pupil. The text-book usually enjoys but an ephemeral reputation ; the book of Father Frin's will, unless we are much mistaken in our estimate of its value, take a permanent place among the classical expositions of Catholic moral science. Those to whom the intricacies and subtleties of human action are familiar, will recognise how many problems and inquiries must be left with a superficial handling from the sheer necessity of covering the whole ground of the science of morals in a given time. Our author is free from all such contingent restrictions, and abandons himself with a joyous freedom to the discussion of every question on its own merits, and in the light of the traditional teaching of the schools and of controversy. The following headings of the different sections will give an idea of the ground travelled over in this masterly monograph : "De moralitate" (1-53) ; "De regula moralitatis" (54-102) ; "De bonitate morali" (103-353) ; "De malitia morali" (354-512) ; "De indifferentia actuum" (513-544). Occupied as he is with scholastic questions, he employs the scholastic method, although his general treatment is rather that of a critical discussion of the views of leading moralists than a purely doctrinal exposition.

We may justly describe the work as a scholarly study of incredible patience and thoroughness; and as it surpasses all recent treatises on these subjects in fulness and detail, it is a book to be reckoned with by all those who profess to handle the fundamental questions of moral science with anything more than the necessary brevity and superficiality of the school manual. While the fathers are not neglected, St. Thomas and Suarez appear on almost every page, and a crowd of writers of secondary rank are summoned in turn to bear witness to the traditional doctrine or to answer for their individual peculiarities.

Type, paper and printing are worthy of the great publishing firm who have brought out the book. The text is wonderfully free from errors, and the Latin, though from the necessity of the case scholastic, is pure and even elegant.

H. P.

Divorce: A Domestic Tragedy of Modern France. By PAUL BOURGET, of the French Academy. Translated from the French by E. L. Charlwood. London: David Nutt, 57-59, Long Acre. 1904.

THE following words from the translator's preface will give the scope of this work: "In the following pages may be found a convinced and reasoned defence of the doctrine concerning divorce held by the Catholic Church in its most rigid and uncompromising form. . . . It might not be hard to find instances in which the Church's doctrine, to say nothing of her practice, has been more tenderly tempered to the shorn lamb than, seemingly, M. Bourget would approve. . . . Neither by misrepresentation nor by lack of sympathy does he show himself unjust towards the religious and political opinions he has set himself avowedly to combat. . . . Certain it is that the two most sympathetic characters in the book are the young couple whose revolt against the traditional ideal of marriage goes so far beyond the mere advocacy of divorce, and that the defender of that traditional ideal has set forth their creed of free union with profound emotion and a genuine recognition of its moral elevation." Truly the author has described in very graphic terms the evils that follow the remarriage of a divorced person. While, however, it cannot precisely be said that he recognises the moral elevation of the

creed of free union, it is quite true he describes much too sympathetically the second attempt of the young lady in that line, seeing that the disastrous consequences of the first failed to teach her any better sense. Perhaps we may say rather that the author is merely giving these young people and the elder ones, more directly concerned in the tragedy, credit for such virtues as they may possess. But it is open to very serious doubt whether such good qualities as the author attributes to the man who marries the divorced woman, and still more to the young heroine of the story, really exist in any large number of persons holding the opinions attributed to these two. A remark of the man's reminds one of the attempt of Julian the Apostate to infuse such life into Paganism—that the virtues of its votaries should rival or even excel those of the Christians. No doubt individuals without religion may practise the natural virtues to a high degree, but comparisons in this matter are to be made between peoples, not individuals. Besides the evils with which the author is directly concerned, there is another which is not expressly put forth but mentioned in passing, and of which it may be said that it is often the real cause of divorce. This evil is that of parents choosing husbands and wives for their children. In fact a marriage arranged as described (p. 25) would give some grounds for a declaration of nullity. "I told you my parents married me. If they did not use force in the material sense of that word, it is not the less true that they overruled my will. I was not a free agent; in any case I did not know to whom I was being married. Had I known I would have died rather than consent to such a detestable union." Of course there is but one child of each marriage; that is, unfortunately, but too characteristic of French unions. There are a few printer's errors. For example, at the bottom of page 280 there are two lines that belong to the end of page 281. Otherwise the book is well got up and the type readable.

D. I.

Holy Confidence. By FATHER ROGACCI, S.J. Translated by Mother Margaret Taylor, and revised by Father Clare, S.J. London: Burns and Oates, Ltd. Pp. 195. 1904.

THERE is everything to recommend this reprint, neatness of type and binding, excellence of the translation, sureness of teaching, and the set purpose of encouraging the soul to a close and familiar intercourse with God. The booklet is but

an excerpt from the classical work of its author, who is accounted one of the most celebrated ascetical writers of a society which is distinguished for its eminent masters in the spiritual life. The orderly treatment and stringent reasoning will readily suggest the learned seventeenth century, of which the treatise was the offspring, the original work *Unum Necessarium* having been written early in the eighteenth century at the close of Father Rogacci's long career as a preacher of missions and retreats. The book will be useful to many, for the vigour and sagacity with which it abounds are quite as much needed in the guidance of religious emotion as in any other department of man's complex life.

H. P.

Ideals of Science and Faith. Essays by Various Authors.
 Edited by the Rev. J. E. HAND. London: George Allen.
 Pp. xix.-333. 1904.

WE doubt whether any century but the twentieth could have produced a book like this. It is true we have had our Metaphysical Society, but it never produced any literature beyond the unpublished records of its meetings. And if it has been wittily remarked that it died of too much love, we may also say that its birth was premature. We have had our symposia, which have tended to emphasize rather than to dissipate difficulties. We have had fruitful and unfruitful controversies. Above all we have witnessed the frequent, if not constant, phenomenon of scientific men assuming the office of religious teachers, as if to proclaim that there is something beyond material objects and interests by which the desires of our race are irresistibly attracted. Still it is a new and hopeful sign of the times that a group of eminent scientists and literary men should co-operate in the production of a volume setting forth their respective degrees of approach to a common religious ideal. Science and religion have been divided in heart long enough; misunderstanding has bred aloofness, and the personal antagonisms of one generation have been bequeathed as a party feud to the next. Here however, one instance being excepted, there is neither bitterness, irreverence, nor recklessness; but a calm, honest, frank, and even conciliatory tone pervades the whole collections of essays.

The book is a two-fold approach towards some common goal,

which nevertheless is but ill defined. Six of the contributors approach from the side of Science, and four from that of revealed Religion.

The physical sciences represented by the essayists are physics and biology, after which come the representatives of biology, psychology, sociology, ethics and education. The characteristic religious bodies which take part in the exposition are the Presbyterian Church, the Church of England, the High Church and the Catholic Church. It would not be too much to say that the various pilgrims, from regions apparently so remote, have met in a common sanctuary. The writer of the short sketch, nominally from the outlook of ethics, seems to have taken an independent route, and to have abandoned from the outset all hope of meeting anyone save some unhappy pessimist brother. Of the rest we are safe in asserting that they meet within sight of a temple whose outlines and details are presented to each with many differences. All who come from the territories of science find themselves agreeing in the existence of a Supreme Being, which they conceive somewhat differently, and towards which they regard a nearer approach as hopeful when the relations of Science and Religion are better understood and more exactly adjusted. With regard to the representatives of the churches, we find the Presbyterian and the Catholic clear in their profession of the need of adaptation, or of the principle of development. The two Churchmen, while saying much that is excellent, seem to insist on what will undoubtedly be considered as erroneous or irrelevant by some of their companion writers, namely, the doctrines of the Kingdom of God and the comprehensiveness of churchmanship.

The respective contributions are of unequal merit, yet all are thoughtful, considerate, broad, and well written. Most of the writers have realised the point at issue, which in common phrase may be stated as the claims of religion; and some, like Sir Oliver Lodge and the Rev. Ph. Napier Waggett, have mapped out the ground of the whole inquiry with a certain completeness of detail. The non-Catholic writers have all failed to discern the position of the Catholic Church, and the entire book (with perhaps the exception of Sir Oliver Lodge) omits to take into account (rightly or wrongly according to the particular view adopted by the writers) the historical evidence for the realities of religion. The philosophical structure is indicated almost as in a table of contents in various passages of

the essay by Sir Oliver Lodge ; but held captive as he is by his pantheistic hypothesis, he is withheld from bestowing the attention they deserve on the details of the Catholic position, to which Church, however, he does not explicitly refer. The two Churchmen have definitely pointed out various philosophical inquiries which are necessary for the proper understanding of the matter in hand, but which they purpose to exclude from their particular treatment of the subject proposed to them (pp. 246, 281).

Too often there is a puzzling mystical haziness about the concept of religion or the particular ideal proposed for acceptance as the inspiration of a higher life. The essays settle very little : they were not intended to settle anything. The editor, in his introduction, expresses their character perfectly :

“Of essays like the following, written from such widely different standpoints, and expressing the fullest independence of thought and treatment, the reader will not expect a summing-up of the essential thoughts, much less a positive conclusion. Our task is mainly to introduce, in the simple and social sense, independent writers who have never before written together, and who will not in most cases, until this volume appears, see how they may have respectively treated their subject (p. xi).”

They have nevertheless suggested very much. They have made it plain that the needs, aspirations, obscurities and difficulties of thinking men have a strong family likeness, and that a better understanding between men of different schools will undoubtedly lead to a broader and truer view of life, and to a more just and accurate appreciation of the certainties and trend of the different sciences.

The contribution which will receive an especial welcome from the Catholic philosopher is that of Mr. Victor V. Branford on “A Sociological Approach towards Unity.” This is the longest of the essays, and if somewhat more tentative in character and more general in its application than others, it is important as giving due emphasis to the importance of sociological study—a branch of inquiry which we Catholics have not as yet sufficiently explored. He refers (to take one instance for quotation) to the resistance offered by the Church to the spirit of Mammon in these terms :

“The conflict between Religion and Science, much in evidence though it has been during the past three or four centuries, is thus but a mushroom affair compared with that

conflict between Religion and the pecuniary interest above analysed ; so that we may now indentify the ponderous general enunciation which we have just reached as a tardy sociological restatement of a time-worn aphorism of religion : 'Ye cannot serve God and Mammon.'

He concludes the section with this wide generalisation :

"Now it is fair to generalise this instance as typical of many cases of conflict between Religion and Science. Generations of empirical observers, using conscious or sub-conscious methods, have dimly reached many deep-seated truths and incorporated them—it may be in vague and approximate form—in religious doctrine. And it frequently happens that this sort of truth is the last to be consciously reached by the scientist and formulated in verifiable shape. Yet, meanwhile, Science, with the ready assurance of youth, is too apt to oppose to the claim of Religion to holiness of thought its own immature synthesis of totality—which proves, on further examination, to be not a genuine whole, but a partial and fragmentary aspect of the truth (pp. 122, 124)."

In order not to mislead the reader by the foregoing notice, it should be said that the book is scarcely adapted to the needs of the general public ; it is rather a book for the expert. It is the work of experts, dealing with difficult and lofty subjects, with a frankness and freedom which issues in many inconsistencies.

In offering this estimate of a remarkable compilation, we have purposely abstained from any detailed criticism of individual papers. To have criticised them with any minuteness might have seemed irrelevant or ungenerous. There is much, indeed, both in what is directly stated and in what is obviously implied that we cannot accept. But this attitude in the critic is, of course, anticipated by the writers, from the very fact that their differences of view are the condition that has made such a compilation possible. The point of the book is the *rapprochement* of its writers, and that point has undoubtedly been secured.

H. P.

Histoire des Dogmes. 1—"La Théologie Anténicéenne."

Par J. TIXERONT. Second Edition. Cr. 8vo, pp 475.

Paris : Lecoffre. 1905.

THIS handy volume gives an excellent account of the history of Christian doctrine until the beginning of the fourth century. The author follows what he calls the "synthetic" method, that is to say, he takes each writer in turn, and gives

his views as far as they can be ascertained from the remains which we possess. This method is more complete and more interesting than the other possible method, by which each dogma is separately treated and its development traced. And in so small a book it is not hard to keep in mind what has gone before, so that in fact the progress of doctrinal evolution and the gradual growth in the Church of a full understanding of her own teaching, together with the working out of a theological language, can all be easily followed in M. Tixeront's exposition, in so far as so necessarily condensed an account will allow. Such condensation is no easy matter, and M. Tixeront must be complimented on the justness of proportion which he has been careful in observing. Together with this sense of proportion, he combines a wide knowledge of the literature of his subject with the clearness of statement which is so necessary in a text-book, and which we expect from a French writer.

M. Tixeront is very moderate in his conclusions. No doubt in many places we expect more definite results, but he errs on the safe side. We may remark the first two chapters as especially well done; they treat of the religious, philosophic, and moral doctrines in the midst of which Christian dogma had its origin and first development, and the preaching of our Lord and of His apostles. It is a pity that in the account of the pseudo-Clementine literature no notice should be taken of the date (c. 300) proposed by Harnack in his latest volume, a date which seems likely to be accepted.

It should be remembered when such a volume is read that much could be said in defence of the fathers whose very inadequate presentment of dogma is here given in skeleton form. No doubt they often meant better than they said. Starting from correct premises, they resolved the difficulties which they met as best they were able, and by no means always rightly. We are not to conclude either that they were themselves heretical, or that the Church did not implicitly hold what we hold now. But it took a long time to realize the full meaning and interaction of even the primary doctrines of the faith. The old appeal of Anglicanism to the first three centuries is an absurdity in the light of the conscientious criticism which modern workers apply.

References to the best literature are given on each subject; but the usefulness of this is not very apparent in the absence of all pretension to estimate their relative value, since the book is

not intended for those advanced students who are already fairly familiar with the authors and works named. Occasionally worthless books are referred to, *e.g.*, Bunsen's *Hippolytus* and Hall's *Papias and his Contemporaries*. These are small blots on an excellent work, from which we expect much usefulness.

J. C.

Paris sous Napoléon : Consulat Provisoire et Consulat à temps. Par L. de LAUZAC DE LABORIE. Paris : Plon-Nourrit et Cie.

THIS small volume covers an interesting and important period in the history of France, that of the Consulate immediately preceding the Concordat. It affords a fairly complete and summary survey of the events of this time. It does not attempt in any sense to delineate the character either of Napoleon or his subordinates except by such indications as were given by their conduct as called forth by passing events. It is, in the first place, a brief record of the time, yet in no sense a bare record; for though the author does not swell the volume with padding simply setting forth his own views, he seizes on the salient points, has a proper sense of proportion, and enlivens the work by not too lengthy observations of his own, some of which have a spice of dry humour. He makes considerable use of contemporary records, to which he most commendably refers the reader in frequent footnotes. The main interest for the Catholic reader, especially at the present time, will be the chapters relating to the state of religion in France, and the last and longest, about the signing of the Concordat. It is evident that the writer's sympathies are monarchical. He does not like the "constitutional" priests; yet, though their Gallicanism was an anachronism, and much abused as they have been, they probably saved the Church by showing that religion was not necessarily allied with tyranny. He is, again, somewhat bitter against Napoleon's officials who showed such distrust of the royalist clergy. Yet under the circumstances such distrust was at least intelligible.

For instance, on p. 328 we read of a certain provincial priest who made himself notorious by his indiscreet and intemperate references to politics in the pulpit. On one occasion he remarked in the course of his sermon at an important church in Paris: "Oh my God! the town in which Thou didst work the miracle which we honour on this day (Pentecost) had just

committed a great crime in condemning Thy Son to death ; has the town in which I am now speaking rendered itself less culpable ? I am silent. . . ." Of course everybody understood the allusion to be to the execution of the King. The chief of police, on hearing of it, ordered him to be detained in a lunatic asylum, which seems a peculiarly appropriate punishment. There can be no doubt that, if the case had been reversed and such an allusion had been made to a political execution carried out under a monarchial instead of a republican government, far severer measures would have been used ; and the author, who sees in this incident only the occasion of a reprimand, would have been one of the first to have approved them. To such extent does political animus blind men and prevent them from realising their opponents' standpoint. It was not so much overt and decided acts which made republicans recognise their enemy in the royalist clergy, as the atmosphere they sought to create and the anti-republican spirit they tried to foster. The writer himself admits of the bishops that "many cultivated relations with the princes of the house of Bourbon," that is, with the enemies of the French Government.

D. C.

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La Mission de M. de Forbin-Janson, Evêque de Marseille, plus tard Evêque de Beauvais, auprès du grand duc et de la grande duchesse de Toscane. Mars-mai 1673. "Récit d'un Témoin." Par C. DONAIS, Evêque de Beauvais. Paris : Picard, Père et Fils, Editeurs, 82 rue Bonaparte. 1904.

THIS book relates to the mission of M. de Forbin-Janson, Bishop of Marseilles in the seventeenth century, undertaken at the instance of Louis XIV., in which he endeavoured to effect a reconciliation between Marguerite of Orleans and her husband, the Grand Duke of Tuscany, between whom serious differences had arisen. In the course of his short volume the writer describes briefly the circumstances which led to the breach between the wedded pair and the main efforts made by the Bishop to bring about an understanding.

The author tells us in his preface that his account is taken from a larger work in his possession, at present unpublished. At the end of the volume a considerable number of letters bearing on the subject are published, which were written by

the chief parties concerned, the larger part of them being those of the Duchess and of the Bishop.

All those people who take delight in reading of the inner history and private scandals of personages belonging to royal houses, though they may have long since passed away, will no doubt find this volume of interest.

D. C.

La Reine Margot et la Fin des Valois (1553-1615). D'après les Mémoires et les Documents. Avec un portrait en héliogravure. Par CHARLES MERKI. Paris: Libraire Plon-Nourrit et Cie. Price 7fr. 50c. 1905.

NO student of the later Renaissance as it developed in France can afford to ignore this scholarly volume, treating as it does with due impartiality of a period that has hitherto been mainly the happy hunting-ground of the partisan and the historical scandal-monger. The picture presented by Monsieur Merki of the life and times of the last of the Valois is dark enough, but the lurid colours with which the portrait of La Reine Margot has hitherto been painted must henceforth be somewhat modified. In many ways the true daughter of Catherine of Medici, Marguerite of Valois was however neither treacherous nor cruel, and she is here shown to have possessed real qualities, which in less stormy, difficult and demoralising circumstances might have made of her a noble, as she is already a commanding, figure. If she had been allowed to follow her inclination, and to have married the young Duke of Guise instead of Henry of Navarre, who plays by no means an estimable part in these pages, the whole subsequent history of France might have been different. The unfortunate marriage into which she was forced was clearly accountable for at least half the sins and scandals with which her life was sullied. Marguerite is thus described by her latest biographer :

“She united in her person all the gifts and all the defects of the Orléans-Valois. Her noble air and royal bearing remind us of her brother, Henry III., and no queen ever wore her dignity more grandly than she. Louis XII. bequeathed to her his gentle and easy manners as well as his weakness for those he loved. From her grandfather Francis I. she inherited vanity and love of admiration ; from her father affability and the faculty of making herself popular, but he also transmitted to her his levity, inconstancy, caprice and immorality. In

common with her whole house, she possessed a remarkable taste and a large capacity for the cultivation of literature and the fine arts.

Her *Memoirs* and *Correspondence* form a considerable part of the important sources from which this valuable contribution to the history of the sixteenth and early seventeenth century is compiled. The volume is adorned with an interesting portrait of the Queen in heliogravure.

J. M. S.

Matilda, Countess of Tuscany. By Mrs. MARY E. HUDDY. With four Photogravure Plates from drawings by George M. Sullivan. London: John Long. Price 12s. net. 1905.

THIS is a more than disappointing book. Its title raises brilliant expectations, for the ground is all but untrodden, and there was ample room for a thorough and picturesque study of "the first woman since the fall of the Roman Empire of whom account must be taken in history." Mrs. Huddy is not without enthusiasm for her heroine and for the cause represented by the Countess Matilda, but she is seemingly unaware of the magnitude of the task which she has so light-heartedly undertaken, bringing no pains to bear on the preparation necessary for an adequate appreciation of the great characters and great events of which she discourses. Of the eleven Popes of whom she writes, not one is described with any distinctness; even the mighty Hildebrand passes through her pages as a mere shadow, and Matilda herself—the powerful champion of the Papacy in the eleventh century—fails to take on flesh and blood.

No doubt a complete and independent survey of the period, with all its degrading abuses, its strong and stormy personalities, its fierce passions, its valiant asceticisms, its ignorance, its profound learning, would have entailed the ransacking of the principal archives and libraries of Europe, but work based on researches short of this is practically valueless to students, for it adds nothing to that which is already known. As for the general run of readers, they may well complain that Mrs. Huddy provides them with no map of Tuscany as it was constituted in the eleventh century, no index, no table of contents, no headlines to guide them, no bibliography, no references in fact, but a few sparse footnotes vaguely indicating

her authorities, mostly modern writers. Mrs. Huddy had a magnificent opportunity, and she has failed to use it.

The four photogravures which illustrate the book, are: an imaginary portrait of the Countess Matilda; the well-known view of St. Peter's and the Castle of St. Angelo from the Tiber; the tomb of the Countess Beatrice, Matilda's mother; and her own monument in the style of the Renaissance in St. Peter's.

J. M. S.

The Tutorial History of Greece. By W. J. WOODHOUSE, M.A. Oxon. London: W. B. Clive.

THE student of Greek history will find in this handbook all the information required for examination purposes, and much that he will not find in other similar manuals. Recent excavations in Crete, in Asia Minor, at Mycenae and elsewhere have added considerably to our knowledge of the pre-historic period: of these results the author has been able to make good use. The account of the vaulted tombs at Mycenae is particularly interesting. Plans of the more important battles are inserted, and the index is all that could be desired; but it was surely an oversight to omit a map of Greece, however small it would have to be to suit the compass of the volume. A list of the more important events, with their dates and tables of the Persian kings, will be looked for in vain, as also any reference to history other than political and constitutional.

F. R.

By what Authority? By ROBERT HUGH BENSON. London: Isbister and Co. 1905.

THE highest art in a historical novel is to so clothe its pages with that elusive quality, local atmosphere, that the reader plunges headlong from the first sentence into the particular period it is desired to present to his imagination, and continues to breathe that rarified air till at the last page he wakes almost as a sleeper awakes from the effects of laughing-gas. No little skill is required for the weaving of such a spell, and this skill is abundantly displayed in the present work. Whether we are admitted to Lady Maxwell's peaceful little Italian garden, where my lady spends most of her day under the shadow of the yew-hedge, reading and embroidering with

Mistress Margaret, or they talk a little now and then to each other in quiet voices ; or whether we assist at a priest-hunt, breathless with fright and dread, from beginning to end the book holds and absorbs us, and we realise how men and women had their being, and held their lives in their hands in the spacious days of Queen Elizabeth. Not that quite all Mr. Benson's portraits are true likenesses. Elizabeth the author shows us in the flesh, and Sir Francis Walsingham, but in the mild and melancholy Archbishop Grindal we fail to recognise the ruthless destroyer of altars and the savage defacer of the very pedestals on which the images once stood in the churches. Mr. Benson's Grindal is far too well disposed towards Catholics and their religion, whereas the true Grindal, say the records he has left behind him, was zealous in the uprooting of every trace of the old religion. We have some misgivings, too, as to the perfect amity in which a Papist and a Puritan household are depicted as living side by side ; but these are minor defects, and the story goes on its realistic way, and graphic scenes succeed graphic scenes ; and there is so much to enjoy that we can forgive a few lapses from historical fact into romance pure and simple. For, on the whole, the picture is singularly accurate, and will convey the true inwardness of the times to many who have not the taste or the opportunity for a more serious grappling with the records of the past. Of the story, apart from its setting, we will only say that it follows the outline of public events, and the hero and heroine (on the conception of whose characters the author may be sincerely congratulated) arrive at their legitimate conclusion in a manner as unconventional as it is elevating.

J. M. S.

Histoire des Livres du Nouveau Testament. Par E. JACQUIER. Tome second. Paris : Lecoffre. 507 pp., sm. 8vo. Price 3fr. 50c. 1905.

THE second volume of M. Jacquier's history of the books of the New Testament deals with the Synoptic Gospels : in fact it may be called a handbook of the synoptic problem. We welcome it warmly as a useful contribution to the subject, and especially as the best introduction for students that we know of. The few words on the witness of tradition at the beginning are necessarily too incomplete to be satisfactory, and the final chapter on the textual problems is so short that it may

well be even misleading to those who are not well up in the question already. A large portion of the volume is taken up by an analysis of the three Synoptic Gospels (pp. 37-282). In the first place St. Mark is followed throughout, and carefully compared with Matthew and Luke. Next St. Luke's Gospel is taken as a base, and St. Matthew is compared with it. Lastly St. Matthew is taken alone. In many passages the three accounts of the same event are printed in parallel columns in French, and the Greek is frequently given in three lines, one above the other. This will help the beginner to get a notion of the problems to be solved. It is obvious, however, that such an exposition will not be able to supply that knowledge which independent work on the student's own part alone can give him. For those who only desire a general conception of the difficulties and enigmas; a persual of M. Jacquier's analysis will be most enlightening, while it will give an impulse, we hope, to many to take in hand a good harmony (Rushbrook's *Synopticon* is so far the best as to merit the name of indispensable), and work at the riddle for themselves.

The remaining portion of the book is altogether admirable. Chapter V. gives a complete and clear account of all the numerous and confusing hypotheses which have been put forward to explain the astonishing convergence and divergence of the evangelists. Chapters VI.-VIII. give a detailed account of the characteristics of each gospel. These pages are crammed with matter and extremely well arranged. The writer keeps his own views somewhat in the background. He gives the arguments for the now usually accepted view—that St. Mark was used by both the other evangelists—with so much force and clearness that one is surprised to find that he does not himself accept it—nor does he supply sufficient reasons for its rejection. But this is an instance of his perfect fairness and moderation. We strongly recommended this most valuable manual to students.

J. C.

The Yoke of Christ. By the REV. ROBERT EATON, Priest of the Birmingham Oratory. London: Catholic Truth Society. Two vols., price 2s. 6d. net., in paper 1s. each net. 1905.

THE Archbishop of Westminster, in his preface to this work, after remarking that the old truths must be prepared in really attractive form for those who are too weak in body for deep contemplation, in order that they may easily assimilate

the nourishment they need, says that in these readings such persons will find what they require to brace their failing strength and inspire fresh courage to bear a burden at times almost beyond their powers of endurance. These words seem to express very well the leading idea of these hundred readings on the Life and Passion of our Lord. Take "Discouragement," for example, which means that because we do not advance as quickly as we wish we are inclined to give up trying. After being reminded that this comes from pride, that light comes slowly, sin dies slowly, the flame of passion is extinguished slowly, grace comes slowly, it is brought home to us that because we do not see and feel our progress we are not to conclude that no progress is being made. It is God, not we ourselves, who is to judge of the progress accomplished. Perseverance likewise is not so much an unbroken record of victories as a dogged determination never to give in, but always to try again. "Unwelcome Guests" will bring consolation not only to the sick in body, but to the sick in mind. These guests are the evil thoughts of every kind that we find so hard at times to banish; our good works seem to be an occasion of their presence; after a long fight they seem to be as strong as ever, and we ask ourselves whether it is our own fault that they are with us. It is an encouragement to be reminded that every effort we make, however useless it appears to be as far as the immediate object is concerned, is a victory for us that God will not forget. We can recommend this book not only to those for whom it is more immediately intended, but to all, either for a short spiritual reading or for the more serious purposes of meditation.

D. I.

Now and Then: and Other Sermons. By the Rev. SPENCER JONES, M.A. London: S. C. Brown, Langham and Company, Ltd. 1904.

IN a book of sermons by the author of *England and the Holy See*, one will naturally expect to find a Catholic spirit pervading them, and he will not be altogether disappointed. In the first sermon there is some very useful advice respecting the folly of brooding in a melancholy way over the past, instead of directing our attention to what we have to do now. There are some pertinent animadversions on the habit which is but too common of attributing favours that

come unexpectedly to us to good luck instead of to God. There are some remarks very good as far as they go on pain and suffering, but into the deeper question of the permission of so much moral evil in the world, the author does not enter. It is interesting to consider whether we can extract from these sermons any indication of the author's position as regards the Catholic Church. In a sermon on "Guidance and Comfort" we read (pp. 130-3). "In our day, when men are studying other religions besides their own, and are confused and bewildered by divisions among themselves, it is necessary to understand and appreciate the Catholic doctrine of grace—that is, to hold firmly to the truth that the Holy Spirit of God is over the entire face of the earth, that He enlightens every soul that comes into the world, that He leads men through false systems, but by means of what is true in those systems, to the one system of truth itself, and that He may be at work in individual souls here and there within an organisation without being necessarily at work in the organisation as such. . . . While the Catholic Church is understood to constitute the normal home of His working, it is the part of the teaching of an exact Theology that the Holy Spirit steps outside and beyond the portals of the Church in order to fasten upon individual souls everywhere and to conduct them step by step to the home of truth itself." From this it would seem that the author considers the communion to which he belongs to be the Catholic Church. Well, certainly, neither the Holy Spirit nor the truth He teaches can find its home in an Anglican communion in which unscriptural and contradictory doctrines are received and encouraged. It is of course perfectly true that God bestows His grace on those outside the Church and may lead men through false systems to the one system of truth, but never in such a way as to give His approbation to the system itself. Perhaps He makes even a greater use of what is false in the system to show people that His home is not there in order that thereby they may be led to find the real home of truth. The book is neatly got up, and ornamented with a portrait of the author.

D. I.

By its title the *VERA SAPIENTIA, OR TRUE WISDOM* (London : R. and T. Washbourne) of Thomas à Kempis gives promise of being an complete work from the pen of the author of the *Imitation*.

It is, in fact, no more than a gleanings of sentences from his various writings. The excellent translation before us is made by Mgr. Byrne, D.D., Vicar-General of Adelaide, South Australia. The book is well worth a place in every ascetical library.

L'IMMACULÉE CONCEPTION (Paris: *Lethielleux*) is a portion, complete in itself, of a work in four volumes by the late Father Terrien, S.J. It is admirably suited for the purpose for which it was published: developing the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception, and answering the more ordinary objections that are urged against this doctrine of the faith.

To prove that the *Canones Romanorum ad Gallos Episcopos* is the earliest Papal decretal in existence is the task of M. Babut, in *LA PLUS ANCIENNE DÉCRÉTALE* (Paris: *Société Nouvelle de Librairie et d'Édition*). He assigns its authorship to Pope Damasus, rather than, as was generally held, to either Innocent I. or Siricius; and it may be said that, considering the weight of the arguments he uses, he has fairly proved his contention.

Devoted to an examination and refutation of popular notions as to the cause and nature of the change of religion in England in the sixteenth century is *SOME POPULAR HISTORICAL FALLACIES EXAMINED* (London: *Burns and Oates*). It is well and carefully written, and should prove useful in dispelling the extraordinary opinions held upon these subjects.

From the French of Fr. Urban Coppens, O.F.M., *THE PALACE OF CAIPHAS* (London: *Burns and Oates*) is translated by Fr. Andrew Egan, of the same order. It is an able defence of the Franciscan contention as to the genuineness of the traditional locality. It is regrettable that the *Guide to Palestine*, published by the Assumptionists, should have necessitated such an addition to the bibliography of Palestine; and yet more to be deplored that "the spirit of jealousy, the incessant rivalries, the deepest animosities," of which the author complains, should have found an echo even in his own volume.

THE LAND OF THE ROSARY (London: *Burns and Oates*) is devotional as well as entertaining. Evidently Sara H. Dunn writes with the appreciation of an eye-witness, and her fifteen sketches of the scenes of the Rosary mysteries will enable one to bring vividly before his mind the places where our Lord's Life was passed and where His Passion took place.

Is Latin to be the universal commercial language of the future? The *MANUEL DU LATIN COMMERCIAL* (Paris: *Lethiel-*

leux), by Dr. Ch. Colombo, obliges us to ask ourselves—why not? We can recommend this little work to the Professors of Latin in our Colleges, at any rate, if not to the students whom they have to teach.

In thirteen studies of THE MIDDLE AGES (New York: *Benziger Bros.*) Dr. Shahan gives to the public a trustworthy and eminently readable book. It effectively dispels the absurd myth that has labelled these years of growth and development, of piety and learning, enshrined in palace or monastery, the Dark Ages. It is a book to be studied, arresting, timely, and inspiring.

The Rev. P. A. Sheehan, D.D., in a volume of short stories, A SPOILED PRIEST (London: *Burns and Oates*), keeps up the interest of his earlier works. His plots are good, and there is a freshness of language and treatment that is sure to charm the reader.

A neat and tastily gotten up little guide to Rome comes to us from *Messrs. Lawrence and Bullen*. The CONCISE AND PRACTICAL GUIDE TO ROME (1s.) is from the pen of Lina Duff Gordon. It is simply and well arranged, and should prove quite as useful as a far larger and less portable guide-book.

Miss Francesca M. Steele is to be congratulated upon her rendering of THE MIRROR OF ST. EDMUND (London: *Burns and Oates*; 2s.). The eighty pages of this little book are full of excellent matter for meditation, and give a good idea of that solid piety which merited for the land of our forefathers its proud title of Our Lady's Dowry. There is a preface by Fr. Vincent McNabb.

THE YOUNG CHILD'S MASS-BOOK (London: *Burns and Oates*; 1s.) is a compilation of prayers and hymns suitable for children attending Mass. It has been well arranged by the Hon. Mrs. Kavanagh, but we regret the insertion of the pictures, which are neither liturgically nor artistically a success.

In GEMS OF CATHOLIC THOUGHT (London: *Burns and Oates*; 1s.), compiled by Anna T. Sadlier, we have 953 excellently-chosen sayings of eminent Catholic authors. It is a handy little volume to read occasionally, and we wish it all success. In the words quoted on the title-page, these sayings, "like hoarded household words, no more depart."

Messrs. Benziger Brothers, of New York, have issued the second series of their JUVENILE ROUND TABLE. The tales are written by some of the best-known Catholic writers in the

United States, and form an interesting collection, sure to be received with delight by the younger generation of readers.

Another good book written for the little ones is *Mother M. Salome's SOME LITTLE LONDON CHILDREN* (London: *Burns and Oates*; 2s. 6d.). The author evidently understands the children for whom she writes, and we are much mistaken if they are not captivated by this pretty and instructive tale.

A powerfully-written novel, with an enthusiastic young Socialist for its hero, is *GEORGE EASTMONT: WANDERER* (London: *Burns and Oates*), by John Law. The characters are finely and delicately portrayed, and the throbbing actuality of life breathes through its pages. The dock strike of 1889 is the central pivot around which this strong sketch of the labour movement revolves.

In *THE RED INN OF ST. LYPHAR* (New York: *Benziger Bros.*) Miss Anna T. Sadlier presents us a spirited and thrilling tale of the French Revolution. Though it is not founded upon actual historical characters, the book has all the charm of a historical novel, so carefully are the *dramatis personæ* drawn.

The same firm has published *THAT MAN'S DAUGHTER*, by Henry M. Ross. It is a tale woven of plots and love-making, and keeps its interest up to the end.

THE LOST JEWEL OF THE MORTIMERS (Freiburg: *Herder*) is one of Miss Sadlier's tales for children. It is of a quest for a ruby, handed on from father to son, and crowned with success in the chapter last but one—a hackneyed theme, but a well-told tale.

THE LUCK OF LINDEN CHASE (London: *Catholic Truth Society*), by S. M. Lyne, begins with a prophecy and ends with its fulfilment. It is a brightly-written tale, and though religious in tone, its piety is not too obtrusive or forced.

Books Received.

The Works of Charles and Mary Lamb. Nine Volumes.
Edited by E. V. Lucas. London : Methuen and Co. 1903.
9 by 6. 7s. 6d. per vol.

Apollon ou Dionysos : Etude critique sur Frédéric Nietzsche
et l'Utilitarisme Impérialiste. Par Ernest Seillière. Paris :
Plon-Nourrit. 1905. Pp. xxvii.-364 (9½ by 6¼).

**Summa Theologica ad modum Commentarii in Aquinatis
Summam præsentis ævi studiis aptatam.** Tomus VI.:
"De Deo Creatore et De Angelis." Auctore Laurentio
Janssens, S.T.D. Friburgi : Herder. MCMV. Pp. xxxiv.-
1048 (9¾ by 6½). 12s.

Bartholomew Sastrow. Being the Memoirs of a German
Burgomaster. Translated by Albert D. Vandam. London :
Constable and Co. 1905. Pp. xxv.-349 (8 by 5). 3s. 6d.
net.

Cities of India. By G. W. Forrest, C.I.E. London : Con-
stable and Co. 1905. Pp. xvi.-354 (8¾ by 5¾). 5s. net.

Requiescant. A Little Book of Anniversaries. By Mary E.
S. Leathley. London : Burns and Oates. 6¾ by 4½.

England's Ruin. Second Edition. By A. M. S. Methuen.
London : Methuen and Co. Pp. 127 (7¼ by 5).

A Second Thebaid. Being a Popular Account of the Ancient
Monasteries of Ireland. By Rev. James P. Rushe, O.D.C.
London : Burns and Oates. 1905. Pp. xii.-291 (9 by 5½).
7s. 6d. net.

Outlines of the Life of Christ. By W. Sanday, D.D., LL.D.,
Litt.D. Edinburgh : T. and T. Clark. 1905. Pp. vii.-
241 (8¼ by 6).

Travels Round our Village. By Eleanor G. Hayden. Lon-
don : Constable and Co. 1905. Pp. 321 (8½ by 5½). 3s. 6d.
net.

- The Red Inn of Saint Lyphar.** By Anna T. Sadlier. New York : Benziger Bros. Pp. 179 (8 by $5\frac{1}{2}$). 6s.
- Dante's Ten Heavens : a Study of the Paradiso.** By Edmund G. Gardner, M.A. London : Constable and Co. 1904. Pp. xv.-351 (9 by $5\frac{3}{4}$). 5s. net.
- The Fight with France for North America.** By A. G. Bradley. London : Constable and Co. 1905. Pp. xi.-400 ($8\frac{1}{2}$ by 6). 3s. 6d. net.
- Bonaparte et Moreau.** Par Ernest Picard. Paris : Plon-Nourrit. 1905. Pp. xv.-443 (9 by $5\frac{1}{2}$). 7.50 fr.
- Plain Chant and Solesmes.** By Dom Paul Cagin, O.S.B., and Dom André Mocquereau, O.S.B. London : Burns and Oates. Pp. vii.-70 ($8\frac{1}{4}$ by $5\frac{1}{2}$). 1s. net.
- The Angel of Syon : the Life and Martyrdom of Blessed Richard Reynolds.** By Dom Adam Hamilton, O.S.B. London : Sands and Co. 1905. Pp. xii.-116 ($7\frac{1}{2}$ by $5\frac{1}{4}$). 3s. 6d. net.
- History of the Orthodox Church in Austria-Hungary.** I.—Hermannstadt. By Margaret G. Dampier. London : Rivingtons. 1905. Pp. 76 ($7\frac{3}{4}$ by 5). 1s. 6d.
- Brother and Sister.** By Jean Charruav, S.J. Freiburg : Herder. Pp. 381 (8 by $5\frac{1}{2}$). 5s.
- Hereafter ; or, The Future Life According to Science and Faith.** By Rev. J. Laxenaire, D.D. Freiburg : Herder. Pp. 104 ($5\frac{1}{4}$ by $4\frac{1}{2}$). 1s. 6d.
- Within and Without the Church.** By Rev. J. Laxenaire, D.D. Freiburg : Herder. 1904. Pp. iv.-76 ($5\frac{1}{4}$ by $4\frac{1}{2}$). 1s. 6d.
- The Ray.** A Story of the Time of Christ. By R. Monlaur. Freiburg : Herder. 1904. Pp. 203 ($5\frac{1}{4}$ by $4\frac{1}{2}$). 2s.
- The Mysteries of the Holy Rosary.** Second Edition. Freiburg : Herder. 1905. Pp. 72 (5 by 3). 6d.
- Biblische Studien.** X. Band, 1.-3 Hft. Der Jakobusbrief. Von Dr. Max Meinertz. Freiburg : Herder. 1905. Pp. xvi.-323 (9 by 6). 7 Mark.
- The Apparitions and Shrines of Heaven's Bright Queen.** In Legend, Poetry, and History. Compiled by William J. Walsh. With an Introduction by Monsignor Bernard O'Reilly, D.D. New York : Carey and Co.; London : Burns and Oates. Four Vols., pp. xviii.-367 ; x.-377 ; ix.-337 ; ix.-318. 28s. net.

- Biblische Zeitschrift.** Von Dr. Joh. Gottsberger und Dr. Jos. Sickenberger. Freiburg : Herder. 1905. Pp. 110 (9 by $5\frac{1}{2}$).
- The House of God,** and other Addresses and Studies. By the Very Rev. Thomas J. Shahan, D.D. New York : The Cathedral Library Association. MCMV. Pp. 428 (8 by $5\frac{1}{2}$). 1.50 dols. net.
- A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on Amos and Hosea.** By William Rainey Harper. Edinburgh : T. and T. Clark. 1905. Pp. xxx.-424 ($8\frac{1}{2}$ by 6). 12s.
- La France, l'Angleterre, et Naples de 1803 à 1806.** Two Vols. Par Ch. Auriol. Paris : Plon-Nourrit. 1904. Pp. vi.-683, 834. 20 fr.
- Some Little London Children.** By Mother M. Salome. London : Burns and Oates. Pp. 171 ($7\frac{1}{2}$ by 5).
- Reminiscences of an Oblate of St. Charles.** By Rev. Francis J. Kirk, O.S.C. London : Burns and Oates. 1905. Pp. 111 ($6\frac{3}{4}$ by $4\frac{1}{4}$).
- Juvenile Round Table.** Second Series. Stories by the foremost Catholic Writers. New York : Benziger Bros. 1905. Pp. 174 (8 by $5\frac{1}{2}$). 4s.
- "That Man's Daughter."** By Henry M. Ross. New York : Benziger Bros. 1905. Pp. 190 (8 by $5\frac{1}{2}$). 5s.
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